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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines what the response to the 1891-92 famine by the provincial 
authorities of Tambov province tells us about the role of the province and, more generally, 
about how the imperial Russian state functioned in the late nineteenth century. Contrary 
to the dominant historiography about Russian provinces, they were not chaotic and 
incapable of responding to a crisis. Under-resourced and with severe structural and 
strategic limitations, Tambov’s officials nevertheless performed to the best of their 
abilities, driven by a strong sense of moral and provincial responsibility. 
 
The tension between arbitrariness (proizvol) and legality (zakonnost’) that created a 
flawed and fragmented structure also provided for the flexibility that offered a partial 
solution. Tambov province repurposed the ad hoc structures, either created within the 
province or imposed by St. Petersburg, to meet its own needs as the crisis developed. 
Tambov province was not merely a passive actor in relation to the imperial ‘centre’, but 
instead innovated within certain boundaries while the relationship between provincial and 
uezd institutions often mirrored that of the centre and the provinces.  
 
Over five chapters this thesis explores the relationships between centre and province and 
province and uezds, via the two concepts of dialogue and ‘provincial identity’. A 
comparison between institutional decision making and the reality of the crisis on the 
ground shows that Tambov province was a far from passive place in which uezd and 
provincial officials used the relief effort to develop and articulate a strong sense of 
provincial identity. 
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Dates, Transliteration and Style 
 
All dates are given in the Old Style (Julian) calendar. Transliteration is based on a 
modified version of the Library of Congress style guide though anglicised versions of 
well-known names (such as Tsar Alexander III) are retained. For simplicity, certain terms 
such as funt, ispravnik, pud, uezd, volost’ and zemstvo are treated as English nouns 
throughout. 
 
A particular convention has been adopted in relation to the minutes published by the 
provincial and uezd zemstvos. There was no consistent naming style with separate 
meetings in the same year listed as different publications, despite being collected in one 
volume. Therefore, for ease of use, the style adopted throughout is to shorten the title to 
specify whether it is the provincial or an uezd zemstvo, then list the year and the page 
reference of the collected volume. For example: Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo 
zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, p. 23. Full reference details for each meeting and zemstvo 
are given in a special section in the bibliography. 
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Units of measurements 
A number of imperial Russian units of measurement for volume are used, and a 
conversion to metric is given here for convenience. Where conversions between 
measurements (i.e. funts to chetverts) are necessary, the ratio used is given in a relevant 
footnote. Conversion source: Francois Cardarelli, Encyclopaedia of scientific units, 
weights, and measures: their SI equivalences and origins (New York: Springer, 2003), 
pp. 121-4. 
 
Chetvert 
Imperial Russian measurements distinguished between dry and liquid volume with the 
chetvert having both forms. The dry form is the one used here, and is equivalent to 209.91 
litres. The chetvert was the predominant measurement used by Tambov’s authorities for 
measuring sown area and seed grain purchases. 
 
Funt 
When issued to individuals, food aid was primarily measured in funts. There were forty 
funts in a pud, with a funt being equivalent to 409.51718 grams. 
 
Pud 
A pud was equal to forty funt, and is equivalent to 16.3807 kilograms. Puds were the main 
unit of scale used by the imperial and provincial authorities for food aid; thus food aid 
was allocated in funts but estimations of gross need and purchases were made in puds.
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Introduction 
In modern Tambov city, by the bank of the river Tsna, there is a statue of a stout, proud 
man holding a plough, simply entitled ‘the Tambov peasant’. In his healthy, broad 
shoulders and strong pose, he evokes an idealised image of the region’s agricultural past, 
one familiar to many late nineteenth century Russian idealists. This, the statue seems to 
say, is how Tambov’s people have always been: simple, virtuous and strong. ‘Mown 
down’ by hunger, being killed by the very food sent to save them (so they claimed), the 
peasants of Tambov province in 1891-2 would have found such an image grotesque. 
The famine sweeping Russia in those two years, affecting an area twice the size 
of modern France, hit the province hard; dire warnings of hunger and impending famine 
in Tambov province came from uezd and travelling imperial officials.1  Though previous 
years had not been kind, the crisis of 1891-2 was on an entirely different scale: a scorching 
summer and drought in 1891 followed 1890’s severe winter, leading to a 65 per cent 
decline in the rye crop in Tambov Province in 1891 and a 58 per cent decline in all crops.2 
From December 1891 to June 1892, the numbers receiving food aid nearly trebled to 
1,025,446; this in a province where the population was just 2.455 million people.3 Total 
mortality in the province was 22,395 above average; at least 8,780 people died of cholera 
and we can assume that the famine was responsible for most of the rest. 4 
                                                 
1 James Y. Simms, ‘The crop failure of 1891: soil exhaustion, technological backwardness, and Russia’s 
“Agrarian Crisis ”’, Slavic Review, Vol. 41, No. 2 (1982), p. 237; Richard Robbins, Famine in Russia, 
1891-1892  the Imperial Government Responds to a Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), 
p. 1; Tambovskoe uezdnoe zemskoe sobranie, Zhurnaly Tambovsogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia s 
prilozheniiami; Ocherednogo sessii 1891 g. (Tambov, 1892), pp. 13-14.  
2 Robbins, Famine in Russia, 1891-1892, p. 2; A.S. Ermolov, Neurozhai i narodnoe bedstvie (St. 
Petersburg: Tipografiia V. Kirshbaum, 1892), p.20. The latter was published anonymously by the Ministry 
of Finance but it was later revealed to have been written by Ermolov, who would later become Minister of 
Agriculture. 
3  Tsentral’nyi statisticheskii komitet Ministerstva Vnutrennykh Del, Statisticheskie dannye po vydache 
ssude na obsemeneniei i prodovol’stvie naseleniiu, postradavshemu ot neurozhai v 1891-1892 gg. (ed. P. 
Bechasnov) (St. Petersburg, 1894), pp. 58-9, pp. 78-9 (hereafter Statisticheskie dannye).  
4 Robbins, Famine in Russia, p. 189; Tambovskoe gubernskoe zemskie sobranie, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo 
gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia: S prilozheniiami ocherednogo v dekabre 1892 g. (Tambov, 1893), p. 
214.  
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These figures, shocking though they may be, are dry and quantitative and do not 
tell us much of the human element of the story. They do not reveal the desperate struggle 
to stay alive, the pleading and sometimes trickery that was necessary to get the small 
amount of government aid, and the fear and terror as peasants saw their own crops fail 
and prices of others rise. It does not tell us of the gnawing, never-ending hunger as the 
peasantry had to make do with goosefoot or grain so admixed with grit that it was only 
‘fit for the bin’.5 No mention is made of the peasant reduced to selling her last horse and 
burdened with an ‘insane’ son, another denied aid because he was unpopular with the 
volost’ elite and a village so desperate they sent a messenger to the Tsar himself, looking 
for aid. 
Nor do statistics reveal much about the other side of the story; the officials who 
were tasked with limiting and resolving the crisis. The land captain, only a month or two 
in his new post and overwhelmed with petitions for aid he had to check and recheck; the 
uezd and provincial zemstvo officials, legally responsible for purchasing and distributing 
relief yet always short of money and forbidden from liaising formally with the peasantry; 
and the governor, the Tsar’s viceroy, no longer welcomed by salt and bread but the 
spectres of hunger, disease and death. They also do not tell us of the darker side of the 
official coin; attempts to manipulate the aid rolls, dereliction of duty that could cost lives, 
narrow thinking and incompetence. 
                                                 
5 Usman uezd zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii 17 December 1891, Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Tambovskoi 
Oblasti (GATO), f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 208-13. 
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Aims and Goals 
Russian history is increasingly becoming a ‘history of regions’, with the margins 
becoming, as it were, the new ‘centre’ of historiography; thus this thesis seeks to re-orient 
the story of the famine crisis away from the imperial response, covered thoroughly in 
Richard Robbins’ fundamental study Famine in Russia, 1891- 1892, to that of the affected 
provinces themselves.1 The imperial government may have funded the relief effort but it 
was the uezd and provincial administration who lived on the sharp edge of the crisis. By 
combining a detailed look at the human side of the crisis with an analysis of the 
institutional response, this thesis makes an original contribution to historiography by 
empowering the provincial voice and experience and by examining institutional 
networks, politics and relationships outside of the dominant, capital focused narrative. 
 If, as this thesis argues, the province’s officials were empowered and were more 
developed historical actors than previously thought, could they cope with the crisis? 
There were terrible mistakes, such as leaving grain to rot for the want of bags or double-
allocating aid grain.  A number of officials acted capriciously or siphoned off funds or 
grain. Even Governor Rokasovskii was accused of being less interested in helping the 
peasantry than in pancakes and champagne, while his deputy went hunting.2 Yet there 
were exemplary officials too: a land captain donated food to the needy and hired doctors 
at his own expense while Governor Rokasovskii restored morale to a cholera-ravaged 
Kozlov town and received a laudatory poem for his general efforts in the crisis.3 E.A. 
Brayley Hodgetts, an English correspondent for Reuters who travelled through several 
                                                 
1 Susan Smith-Peter, ‘How to write a region: local and regional historiography’, Kritika: Explorations in 
Russian and Eurasian History, New Series, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Summer, 2004), p. 527. 
2 A.A. Polovtsev, Dnevnik gosudarstvennogo sekretariia (ed. P.A. Zaionchkovskii) (Moscow, 1966), II, p. 
468. 
3 The land captain’s name was Aleksandr Ivanovich Novikov, and we will come across him more in Chapter 
1. Zhurnaly Kozlovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 39-43, pp. 139-40, Factual 
testimony concerning the two half-years and the commands in a starving society 19 June 1893, GATO, f. 
4, op. 1, d. 4429, ll. 60-5. 
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famine-hit provinces, said this of Tambov province’s response: ‘The failure of the crops 
has […] been severely felt […] that the distress has not been more acute is mainly 
attributable to the prompt and energetic action of the Zemstvo […]’.4 
The overall contention of this thesis, then, is that the province’s response 
represents one of the more positive possible outcomes, comparatively and absolutely, 
given the circumstances of the crisis. Overwhelmed and under-resourced, the institutions 
did not collapse or fall into chaos but muddled along, adapting and changing where 
necessary through ad hoc solutions. Indeed, their response tells us much about provincial 
government in late imperial Russia and its surprising vitality. Aware of their limitations 
and structural defects, they took steps to correct them and the interaction between the 
provincial centre and the uezds often reflected how St. Petersburg interacted with the 
provinces. Another key aim of this thesis is to show how the crisis helped to develop a 
sense of ‘provincial identity’, broadly defined as a moral responsibility to Tambov’s 
population and a sense of initiative in the face of crisis (covered more in ‘The role and 
place of the province in imperial Russia’ in this Introduction). 
 
Structure 
The thesis is divided into two halves, the first studying the period between June and 
December 1891 the latter examining January to July 1892. The crisis differed radically in 
these two times: the first was characterised by an escalating crisis and ad hoc institutions 
while the second was dominated by a full-blown crisis and deeper institutional integration 
(at least on paper). The first chapter of each section (Chapters 2 and 4) examines the 
broader institutional trends while the second (Chapters 3 and 5) looks at the relief effort 
                                                 
4 E.A. Brayley Hodgetts, In the Track of the Russian Famine: The Personal Narrative of a Journey Through 
the Famine Districts of Russia (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1892), p. 107. 
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on the ground. This allows us to see a dynamic and evolving picture of the relief effort, 
official and charitable, over time. Preceding them is Chapter 1, which looks at how 
provincial Russia was governed in the late nineteenth century. This takes in key themes 
such as the development of legality, bureaucracy and the structure of provincial 
government. The second half of Chapter 1 takes these idealised, centrally created themes 
and structures and, using profiles of provincial officials such as Baron Vladimir 
Platonovich Rokasovskii, Tambov’s governor, and the colourful Aleksandr Novikov, a 
local land captain, holds them up to the reality of how Tambov province worked. The 
remainder of this Introduction looks at the sources used, key theories around famine, the 
role and place of the province in Russia and a brief sketch of Tambov province. 
 
Sources 
As this thesis is primarily concerned with the relationships between various institutions 
and officials, its main sources are official documents, reports, minutes and petitions. At 
the central and provincial level, imperial Russian government produced voluminous 
documentation, though official documents are not without limitations.  In discussing the 
strengths and limitations of our rich source base, we shall consider in particular the 
conceptual and methodological challenge posed by the lack of available material charting 
the lived peasant experience. 
 Our sources can be broken down into three main groups: MVD files from the 
Russian State Historical Archive (RGIA), records of the Tambov governor’s chancellery 
(including police reports) from the State Archive of the Tambov Oblast’ (GATO), and 
reports and minutes of the provincial and uezd zemstvo assemblies and upravy in Tambov 
province. The RGIA files chart interactions between the centre and the province 
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concerning the scale of the crisis, updates and complaints, requests for funding and 
correspondence between the Special Committee for Famine Relief and the province’s 
charitable institutions. The files from GATO are the richest source base for two main 
reasons: they reveal the relationships and tensions between the various officials within 
the province, and the vast majority of them are previously unseen. Nearly as rich is the 
collection of published provincial and uezd zemstvo minutes and reports; they show the 
discussions, decisions and executive processes that went on within the bodies with 
primary responsibility for food security. Alongside these are reports from the MVD’s 
Central Statistical Committee and other sources such as A. I. Novikov’s memoir of his 
time as a land captain, providing a picture of the relief effort at every level of officialdom.  
It is not an unbroken chain however, with a number of small yet significant gaps. 
Of the uezd zemstvo minutes, we lack records for four uezds: Shatsk and Elatomsk in the 
north, centrally located Morshansk and Lebedian in the south. A link between the absence 
of records and difficulties in the relief effort is difficult to prove: while Morshansk 
suffered structural failings and Elatomsk had localised problems, Shatsk had one of the 
most initially pro-active responses while Lebedian’s experience seems to have reflected 
that of other uezds. It is therefore difficult to detect a pattern beyond, perhaps, poor record 
keeping. Another important gap in the archival material is that of the land captain records 
in GATO; only Morshansk and Tambov have uezd congress records for 1891-2 while, 
for individual precincts, only the third precinct in Kozlov uezd and the first, second and 
fourth precincts in Morshansk uezd cover the same period. It is perhaps unsurprising that 
even these records reveal little about the famine in the villages: the land captains’ main 
function was often judicial and as the famine struck almost immediately after they took 
office, expecting thorough record-keeping is perhaps unrealistic. These gaps hint at what 
this thesis will suggest throughout: that in the overwhelming chaos of the famine, officials 
often prioritised doing something over formal lines of reporting. Nevertheless, even with 
18 
 
these archival lacunae, we are able to track in some detail the relief effort, and its tensions 
and relationships, from the volost’ to St. Petersburg and back.  
Where the detail is lacking however, is in what the peasantry, the people most 
affected by the famine crisis, thought and felt. What we get from the archival sources and 
the zemstvo minutes are the detailed workings of the minutiae of the relief effort and the 
concerns of the officials themselves. While, as we will see in Chapter 2 specifically and 
throughout the thesis more generally, the officials felt a keen sense of moral responsibility 
to the peasantry, they appeared as a distant character or, in certain cases, as the problem 
such as when they tried to sell aid allocations (explored in Chapter 5) or proved reluctant 
to use fertiliser. While deeply sympathetic to the peasantry, Aleksandr Novikov, the land 
captain in Kozlov uezd and a principal character in this thesis, still referred to the 
peasantry in an ‘othering’ tone; to most officials they were an amorphous social group, 
rather than individuals (official views of the peasantry are examined in ‘Trying to feed 
the population: the provincial food conference’ in Chapter 2). Where the peasantry do 
emerge as individuals, it is at a certain distance and through an official lens; their biggest 
presence is through the aid petitions submitted to the provincial food conference, covered 
in depth in ‘Peasant appeals: type, investigation and decisions’ in Chapter 4. Again, 
however, what we see are official summaries of peasant complaints: the details we get 
are what the investigating officials considered salient. Direct encounters with the 
peasantry are rarely mentioned and, from the available archival material, seem to have 
been limited mostly to assist investigations into the behaviour of officials: see here ‘Case 
study: Management of relief in Spassk and Morshansk uezds’ in Chapter 3 and ‘Public 
order and security’ and ‘Local relief problems and provincial intervention’ in Chapter 5. 
The province’s institutions did not ignore the peasantry but they looked at them in a 
quantitative, impersonal fashion. Over the 1880s and 1890s, the provincial zemstvo’s 
statistical bureau, under the leadership of Nikolai Romanov, produced a detailed volume 
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on each uezd and gave detailed geographical and demographic information. A rich 
resource for the historian in most cases, the information is summative and statistical, 
compiled from dozens of household surveys and lacking a human element.  
This human element is also missing from the secondary material on conditions in 
the nineteenth century in Tambov province. There is no doubt that a shortage of available 
and suitable primary sources determined, to a certain extent, the type of historiography 
that has emerged. As Nina Tsintsadze has noted, the high rate of illiteracy means that 
there are very few available sources written from the point of view of the peasantry, 
making understanding their point of view a ‘complex problem’.5 There appear to be no 
memoirs left behind by any of the major figures in the relief effort, other than those 
produced by A. I. Novikov. In recent years, a scholarly form of kraevdenie has emerged, 
though this, too, has its limitations: on the one hand, broader structural questions are 
considered in a deeply technical fashion, often obscuring the rich local detail available 
while on the other, a narrow local focus obscures wider analytical interpretation. The 
results of this work are nevertheless useful and certain aspects of it have informed this 
thesis, especially Irina Dvukzhilova’s research on provincial zemstvo officials.  
Dvukzhilova and Tsintsadze have both attempted to tackle the issue of 
personalities and individuals in Tambov’s history, with slightly differing results. 
Tsintsadze grapples with the problem of sparse peasant evidence by looking at records of 
peasant/landlord disputes but provides more of a chronicle of these cases, broken down 
by type, and refers to peasant perceptions as ‘emotional’.6 In the same monograph, which 
examines demographic and economic problems of development, and in a later article, she 
places the majority of the emphasis on the evidence of ‘contemporaries’ such as zemstvo 
                                                 
5 Nina Tsintsadze, Demograficheskie i ekologicheskie problem razvitiia agrarnogo obshchestva Rossi vo 
vtoroi polovine xix – nachale xx veka v vospriiatii sovremennikov (Tambov: TGU Press, 2012), p. 247. 
6 Ibid., pp. 41-54, p. 247. 
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officials (including Romanov’s statistical surveys referred to above) or the governor’s 
annual reports. She creates an authoritative picture of an officialdom deeply engaged in 
questions of development but does not place it within a broader framework.7 
Dvukhzhilova profiles the social composition of the provincial and uezd zemstvos; in 
addition to biographies of key personnel, used in Chapter 1, her work is primarily a 
statistical breakdown of election and demographic patterns.8 The profiles she provides 
are useful for illustrating the existence of a distinct administrative culture in the province, 
especially when connected with the activities of the officials as revealed from the archival 
material. However, it is only by making these connections that we get a sense of the 
personalities of these local actors that her work does not provide, which is somewhat 
ironic given her call for a greater focus on personalities.9 
Much of the rest of the historiography relevant to this thesis focuses on broader 
structural issues and is led by V. V. Kanishchev, in collaboration with other historians, 
including Tsintsadze. This historiography draws heavily on the idea that Tambov 
province was in a state of permanent ‘agrarian crisis’ after 1861; this thesis takes the more 
nuanced view that it was not a permanent crisis, but that there was deep vulnerability. 
Kanishchev and Tsintsadze draw on what they call the ‘demo-ecological’ mode of history 
developed by S. A. Nefedov, terming the post-1861 period in Tambov province as one of 
‘stagflation’; by this they mean an unsustainable ecological balance where a natural 
disaster or crisis could occur easily due to a chance event or combination of random 
                                                 
7 Ibid., ‘Demograficheskie i ekologicheskie problem razvitiia agrarnogo obshchestva poreformennogo 
perioda v vospriiatii mestnykh vlastei (po materialam otchetov Tambovskikh gubernatorov za 1860-1890-
e gody’, Ineternum, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2010), pp. 40-6. 
8 Irina Vladimirovna Dvukhzhilova, ‘Tambovskoe zemstvo v otechestvennoi istoriografii nachala xxi 
veka’, Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i iuridicheskie nauki, kul’turologiia i iskusstvovedenie, 
Voprosy teorii i praktiki, No. 7 (2012), ‘Predsedateli Tambovskoi gubernskoe upravy (1886 – 1892 gg.)’, 
Istoricheskie, filosofskie, politicheskie i iuridicheskie nauki, kul’turologiia i iskusstvovedenie. Voprosy 
teorii i praktiki, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2009), Sotsial’nyi sostav Tambovskogo zemstva (1865 – 1890 gg.) (Tambov: 
Iulis, 2003). 
9 Ibid. 
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factors.10 As we will see in the next section on famine theory, an in chapter 2 on ‘warnings 
signs and distress’, there is considerable merit to this as it highlights the nature of 
vulnerability. However, it places too much emphasis on purely environmental or 
demographic causes, neglecting structural, economic or even political ones, or the deeply 
influential ‘entitlement theory’ argued by Amartya Sen.  Kanishchev, whose coverage is 
not limited to the nineteenth century, adopts a modelling approach to history, using a 
‘demo-fractal’ model to examine demographic trends in the province, modelling 
population change and using spatial modelling to look at long-run ecological processes, 
amongst others.11 A series of articles by several historians from Tambov, published in 
English, best typify this over-arching, top-down methodological approach. A cooperative 
project with Dutch historians, it aims to provide a thorough picture of the social and 
demographic picture of the province through quantitative, social-science methods. Thus, 
we have a grid based examination of the demography and ecology of the province, which 
again attests to the existence of an ‘agrarian crisis’ with little context, and a ‘cohort 
analysis’ of family and social structures.12 The latter makes a significant contribution to 
quantitative and social history, but it does not directly connect to the themes covered here. 
                                                 
10 Nina Tsintsadze, V. V. Kanishchev,’Ekologicheskii aspect krest’ianskoi reform 1861 g. (po materialam 
Tambovskoi gubernii)’, Istoria i Sovremennost’, No. 2 (2005), pp. 64-79. 
11 V. V. Kanishchev, E. V. Baranova, N. A. Zhirov, ‘Lesnye resursyi v istorii agrarnogo obshchestva Rossii 
(lokal’nyi i mikroistoricheskii urovni)’, Istoria i Sovremennost’, No. 2 (2014), V. L. Diatchkov, V. V. 
Kanishchev, ‘Prognoz rosta naseleniia Rossii na xx v. i sostoiavshaiasia ral’nost’. Vzgliad 'Snizu' iz 
Tambovskoi kres’ianskoi sredi’, Ineternum, No. 1 (2011), V. V. Kanishchev, R. B. Konchakov, S. K. 
Kostovska, ‘Prostranstvennoe modelirovanie ekologicheskikh protsessov v istorii’, Fractal Simulation, No. 
1 (2011), V. V. Kanishchev, S. O. Kovaleva, I. V. Kovalev, ‘Istoricheskoe pochvovedenie Tambovskoi 
oblasti: pervye rezultaty issledovanii’, Vestnik Tambovskogo Universiteta. Seria: Estestvennye I 
tekhnicheskie nauki, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2012).  
12 Vladimir Diatchkov, V. V. Kanitschev, ‘Tambov regional development in the context of integral history, 
1800-1917: Contradictions in the modernization of Russian society on a basis of micro-history’, Historia 
Agriculturae: Where the twain meet again. New results of the Dutch Russian project on regional 
development 1780-1917, No. 34 (2009), Marina Akolzina, Vladimir Diatchkov, Valery Kanitschev, Roman 
Kontchakov, Iuri Mizis, Ella Morozova, ‘A comparison of cohort analysis and other methods of 
demographic microanalysis used in studying the Tambov region, 1800-1917’, Historia Agriculturae: Where 
the twain meet again. New results of the Dutch Russian project on regional development 1780-1917, No. 
34 (2009). 
22 
 
 Since all of this makes it hard to construct a thorough picture of what the peasantry 
were feeling, this thesis errs on the side of caution and avoids broad conclusions about 
the peasant psychological experience. Nevertheless, while the ‘voice’ of the peasantry is 
rarely given directly, through its indirect appearance we will be able to build at least a 
picture of the distress they experienced and the coping strategies they used and, where 
possible, place it within the context of broader famine economics and responses. Overall, 
the sources available are rich if limited and, as the secondary material shows, have not 
been fully exploited in a way that shows a dynamic picture not just of institutions, but of 
individuals, coping with crisis. 
 
Definition and theories of famine 
Count Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov, Minister of the Imperial Household, wrote 
to St. Petersburg to describe the impending famine in Tambov province in July 1891: 
‘Here we are getting ready to go hungry. The peasants’ winter crops have failed 
completely…The situation is one of the utmost seriousness and demands immediate 
aid’.13 Vorontsov-Dashkov’s plaintive statement evokes the classic image of famine; 
devastated and desperate communities on the brink of failure and, if aid is not forthcoming 
at a sufficient pace, death. Famine is also a qualitative statement on how we perceive 
countries; Michael Watts argues that the images of famine in Africa have helped link the 
continent to images of decay, anarchy, war and over-population.14 Recent scholarship has 
begun to reinterpret the periphery, seeing it as more dynamic than previously thought, 
leading us to question not just the association of famine with ‘backwardness’ but the 
nature, causes and suggested responses to it.  
                                                 
13 Robbins, Famine in Russia, p. 1. 
14 Michael Watts, 'Entitlements or Empowerment? Famine and Starvation in Africa', Review of African 
Political Economy, The Struggle for Resources in Africa, No. 51 (Jul., 1991), pp. 9-11. 
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One of the main problems is the definition of ‘famine’ itself. Stephen Devereux 
considers that dictionary definitions and definitions attached to famine as a problem of 
food shortage, mass starvation and community fail to deal sufficiently with issues of 
causality and scale and tend towards the descriptive. Devereux prefers definitions of 
famine given by famine victims as these seem to distinguish between the various effects 
of famine and see widespread death as the end of the process rather than the beginning.15 
This notion of famine as a process is emphasised by Michael Watts who argues that its 
stages can be seen as dearth, famishment and morbidity.16 Famine, then, goes from being 
a sudden crisis to a process that has a sudden, catastrophic event as its culmination. It is 
this sudden, catastrophic event that distinguishes famine from starvation. Amartya Sen 
defines starvation as ‘the characteristic of some people not having enough food to eat. It 
is not the characteristic of there being not enough food to eat’.17  In Sen’s view, starvation 
is the condition of people going without adequate food while famine is a virulent 
manifestation, causing widespread death.18 Devereux, however, questions the association 
of excess morbidity with famine, arguing that it ignores famine situations that may not 
necessarily be reflected in death totals.19 Nonetheless, it seems clear that we can 
understand famine as the catastrophic culmination of a process that may or may not result 
in excess mortality. 
However, the precise nature of this process remains heavily contested.  The food 
availability decline (FAD) theory of famine is the ‘classic’ theory of causation according 
to which famine is caused by a precipitous collapse in food supply.20 FAD  has been 
                                                 
15 Stephen Devereux, Theories of Famine (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 9-18. 
16 Watts, 'Entitlements or empowerment?', pp. 17-18.  
17 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1981), p. 1. Italics in original. 
18 Ibid., p. 40. 
19 Devereux, Theories of Famine, p. 19. 
20 Sen, Poverty and Famines, pp. 57-62. 
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criticised  in recent decades as it does not seem to do enough in terms of causality; 
drought, for example, can cause a collapse in local food supply but that does not 
necessarily result in famine.21 In looking at famine in 1980s Sudan, Christopher G. Locke 
and Fredoun Z. Ahmadi-Esfahani have argued that the famine may have been exacerbated 
by a drought, but to claim drought as the sole cause would be erroneous.22 The 
disconnection between causality and FAD has been highlighted by Devereux: ‘Drought 
may be an act of nature, but famine is decidedly an act of man’.23  
This disconnection between FAD and causality led to the emergence in the late 
1970s and 1980s of what has become a dominant way of interpreting famine: the 
entitlement theory. It emerged as part of an attempt to understand, in the words of John 
Drèze and Amartya Sen, why ‘while one part of humanity desperately searches for more 
food to eat, another part counts the calories and looks for new ways of slimming’.24 The 
entitlement approach focuses less on the availability of food than on a person’s inability 
to command sufficient food. Through a process that Sen terms ‘exchange entitlement 
mapping’, the total combination of a person’s resources allow (or ‘entitle’) access to a 
variety of ‘commodity bundles’ which include sufficient food. Famine occurs when these 
entitlements are insufficient to command commodity bundles with adequate food. A 
direct entitlement failure occurs where food production for own consumption has fallen, 
and a trade entitlement failure is where one obtains less food through trade by exchanging 
one’s own commodity. Endowment declines can occur due to asset related issues such as 
the alienation of land and sale of livestock at low prices or other factors such as 
unemployment, inflation and changing social security policy. The entitlement approach 
                                                 
21 An example of that would be adverse weather conditions in Western Europe; if drought inevitably 
resulted in famine then it is likely that famines, if only localised ones, would have occurred recently in 
countries such as Spain and the United Kingdom. 
22 Christopher G. Locke, Fredoun Z. Ahmadi-Esfahani, 'Famine analysis: a study of entitlements in Sudan, 
1984-1985', Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jan., 1993), p. 363. 
23 Devereux, Theories of Famine, p. 42. 
24 John Drèze, Amartya Sen, Hunger and Public Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 4. 
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seeks to understand the process behind famine, especially in countries where food supply 
decline is either localised or not an issue (some of the worst famines have taken place 
with no significant decline in food availability per head). Addressing the causal 
deficiencies of (what is now) FAD1, Sen argues that even when starvation is caused by 
food shortage in this way, the immediate reason for starvation will be the decline in 
exchange entitlement.25 Locke and Ahmadi-Esfahani agree that the entitlement approach 
is a better determinant for famine causality as opposed to food availability: ‘In summary, 
the food entitlement data can reveal the existence of a famine, no matter what its cause, 
whereas food supply data reveal a famine only some of the time’.26 Though the 
entitlement approach can help uncover biases and causality, Justin Yifu Lin and Dennis 
Tao Yang highlight that it has faced criticism on localised famine; on the local level, crop 
failures caused by natural calamities lead to supply shortages, speculation, increased 
demand due to uncertainty and sales of possessions. Essentially, food availability decline 
lowers purchasing power.27 Locke and Ahmadi-Esfahani acknowledge other limitations 
such as defining entitlement sets, the impact of illegal activities and the assumption that 
people will consume all the food they can.28 Lynne Kiesling, eschewing the entitlement 
approach, focuses on the way distress spreads during a famine and the ways in which a 
community determines and allocates relief based on factors beyond economic 
calculations, using the example of the Lancashire cotton famine and issues such as moral 
hazard, the responses of pre-existing income institutions and the institutional changes that 
occurred.29 The entitlement approach was ground breaking in its explanation and 
integration of causality but it has tended towards generalisations in certain areas and 
                                                 
25 Sen, Poverty and Famines, pp. 45-51, p. 7, p. 4. 
26 Locke, Ahmadi-Esfahani, 'Famine analysis’, p. 373. 
27 Justin Yifu Lin, Dennis Tao Yang, 'Food availability, entitlements and the Chinese famine of 1959-61', 
The Economic Journal, Vol. 110, No. 460 (Jan., 2000), p. 136. 
28 Locke, Ahmadi-Esfahani, 'Famine Analysis’, pp. 364-5. 
29 Lynne Kiesling, ‘Collective action and assisting the poor: the political economy of income assistance 
during the Lancashire cotton famine’, The Journal of Economic History, No. 2 (Jun., 1995), pp. 380-3. 
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seems to neglect the multi-faceted coping strategies which individuals, families, and 
communities may pursue. 
This has led to the emergence of multi-causal approaches to famine which reject 
the ‘dogmatism’ of accepting either the FAD or entitlement approaches as sole explainers. 
The criticism of entitlement theory has led to a re-evaluation of the importance of food 
supply to the issue of causality when looking at historical famine. Devereux maintains 
that famine is a man-made issue but also cautions against the total exclusion of climate, 
seeing seasonality as important as it increases the power of the wealthy and overall 
vulnerability to famine.30 There have been attempts to integrate causality into FAD as 
opposed to discarding it altogether. Cormac Ó Gráda has shown that food supply was a 
causal issue in most, if not all, of the key famines in the twentieth century while he and 
Jean-Michel Chivet argue one of the main reasons for the famines in France of 1693-94 
and 1709-10 was a catastrophically poor harvest.31  
Ó Gráda and Chivet do not solely attribute causality to a decline in the food 
supply, however. The scale of the infamous ‘terror famine’ in the USSR in 1931-33, and 
the famines in France were exacerbated by the reaction of the authorities and the stresses 
of war.32 The connection between a decline in food supply and the actions of government 
emerges in an examination of the 1947 famine in the USSR: ‘The famine was a FAD2 
(preventable food availability decline) famine, which occurred because a drought caused 
a bad harvest and hence reduced food availability, but, had the priorities of the 
government been different, there might have been no famine (or a much smaller one) 
despite the drought’.33 FAD2 continues to assign primary causality for famine to events 
                                                 
30 Devereux, Theories of Famine, pp. 35-44. 
31 Cormac Ó Gráda, ‘Making Famine History’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Mar., 2007), 
pp. 26-32; Cormac Ó Gráda, Jean-Michel Chevet, ‘Famine and market in ancien régime France’, JEH, Vol. 
62, No. 3 (Sep., 2002), p. 727. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Michael Ellman, ‘The 1947 Soviet Famine and the Entitlement Approach to Famines’, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, No. 24 (2000), p. 603. 
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that result in the collapse of the food supply but differs from FAD1 theory by arguing that 
other factors may intensify the effect of this decline. Anders Karlsson attributes the 
primary cause of a famine in late eighteenth-century Korea to crop failures but argues that 
a combination of Confucian ideology (leading to unsustainable tax exemptions) and 
socio-political interests that privileged certain provinces exacerbated the famine in 
affected provinces.34 The interpretation that the scale of a famine can be deepened by the 
privileging of certain areas or groups by the state has become an increasingly important 
part of recent scholarship. Lin and Yang, examining the Great Leap Forward famine in 
China of 1959-61, show that after the revolution, the government’s agricultural and 
industrial policies were heavily biased towards industry; using the percentage of rural 
population in an affected province, they show that urban bias was a significant factor in 
the death rate.35 Richard Robbins argues that the export and trade led economic policies 
of the imperial Ministry of Finance resulted in a delayed response to the 1891-92 famine 
and an initial refusal to ban the export of rye.36 
It is not just central government policies that have been shown to have an impact. 
Perhaps in reflection of the turn towards the ‘region’ and spatial history, the role of local 
government with emphasis on the relationship with central government has been the 
subject of focus. Carol Shiue looks at the relationship between central and local granaries 
in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century China, showing that they were characterised by a 
pattern of action that seems to match the cycle of initiative and response identified by 
Catherine Evtuhov, a concept we will return to frequently throughout this thesis.37 Local 
authorities attempted to allocate resources over which they have discretion towards public 
                                                 
34 Anders Karlsson, ‘Famine, finance and political power: crop failure and land-tax exemption in late 
eighteenth-century Chosôn Korea’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 48, No. 
4 (2005), p. 567, p. 573, p. 552. 
35 Lin, Yang, 'Food availability’, pp. 138-140, p. 149, p. 154. 
36 Robbins, Famine in Russia, pp. 31-41. 
37 Catherine Evtuhov, Portrait of a Russian Province: Economy, Society and Civilisation in Nineteenth-
Century Nizhnii Novgorod (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011), p. 134. 
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goods that have higher priority in their own jurisdictions such as under stored grain and 
also deviated from central targets. She suggests that they acted independently, stretching 
the limits of authority delegated to them. Central authorities, meanwhile, perceived a 
successful response as conformity with its targets and regulations; their main solution for 
the various problems of deviation was better monitoring which she argues made the 
situation worse.38 Delano Dugarm shows that the local authorities in Tambov during the 
1918-21 crisis developed a food-supply system that deviated considerably from the plans 
developed in Moscow. What is different in this case, however, is that the interaction and 
tension occurred in the province between local institutions and central representatives; by 
focusing on the conflict between the two, Dugarm shows how local authorities pursued 
independent policies but that the centre was not above the systematic crushing of local 
interests that could threaten the stability of the centre.39  
The scholarship on the Russian famine of 1891-92 does not address the issues 
surrounding FAD or make use of the entitlement theory as an alternative. However, it 
should be acknowledged that much of the scholarship was written only as entitlement 
theory began to emerge. James Simms, without directly using the term, argues that the 
1891-92 famine was a FAD famine caused by drought and poor soil moisture.40 However, 
both nineteenth-century and modern scholarship has also put forward a narrative of the 
provinces as backward and inherently negative while many radicals and liberals, such as 
Plekhanov and Solov'ev, used it to argue that the famine demonstrated an agrarian crisis 
and the general backwardness and incapacity to respond of the Tsarist state.41 Richard 
                                                 
38 Carol H. Shiue, ‘Local granaries and central government disaster relief: moral hazard and 
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Robbins echoes this, arguing that the structure and capacity of the imperial administrative 
structure was a crucial factor; the lack of connection between the centre and the province 
and between the zemstvo and the volost’ made the response more difficult to coordinate 
and that at the local level it was often a function of the variable quality of leadership.42 
He also brings in the ‘backward’ agricultural practices of the peasantry (such as land 
exhaustion), a claim rejected by Simms who uses yield figures to show that the land was 
not becoming exhausted.43 Steven Hoch rejects overpopulation claims and argues that the 
emancipation may have led to an improved standard of living for the peasantry.44 
However, neither Simms nor Hoch addresses other causal factors such as state action or 
entitlement collapses. Indeed, it is only Robbins who comes close to foreshadowing the 
developments in famine causality by treating the role of the state and local government. 
 
The 1891-92 famine in Tambov province and historical comparison  
If famine, then, has multiple causes, and there are differing views in the scholarship on 
the correct way to respond to it, how do we define a ‘successful’ famine response? It is, 
unfortunately, an open-ended question with no easily available answer, as Richard 
Robbins has noted.45 Medical and technological advances, along with a changing 
understanding of famine as a process, have raised the bar for what we would consider a 
‘successful’ response. We need to be careful of retroactively imposing these standards 
while also excusing mistakes as ‘context’. This is, undoubtedly, a difficult balance to 
                                                 
42 Robbins, Famine in Russia, pp. 1-14, pp. 124-148. Kimitaka Matsuzato, however, argues that a volost’ 
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period to the present’ in Empire and Society: New Approaches to Russian History, eds. Teruyuki Hara and 
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43 Robbins, Famine in Russia pp. 1-14, Simms, ‘The crop failure of 1891’, pp. 236-50. 
44 Steven L. Hoch, ‘On good numbers and bad: Malthus, population trends and peasant standards of living 
in late imperial Russia’, SR, Vol. 53, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), pp. 41-75. 
45 Robbins, Famine in Russia, pp. 168-70. 
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strike but attempting it will allow us to locate the relief effort in a broader history of 
famine relief internationally and provincial government in imperial Russia. Ideally 
famines are prevented but this is obviously not possible in a historical context. We are 
thus required to find some way of evaluating the decisions the authorities did take. 
‘Success’ then, can be defined as the extent to which a province’s institutions navigated 
the specific challenges the crisis gave rise to and met the specific needs and goals that 
arose. In short, could Tambov province cope with the challenge of empty stores, the 
rasputitsa, rising need and successfully get aid to as many people as they could, while 
keeping mortality rates as low as possible? As Tambov province’s challenge clearly had 
large structural elements, this will be the main focus of this thesis with the contention that 
the province’s structures and personnel coped to a greater degree than may have been 
expected. 
While each incident of famine differed, over the course of the nineteenth century, 
a number of patterns in famine crises emerged. They were cumulatively more severe than 
in the twentieth century, were increasingly localised, occurred rarely in Europe in 
peacetime and there was a strong link between the level of industrialisation and the level 
of distress experienced.46 While famines in China and India from 1876-9 resulted in 9.5 
– 13 million and 7 million deaths respectively, cruel tolls were also exacted in the heart 
of European empires: 1 – 1.5 million deaths (as calculated by Joel Mokyr) in Ireland in 
the 1840s and 375,000 – 400,000 deaths in Russia (as calculated by Robbins) in 1891-
92.47 Ireland’s population was nearly eight million (up nearly 50 per cent since 1801) 
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while in 1891-2 the population for the twenty-three Russian provinces that received MVD 
food loans was just over (an estimated) 36,786,000.48 On these terms alone, the relief 
effort in Russia was considerably more successful, already illustrating that we need to 
revise our idea that the imperial state was incapable of managing a crisis. 
However we should be careful about the use of mortality as a measure of success; 
as Robbins makes clear it is the ‘least unreliable’ measure only.49 Part of the reason for 
this is that what kills people during a famine is complex and multi-faceted and is rarely 
starvation directly. As Tim Dyson makes clear, it was severe emaciation that meant a 
hungry person’s ‘hold on life was so slender that any illness could snap their frail 
support’.50 Famine weakens the body to the point that either digestive conditions (such as 
diarrhoea and dysentery) or epidemics like typhus (endemic to the Russian countryside) 
and cholera can spread with ease. Again illustrating the difference between the two 
famines, digestive conditions killed roughly half of the Irish famine victims while in 
Tambov province, over half were killed by the cholera epidemic, the result of what Joel 
Mokyr and Cormac Ó Gráda refer to as famine’s indirect impact on personal and social 
behaviour.51 With the lowest level of famine related deaths amongst neighbouring 
provinces, it seems Tambov’s authorities would ultimately be more successful at 
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providing higher quality food aid than either its neighbours or the British government in 
Ireland.52 
When we look at the raw figures for 1891-92, what is striking is Tambov 
province’s remarkable consistency. It issued the fourth highest amount in food loans 
(5.963 million puds), had the third highest population (2.455 million people) and had the 
third highest monthly average issuing rate in puds (553,900 puds); this compares with 
Voronezh which bought the most food, had a smaller population yet had a lower monthly 
issuing rate.53 This consistent performance marks it out from its neighbouring provinces 
and is arguably a remarkable achievement, especially given the absence of rail links in 
the northern half of the province. How the province achieved this consistency is perhaps 
one of the main puzzles this thesis will seek to tease out; it suggests a degree of capacity 
and potential that, if not high by modern standards, was certainly higher than traditional 
perceptions of provincial government has held. 
Tambov’s consistency relative to its neighbours and the significantly lower 
mortality rate in 1891-92 overall compared to the Irish famine leads us then to look at the 
base conditions, or starting point, immediately prior to each crisis. Both areas (Ireland 
and Tambov province) had rapid annual population growth in the decades pre-crisis 
which had slowed to 1 per cent or less in the immediate run up.54 Russian peasant living 
standards are still a matter of much debate but it seems that the general trend was for 
improving living standards (from a low base) with increased pressure pre-crisis due to 
bad harvests whereas the Irish population were poor by European standards with an 
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income half that of Britain and a national trend for increasing poverty.55 Irish and Russian 
agriculture was inefficient compared to other European states but as Ó Gráda notes, 
structural factors mean it should have been worse; in 1889 Tambov province was the 
second most productive of itself and its neighbours despite, as we will see in the profile 
of the province, widely derided agricultural practices.56  
The crop failure of 1891 devastated the agricultural economy of the central black 
earth region, lowering the harvest by an average of 40 per cent.57 Tambov province was 
badly hit, with a harvest decline of 55.3 per cent and a decline in rye yields per person 
from seventeen to five puds.58 This is made all the starker when we see that from 1883-
92 the province exceeded the MVD’s ‘minimum average’ for the harvest of thirteen puds 
by up to 100 per cent.59 Yet its neighbours were hit even harder: Voronezh’s harvest fell 
by 75 per cent, Samara and Saratov’s by 73.7 per cent while Voronezh’s rye yield per 
person fell from fifteen to 0.80 puds.60 Even in years of poor harvests, 20 - 30 per cent of 
Tambov’s population were unable to feed themselves; the famine would take this to over 
50 per cent (based on the percentage receiving aid), while in Voronezh it was nearly 90 
per cent.61 This may go some way to explain Tambov’s consistency in that it is easier to 
recover when the effects are less devastating.  
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Unfortunately however, Tambov province would not escape so easily. It may have 
been hit less hard by the actual crop failure but its ability to cope with a disaster of this 
scale was far below that of its neighbours. We will look at the failures of the 1889 Food 
Security Statute in Chapter 3 but here it is useful to give a basic indication of how little 
redundant capacity existed in the very system designed to prevent or ease this very 
catastrophe. By September 1891 the provincial grain stores in Tambov province were 
owed 930,306 chetverts and 2,836,000 roubles; of its neighbouring provinces only 
Voronezh could equal the grain deficit while none could match the financial deficit.62 In 
addition to this, the provincial food capital reserve, the financial backstop, was nearly 3.1 
million roubles in debt in Tambov province while in Voronezh it was 354,000 roubles.63 
Poorly served by a collapsing rail network, this tattered safety net was in no way capable 
of protecting the population, again underscoring the relative success of the relief effort. 
Ultimately, ‘relative success’ is the key concept when evaluating the relief effort 
mounted by Tambov’s authorities. Measured by mortality, the Russian response to the 
famine of 1891-2 was much more effective than that of the British government in Ireland 
and within Russia, Tambov province could claim a decent level of success. Yet the famine 
threw up different challenges depending on the province as we have seen: Voronezh 
suffered a catastrophic harvest collapse but had redundant capacity whereas Tambov had 
little ability to defend itself. Ultimately then, what this thesis will do in terms of ‘success’ 
or ‘failure’ is look less at the process of how Tambov province managed to hold back, to 
a surprising degree, the devastation the famine threatened to bring.  
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The role and place of the province in imperial Russia 
To understand the role of administration we need to understand how administrative 
boundaries came to be delineated, practised and understood. As Jeff Sahadeo notes, 
‘regional studies […] underline the tension between diversity and uniformity among the 
Tsar and his advisers, who sought to streamline administration as well as apply modern 
concepts of identity to peoples under their control’.64 Sahadeo also questions the tendency 
to avoid the comparative, wondering if historians of Russia fear it will rob imperial Russia 
of its apparent uniqueness within Europe.65 Susan Smith-Peter identifies the problem of 
ignoring the big picture, which can lead scholars to look only at their own province or 
region, ignoring theory, other provinces, and other disciplines.66 Alexander Morrison 
counterpoints this however, arguing that the specificities of the Russian empire can only 
really be analysed and explained by those who specialise in its history, or indeed the 
history of particular regions within it.67   
How then should we approach the history of the local or provincial? Susan Smith-
Peter advocates a mixture between the Western, theoretical approach and the more 
geographically narrow Russian local history (kraevedenie): ‘to oversimplify somewhat, 
in the West we are confronted with theory without the local, and in Russia we see the 
local without theory […] The local is a window onto Russia […]’.68 Studies of the region 
and province need to move away from just seeing it in relation to the centre while also 
seeing the province within the wider institutional and administrative context.69 Smith-
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Peter appears to be advocating an approach that focuses on the local without forgetting 
the importance of a theoretical and conceptual framework and the wider context. It is 
important that our approach to the region does not tend towards the generic but, equally, 
we should not become bogged down in minute detail to the exclusion of wider themes. 
Morrison’s argument that the complexities of a region can best be explained by a 
specialist helps shift the emphasis to a more specific and locally-centred history. Alexei 
Miller sounds out a warning that the regional approach to history is methodologically 
undefined and calls for a greater awareness of context: ‘The success of the ‘regional’ 
investigation depends greatly on how well the author is grounded in methodology and 
able to visualise the processes under investigation as part of a greater whole’.70 All of 
these insights can give us a sense of ways in which provincial institutions may be 
profitably studied. The machinery of provincial government, especially in a crisis, can be 
best explained by going beyond generalities; imperial Russia was made up of complex 
relationships. It is how areas used the standard machinery, not that the machinery was 
standard, which is the most important aspect. 
Most peripheral/centre-periphery scholarship focuses on the ‘region’ with a 
particular emphasis on borderlands while our case study differs by focusing on a province 
within European Russia. While the ‘region’ and the ‘province’ are different, they are both 
sub-national spaces; reviewing the recent historiography on the ‘region’ allows us to see 
not only how historians have treated the sub-national space while also justifying the use 
of administrative boundaries for a case-study but also pull out any useful themes, in 
particular the notion of ‘networks’. 
The ‘region’ as a fixed concept has been challenged; Aleksei Miller is inherently 
sceptical of the notion of ‘region’ or ‘regionalism’, seeing the region as rigid, artificial 
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and suffering from the same problems as nationalism while ‘regionalism’ is simply 
nationalism but on a smaller scale.71 Accepting that the notion of region is central to the 
many differing conceptions of globalisation, political mobilisation and identity building, 
Anssi Paasi nevertheless seems to question the ‘uniqueness’ of a region  
[…] the question of whether a place/region/territory should be understood as a 
bounded unit is of course more complicated. […] the various organisations, 
institutions and actors involved in the institutionalisation of a region may have 
different strategies with regard to the meaning and functions of the region and its 
‘identity’.72 
Thus, it can be argued that ‘regions’ are largely social and artificial constructs, the result 
of power networks and relationships and are dynamic and ever-changing; they can be 
contested and shifted by the individual, institutions and groups within the region itself.73 
Miller supports this and further contends that regional historians do not explain the nature 
and mechanisms of their chosen boundaries in detail while Malte Rolf calls for a radical 
decentralisation of spatial history.74  
Despite the call to deconstruct and move away from boundaries, their use can be 
explained by the recent shift in historiography towards the periphery. Now, it is often the 
centre that is seen as the construct. Kimitaka Matsuzato argues that it is essential to be 
sensitive to people’s sense of ‘space’. Spatial sensitivity is an argument for historical 
realism; the way the administrative structure functioned was based on a combination of 
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local factors such as culture, wealth and capacity.75 A ‘region’ is a set of practices and a 
cognitive structure; a community ‘can also be based on how social life is organised’ and, 
thus, large communities can be discursively constructed and imagined; the local 
‘ultimately relates to the wider society within which it is embedded’.76 I. Gerasimov, S. 
Glebov, A. Kaplunovski and M. Mogilner seek to reconstruct the ‘periphery’ and make it 
‘centre’; the centre then becomes a collection of peripheral narratives.77  
Seeing the province as a collection of narratives lets us draw out one of the most 
useful ideas from the historiography of the ‘region’, that of ‘networks’. Malte Rolf argues 
that one area can contain multiple spaces and places.78 Nick Baron further develops the 
‘region’ as a complex entanglement of networks and relationships that can spread beyond 
‘fixed’ regional boundaries. It is the cultural practices that emerge as part of the human 
interaction with space and terrain that define, delimit and arrange identity.79 The ‘region’ 
has its origins in an artificial construct designed by governments to regulate and control 
the internal space. If we understand the region as a function of the common practices and 
networks within it, these boundaries take on new significance as they limited and shaped 
these practices and those they affected. Tambov was settled and lived in for nearly two 
hundred years before the famine crisis while by the time of the famine, new networks and 
relationships had developed with the creation of the zemstvos and land captains. The 
resultant process of administering others, interacting with others and existing within the 
boundaries and conceptions of local government gave the province life and dynamism. 
                                                 
75 Matsuzato, ‘The concept of “space” in Russian history’, pp. 181-200. 
76 Celia Applegate, ‘A Europe of regions: reflections on the historiography of sub-national places in modern 
times’, AHR, Vol., 104, No. 4 (Oct., 1999), pp. 1157-1182, Donald J. Raleigh, ‘Introduction’ in Provincial 
Landscapes, Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917-1953, ed. Donald J. Raleigh (Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), p. 5. 
77 I. Gerasimov, S. Glebov, A. Kaplunovski and M. Mogilner, ‘The centrality of periphery’, Ab Imperio, 
No. 1 (2012), pp. 19-28. 
78 Rolf, ‘Importing the “spatial turn” to Russia’, pp. 359-80. 
79 Nick Baron, ‘New spatial histories of 20th-Century Russia and the Soviet Union: exploring the terrain’, 
Kritika, New Series, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Spring, 2008), p. 433. 
39 
 
 
 
While administrative boundaries are a valid way to define a ‘province’, geography 
itself has played an important role in how Russia has defined itself internally. Mark Bassin 
pays particular attention to attempts made by Slavophiles, pan-Slavists and others to 
downplay or deny the European characteristics of Russia, and the difficulties they had in 
justifying the imperial expansion into purely ‘Asiatic’ lands in the late nineteenth century. 
He argues that geographic images were used to argue that the inclusion or exclusion of 
Russia as a part of Europe or Asia, far from being the subjective or value-laden judgment 
it was, was given objectively in the configuration of the natural world itself.80 He uses 
Sergei Mikhailovich Solov’ev’s use of the ‘frontier thesis’ in the nineteenth century to 
examine the role of environmental causality in explaining a nation’s development. A 
committed westerniser, Solov’ev sought a theoretical approach that would demonstrate 
why Russia was a European nation and, if that was true, why its development had lagged 
behind that of Europe. Nature, in the Russian context, was an ‘evil stepmother’ 
(machekha); it had allowed other tribes into Russian territory, stretched the Slavs over a 
vast and inhospitable land and forced them into a state of almost permanent self-
colonisation. This, explained Solov’ev, is why, despite being an intrinsically European 
state, Russia’s developmental path was very different.81 Others have put forward an 
interpretation of the Russian province and landscape that does not centre on its 
relationship to Europe. Christopher Ely argues that, for a very long time, the provincial 
Russian landscape was not designated as a scenic space and that there was no conception 
of it as a place of beauty.82 Over time however, the generic landscape which could be any 
province, became a mark of national distinctiveness and pride; Russia’s beauty was in its 
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absence of beauty.83 In each and every case, the ‘province’ or ‘landscape’ referred to was 
generic and undefined; this turn to the beauty of the Russian landscape in late nineteenth-
century landscape painting reflected a nondescript province with many paintings simply 
being set in the ‘Russian countryside’.84 Whether centred on a relationship with Europe 
or not, the physical landscape, its appearance and impact, have clearly had a strong impact 
on the Russian historical concept of the internal space. 
We can also see from the historiography that, due to geographical and/or 
environmental factors, it is also plausible to see provinces as part of Russia’s incessant 
self-colonisation, forcing the centre to stretch restlessly and use autocratic, repressive 
methods. The ‘backwardness’ and unending monotony of the province was a recurring 
trope within Russian culture before and during the nineteenth century. Many writers used 
the ‘provinces’ as generic unnamed places that consisted of ignorance, narrow-
mindedness and abuse; they were interchangeable, monotonous and possessed only of 
negative qualities where abuses were  possible because they were provincial, that is, 
distant from the centre.85 Anne Lounsbery argues that the obsession with provincialism 
reveals an inferiority complex; Russians themselves felt provincial in comparison to 
Europe.86 From such a viewpoint, ‘provincial’, stood for everything that could be seen as 
marking Russia out as backward and an imitator. To Lounsbery and Bassin, the province 
was seen as backward due to its supposedly negative relationship to the seeming 
modernity of Europe and there was thus a need to forcibly control it in order to modernise 
and integrate it. This interpretation is given further weight by Alexander Morrison’s 
argument that in the late nineteenth century a new governmental language emerged in 
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Russia : grazhdanstvennost’ (variously translated as ‘citizenship’, ‘civic values’ or ‘civic 
consciousness’). This definition of citizenship did not depend on the exercise of the vote 
but ultimately aimed at integration, abolishing estate-based taxation, eliminating local 
variations in governance, and curtailing the privileges granted to local, non-Russian 
nobles.87 
The changing historiography on the relationship between the centre and the 
periphery leads us to examine the emergence of provincial identity and practice. Celia 
Applegate argues for the emergence of provincial dynamism as a new way to view 
central-periphery relations.88 Catherine Evtuhov, whose work on nineteenth-century 
Nizhnii Novgorod is one of the most important recent works on the province, builds her 
study around a ‘fundamental pattern of central initiative and local response in which 
government legislation met with local interpretation that sometimes far exceeded the 
centre’s original intentions; more central legislation would then follow in reaction […]’.89 
She shows that it was the process of interacting with the physical and material 
environment that led, over time, to the emergence of a local consciousness, the ‘idea of 
province’.90 As Nizhnii Novgorod, like every other province, was unique, she also views 
it in interaction with other regions and the centre.91 She argues that the Russian province 
came into its ‘own’ from the 1870s on and she puts much of this down to the uezd 
zemstvo; the provincial idea achieved expression through practice.92 This stretched 
through into the Soviet period with some people declaring ‘we already have raions while 
they still have uezds’.93 
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If it was practice that made the province ‘come to life’, this may lend a new 
significance to the response to the famine crisis. As Sarah Badcock has shown in her study 
of revolutionary Russia, in times of crisis where central authority was either too weak or 
too distant to respond effectively, local authorities responded primarily to the challenges 
and needs they encountered, as opposed to national imperatives.94 She draws from this an 
opportunity to understand the dynamics of local government: ‘[…] a crisis offers a good 
vantage point to oversee the balance of power in the town’.95 Two articles show us that, 
in Russia, famine often led to the locality first approach to which Badcock draws 
attention. Mark Tauger shows that in the Ukrainian famine of 1928-1929, the regional 
authorities made clear that they would focus on as many groups as possible despite higher 
level instructions and that the programme of public works was developed considerably in 
response to local conditions.96 Delano Dugarm, in a study of the grain crisis and Antonov 
rebellion in Tambov itself from 1918-1921, shows how local conditions, political actors, 
and peasant communities in Tambov province created a food-supply system that bore 
little resistance to the plans officials in Moscow had envisaged.97 Ultimately, he shows 
that, in a crisis in the periphery, no matter how the centre envisioned matters proceeding, 
success could only be achieved by eventually tailoring policies to the needs of the 
periphery. 
The famine then offers an opportunity to test Evtuhov’s arguments about initiative 
and response, and see whether the practice of local politics made the province ‘real’, in 
effect with a greater sense of urgency. It will also allow us to reconceptualise the 
relationship between the province and the centre, as it was the local institutions in Tambov 
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that had to respond first. The centre was thus pushed, explicitly, into the reactive position 
having traditionally occupied the proactive one.  
We should be careful over making the words ‘provincial identity’ do too much 
work however; through examining institutional networks and relationships, the main 
focus here is on initiative though we will look at the moral dimensions of provincial 
identity, especially in ‘Provincialism and moral responsibility’ in Chapter 2. ‘Provincial 
identity’ can be seen as a turn towards self-reliance not as a result of feeling ignored by 
or disloyal to St. Petersburg, but a sense that answers to the province’s problems were 
best found within the province as holders of the lived experience. A key question for this 
thesis then is whether the experience of the relief effort helped develop this sense of 
initiative and identity.  
 
Tambov Province: A brief sketch 
If the province was now proactive and the source of innovation, it is necessary to 
understand what sort of province Tambov was at the time of the famine, as this provides 
greater depth to our case study and allows us to locate the conclusions within a particular 
context. This takes on greater significance, as this thesis will argue that the response of 
the Tambov province to the famine was relatively successful, which suggests that a 
distinct provincial identity had begun to emerge. Tambov province was, in many ways, 
typical of provinces in the central black earth region in terms of economic and social 
structure, though the north and south of the province diverged somewhat.  
 In terms of its actual physical shape, Tambov province resembled an irregular 
square with a large northward projection; from west to east the base of Tambov province 
held the uezds of Lebedian, Usman, Lipetsk, Tambov, Kozlov (the two most populous 
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uezds) and Borisoglebsk while Morshansk uezd connected the ‘base’ to Shatsk, Spassk, 
Elatomsk and Temnikov uezds in the north.98 Tambov province was located in the central 
black earth region and bordered the provinces of Nizhnii Novgorod and Vladimir in the 
north, Penza and Saratov in the east, Voronezh in the south and south-west, and Orel, 
Tula and Riazan provinces in the west and north-west.99 While the provincial statistical 
committee and the Brokgaus-Efron encyclopaedia differ very slightly on the size of the 
province, indicating the fragile nature of statistics (as we will see throughout this thesis), 
it was somewhere in between 58,161 and 58,511 versts.100 
 A firm part of the central black earth region in European Russia by the nineteenth 
century, the development of Tambov province was rooted in the expansionist history of 
the Muscovite state. Recorded urban settlement in the region began in the fourteenth 
century when the Riazan principality founded the town of Elat’ma, followed by Shatsk in 
1553 while the Muscovite state founded Temnikov in 1536 and Tambov town itself in 
1637 as a fortress to defend against Tatar aggression.101 Yet Tambov province did not 
exist until 1779, when it was created out of Azov (later Voronezh), Shatsk (abolished in 
1779) and Saratov provinces, and it only achieved final territorial stability in 1803.102 
Illustrating the retrospective myth-making common to identity formation, in 1883 I. I. 
Dubasov noted with evident pride that the first occupants of Tambov fortress frequently 
not only fended off large Tatar raiding parties but also gave chase.103 
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 By the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the 
demographic makeup of Tambov province reflected its history as a frontier outpost and 
its transition to a stable province in the heart of European Russia. By 1892 the province’s 
population was just under 2.455 million (50.58 per cent of which was female) with the 
most populous uezds being in the south (Tambov, Kozlov, Borisoglebsk and Morshansk) 
with the northern uezds (Shatsk, Spassk, Elatomsk and Temnikov) being the least 
populous. Uezd populations ranged from 118,000 (Spassk) to 351,400 (Tambov uezd) 
with Kozlov and Borisoglebsk also significant population centres.104 The demographic 
breakdown of the province reveals its frontier history and the fact that as the imperial 
state prioritised expansion, a new Russian majority surrounded ethnic minorities. 
Concentrated in the northern uezds, ethnic diversity included a small but significant Tatar 
population at 4 per cent in Shatsk and Elatomsk uezds and 7 per cent in Temnikov uezd.105 
This paled beside the Mordvinian minority however which made up 9 per cent, 23 per 
cent and 53 per cent of the population in uezds of Shatsk, Temnikov and Spassk, 
respectively.106 The province was more homogenous in terms of religion, but even here 
there were was some variation, with 98.6 per cent of the population Orthodox with the 
remainder of the ‘schismatics’ (predominantly Molokans and Doukhobors, groups which 
appear to have emerged in the eighteenth century).107 The population of the province was 
overwhelmingly rural: in 1897 91.6 per cent (2,457,766 people) of the province’s 
population of 2,684,030 lived in villages with the largest town being Tambov with a 
population of only 48,015.108  
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 Despite its militaristic beginnings, by 1891 agriculture was the ‘main’ or 
‘exclusive’ source of livelihood of the province’s population; in 1888 the obzor to the 
annual governor’s report made clear that the population’s welfare was ‘closely connected’ 
to atmospheric conditions.109 These conditions were deemed, in general, to be deeply 
favourable with very fertile soil and a ‘moderate climate’ though the south was less 
humid, more open and flatter than the north, though prone to greater temperature shifts, 
leading to occasional descriptions of a ‘sharply different climate’.110 The north had once 
been entirely forests and while most of this was cleared, forests still dominated the 
northern uezds while the south was mostly steppe and grass plants.111 This climate 
variation, and the historic settlement pattern, meant that the southern uezds had become 
the province’s economic and infrastructural hub: the northern uezds lacked any rail 
connection with Temnikov town 150 versts from a railway station. 112 As we will see, this 
would leave the hard-hit northern uezds at a significant disadvantage.  
 While structural disadvantages such as this would play a role in the ability of the 
province’s authorities to deliver famine relief to the needy, the overall economic profile 
of the province shows that, in many ways, it was typical of the central black earth region. 
Landholding was overwhelmingly agricultural with 89 per cent of the total area of the 
province given over to landholding with the remaining 11 per cent split between towns, 
the state, estates and churches and monasteries.113 Landholding was split between village 
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societies and privately owned land with village societies dominating: in 1877 58.7 per 
cent of land ownership was collectively owned, the second largest rate in the central black 
earth region (behind Voronezh at 67.4 per cent) and a good bit higher than the average of 
52.1 per cent.114 By 1905 this had increased to 59.1 per cent though Tambov province 
had now slipped to third in the ranking (again behind Voronezh at 71.3 per cent and 
Riazan at 61.3 per cent) while the average now stood at 56.62 per cent.115 Thus, while 
collective landholding increased throughout the central black earth region from 1877-
1905, the figures show that it was more a case of other provinces, barring Voronezh, 
converging on Tambov’s existing position.  
In line with the rest of the central black earth region, peasant allotment size was 
squeezed over the last decades of the nineteenth century. Average allotment size per 
revision soul declined significantly across the region from 3.38 desiatins in 1880 to 1.87 
desiatins in 1900; in Tambov province the decline was from 2.7 to 2 desiatins.116 Despite 
this decline, it consistently had the second largest allotment per soul. However, this 
picture is somewhat deceptive, as there was a difference between former serfs and state 
peasants: the average for the former in 1877-78 was 2.57 desiatins and 4.81 desiatins for 
state peasants while in Tambov province ex-serfs had 2.44 desiatins while state peasants 
had 4.98 desiatins.117 Tambov province thus differed slightly from the regional average 
but was not homogenous itself. In the northern uezd of Temnikov in 1882, the average 
was 2.4 desiatins with ex-serfs having 1.5 desiatins and former state peasants 3.4 
desiatins while in the southern uezd of Kirsanov in 1886 the average was 2.6 desiatins 
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with ex-serfs having 1.6 desiatins and former state peasants 3.6 desiatins.118 Nevertheless, 
none of these different figures were particularly sufficient, with several imperial era 
statisticians estimating a peasant needed a minimum of 5 desiatins to be viable.119 The 
repartitional aspect of communal tenure also meant that peasants had fields on differing 
sides of the village such as in Grudnevo village, Tambov uezd, where their arable land 
was five versts from their homes.120 However, figures seem to indicate that while 
allotments shrunk, land pressure was slightly less intense than in neighbouring provinces. 
Out of every 100 peasants, 4.9 passports were issued in Tambov province from 1881-90, 
and 5.9 to 1891-1900, below the regional average of 6.1 and 7.9.121 In line with the other 
central black earth provinces, just under half of all passports (48.8 per cent) were issued 
for 1-3 months, indicating they were predominantly used for migration between seasons 
as opposed to relieving land hunger.122 Thus, landholding in Tambov province broadly 
reflected the average picture of a peasantry forced to make do with less though the 
changes were less acute than other provinces. 
 In broad terms, however, the last decades of the nineteenth century saw all of the 
peasantry of Tambov province coming under as much economic and demographic 
pressure as the rest of the region. A broad consensus, from ispravniks and provincial 
officials to contemporary historians, highlight a growing resource crisis in the province 
from insufficient allotment size, land over-use and exhaustion to declining livestock 
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numbers and the poor use of fertiliser.123 In 1865, Tambov province was exactly at the 
average with 60 per cent of its land allocated for arable farming and 12.4 per cent for 
pasture and meadowland; by 1887 this had changed to 63.9 and 8.3 per cent respectively, 
while the average was now 66 and 10 per cent.124 Robert Donnorummo argues that these 
changes were highly significant: the more arable land increased, the greater the demand 
for livestock but the supply of fodder for them decreased, reducing the available animal 
power and fertiliser (recognising this, in parts of Tambov province, peasants were 
financially induced to increase their use of fertiliser).125 While all central black earth 
provinces, except Tula, saw a decline in the number of horses per 100 desiatins of arable 
land from 1864-90, Tambov’s was the worst at 29.1 per cent, more than double the next 
closest province.126 Thus as the need for horses in the province grew with the increase in 
arable land, the self-same land structure was making it more difficult to benefit from this 
shift. The three-field system could be counter-productive, which helps explain Governor 
Rokasovskii’s scorn for it, calling it ‘obsolete’, blaming poor harvests on it and accusing 
the peasantry of ‘stubbornness’ in preserving it.127  
 Governor Rokasovskii talked of the ‘unsatisfactory economic situation of the 
province’ and the headline figures appear to bear this out: by 1891, the province’s 
peasantry were apparently ‘extremely indebted’ with redemption payment arrears of just 
over 2,134,500 roubles, an increase of 1,027,000 roubles from 1890.128 Across the central 
black earth region, debt as a percentage of the assessed total had risen from 42 per cent 
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to 122 per cent in 1886-91.129 This was not the full picture however and within Tambov 
province, arrears had decreased in 1886 and 1887 with one poor harvest reversing the 
situation drastically while in the central black earth region, the value of rye produced per 
desiatin exceeded its rental value by 246 per cent.130 This complicated picture was 
reflected in the province’s industrial output: most of the province’s industry consisted of 
processing and/or refining the harvest’s yields so the poor harvests of 1890-91 saw trade 
fall by 5,000,000 roubles.131 However, this sector of the economy had grown rapidly in 
the last few decades, primarily due to the arrival of the railways and connections to other 
markets, growing from 10,000,000 roubles in 1871 to 24,000,000 roubles in 1889, 
employing nearly 14,000 workers.132 Tambov province was in a delicate position and 
something of a transition phase; trade was growing as were the numbers of factories but 
it ultimately all revolved around the harvest. The situation was likely to be even more 
delicate in the northern uezds; with no convenient rail access, they could not easily take 
advantage of the opportunity to sell to markets in other provinces.  
 This reliance on the harvest, and the apparent difficulty in adapting new 
technologies, placed the province under some demographic strain; there was little change 
in grain output from 1866-1917 (between 1.05 and 1.15 million tons) despite a doubling 
in population size.133 The population of Tambov province, like most other provinces in 
the central black earth region, experienced rapid growth in the nineteenth century though 
it slowed down in the last two decades. This ‘bulge’ is seen in the fact that the population 
of Tambov province increased annually by 52,000 people in 1886, 56,000 in 1887, falling 
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to 29,000 in 1890; from 1863-82 the average annual increase in the province was 27,100 
people, shrinking to 12,400 for 1882-97.134 This was a considerable decrease yet 
throughout the period 1863-97, Tambov province recorded the largest annual population 
growth in the central black earth region, its 12,400 figure for 1882-97 considerably higher 
than the average of 7,217.135 The response of the province’s population to this change is 
interesting. While the family and household structure of the province did change, it 
reflected the general trends in the rest of the region despite the proportionally much larger 
population increase. While the average family size shrunk from 8.5 individuals in 1862 
to 6.4 in 1897, this reflected the central black earth region with 40-45 per cent of 
households being between 6-10 individuals.136 The vast majority of women married 
between the ages of 16-19 while men married before the age of 21, this was again in line 
with the regional average.137 Thus, while Tambov province’s population increased faster 
than its neighbours did, its family structure stayed entirely within the same trajectory as 
these provinces, suggesting a growing number of smaller households.  
 Overall then, Tambov province was very similar to its fellow central black earth 
provinces in many ways, certainly in terms of demography and social and economic 
structure. Within the province, the differences were reflected in the southern uezds being 
the population, transport and economic hub, while the northern uezds had a more diverse 
population. As this sketch has shown though, these differences were mostly shades within 
roughly similar broader trends. Over the last few decades of the nineteenth century, the 
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population of the province rose and land allotments shrunk, while indebtedness was a 
growing problem by 1891. Yet industry rose and the population increase was tailing off. 
Tambov province seemed to be relatively stable. It was changing, as were its neighbours, 
but the changes were less dramatic. Was Tambov province prosperous? The main caveat 
is that it is hard to call any province in the central black earth region ‘prosperous’ but, 
within the region, it seemed to be slightly above the mathematical average. What is most 
important to draw from all of this, and which we will explore more in chapter 2, is how 
vulnerable the figures show the population to be. When the harvest was good, so were 
living standards, but there was almost no redundant or coping capacity in the economy. 
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Chapter 1: Provincial government in nineteenth century Russia 
 
Introduction 
The overall aim of this thesis is to use a detailed case study of a provincial response to a 
crisis to examine the resilience, flexibility and robustness of provincial and uezd 
administration in late imperial Russia. Chapters 2-5 will show how the various elements 
of the administrative network functioned and will draw out the various relationships, 
networks and tensions that helped or hindered the crisis response. However, since it is 
important that such an examination should not become narrow and mechanical, let us start 
by considering how nineteenth-century government was supposed to work, before 
moving on to look at the groups and individuals who put this theory into practice.  In 
order to place Tambov province in a wider context, this chapter will discuss first the 
development of legality in nineteenth-century Russia, then the role and attitudes of the 
imperial and provincial bureaucracies, before finally profiling some of the key figures in 
Tambov province at every level of the administration from province to volost’. 
 
The development of legality in nineteenth-century Russia 
The key tension in the evolution of government in imperial Russia was between the 
concepts of arbitrariness (proizvol) and legality (zakonnost’). This tension originated in 
the very nature of the monarchy itself. The autocratic model meant that only the monarch 
could introduce legality into a system that philosophically disdained it. As Richard 
Wortman notes, ‘From Catherine the Great through the reign of Nicholas I, the Russian 
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ruler strove to appear as the champion of legality and to incorporate the advancement of 
the law into the imperial myth. Legality and law now elevated the image of enlightened 
ruler as transcendent, absolute monarch’.1 He argues that this form of legality issued from 
the will of a transcendent ruler, evolved at their discretion and mercy, and presented the 
emperor as the agent of legality.2 There was a desire for regularity and clarity on one 
hand, and the necessity of not impinging on the autocratic power of the Tsar on the other. 
The Fundamental Laws of the 1832 Svod zakonov rossiiskoi imperii embodied this 
contradiction, in one article stating that the empire was to be governed on the basis of 
laws while the first article stated that ‘The Emperor of All Russia, is an autocratic and 
absolute monarch. God Himself commands us to obey his supreme authority not only out 
of fear, but also out of conscience’.3  
The presentation of the emperor as the agent of legality made the contradiction 
between his autocratic will and the regularisation of the government a permanent and 
indelible characteristic of the Russian state in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.4 The contradiction between the role of the Tsar as guarantor of the law and 
transcendent, quasi-divine ruler resulted in successive Tsars in the nineteenth century 
rejecting or undermining attempts to establish a formalised, unified ministerial direction 
in order to preserve the autocratic prerogative.5 Any devolution of power to a ‘cabinet’ 
threatened the privilege of the Tsars who wanted their laws to be followed to the letter 
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and were suspicious of independent activity.6 The notion of transcendent ruler as both the 
embodiment and guarantor of legality helps us understand the way in which the 
bureaucracy evolved over the course of the nineteenth century and the way in which 
legality was put to use.  
Where did the notions of the transcendent ruler and this ruler as the guarantor of 
legality come from? Richard Wortman has developed a strong thesis surrounding the 
emergence of these notions and we will look at it in some detail here. The Russian 
monarchy was a symbolic system; each Tsar developed a ‘governing myth’, refashioned 
by each monarch in turn. Each ‘scenario of power’ had a common emphasis on 
domination and, in the second-half of the nineteenth century, a focus on the ‘bond’ 
between the Tsar and the people. The coronation and other ceremonies of the autocracy 
presented a ‘cognitive map of the political order’, making clear that the Tsar was not 
subject to mundane judgment or the limits of everyday life.7 Unbound from traditional 
convention by virtue of being the Tsar, each ruler chose a conscious role or ‘scenario’. 
Through this ‘scenario’, the monarchy could be revitalised or repositioned and the place 
of the particular Tsar in the monarchical pantheon guaranteed. Legality becomes a 
possible and compatible part of the image of the transcendental ruler then as its 
introduction is a distinguishing and unique feature of the particular ‘scenario of power’: 
it is reconcilable to autocracy by the very act of its introduction. The introduction of 
legality would have acted as a self-defining moment in this scenario; as only the Tsar 
could modify the autocratic and, often, arbitrary system, the very act of doing so 
transcends the rest of government and, ideally, the ruler’s predecessors. Thus, by 
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reducing the autocratic nature of the state, the autocratic ruler becomes more important 
as the protector and guarantor of this change. The autocracy integrated the rule of law as 
a means to effectively govern the empire and it also complemented the traditionalist 
image of the Tsar as the 'father of the people' and guardian of rights and welfare.8 
This personalisation of power had risks however. The introduction of the 
succession laws in the 1832 Fundamental Laws elevated the personage of the emperor to 
the source of all law and good administration. Behaviour by the Tsar or their family that 
threatened this image of a noble and transcendent guarantor of good government now 
undermined both the institutions and legitimacy of the autocracy.9 The elevation of the 
autocratic monarch as both the source and protector of legality in the nineteenth century 
created a tension at the very heart of the state, which would be present throughout the 
remainder of the Tsarist regime. 
This tension expressed itself in the approach the regime and its officials took to 
government. From 1711 until 1905, Russian statesmen continued to hold the personal 
authority of the Tsar and his agents above the law even as they laboured to establish legal 
institutions that would limit personal authority.10 Law, therefore, was merely a tool of the 
autocracy and not a governing ideology; the empire’s legality was formalistic and not 
philosophical and there was a rule by law and not a rule of law. Heide M. Whelan terms 
this ‘regularised autocracy’ and argues that the ruling elite, especially the Tsar, should 
have seen that this was an impossible contradiction.11 ‘Regularised autocracy’ is a useful 
concept through which to view the governing strategy of the late imperial Russian state. 
Francis Wcislo and Daniel Orlovsky argue that the reign of Alexander III was a 
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conservative attempt at renovation of the state and mediation of the social and political 
transformation of Russia, a contention supported by Jeff Sahadeo: ‘Rather than a 
reactionary move towards an idealised Slavic past, Alexander III’s Russification plans 
expressed a dedication to European-style modernisation, albeit with stricter forms of 
control’.12 Legality was integrated into the image of the Tsar as transcendental ruler as 
part of the ‘scenario of power’. This meant that the Tsar could, and did, transcend the 
boundaries of legality with huge projects of social engineering in order to preserve and 
promote that self-same legality. The argument here is that the image of the transcendental 
ruler required grand displays of the autocratic power in order to justify its legitimacy. 
This led to dramatic projects such as the great reforms and the counter-reforms and 
underscores the tension between arbitrariness and legality that was at the heart of the late 
imperial monarchy. 
This tension and the concepts of ‘regularised autocracy’ and ‘conservative 
renovation’ open up reinterpretations of Alexander II’s great reforms and Alexander III’s 
counter-reforms. Traditional interpretations have seen the great reforms as more liberal 
while the counter-reforms are seen as more conservative and regressive. The 
interpretation opened up here is that the great reforms become less liberal than previously 
thought while the counter-reforms are not as regressive. The great reforms become a more 
conservative project; they were changes in response to an overwhelming sense of crisis 
and were designed to be enough to head off social instability and improve administration. 
                                                 
12 Orlovsky’s argument surrounding ‘conservative renovation’ is that, during the reign of Alexander III, the 
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destabilising the political system, Orlovsky, The Limits of Reform, pp. 202-205. Wcislo argues that the late 
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The introduction of elected local self-government institutions was no luxury for the Tsars 
but was necessary to compensate for the inadequacies of pre-reform administration.13 The 
Tsarist regime engaged in the various projects of reform as it was seeking an ideology of 
administration that could provide the right combination of local initiative and political 
control.14 This search for reform that undertook necessary change without threatening the 
regime’s stability or lessening its potential for control can be seen in the changing laws 
surrounding corporal punishment in the nineteenth century and the maintenance by the 
state of these laws to demarcate social status and maintain authority and control, the 
‘language of the lash’.15 The penal system was used to fashion and refashion social 
categories, bind the elite to the state through the concept of ‘negative rights’ and this 
social construction was necessary to maintain and reinforce order.16 The series of reforms 
relating to corporal punishment, in 1863 and 1890, were derived less from purely humane 
considerations than from statist concerns over image, authority and administration.17 
Bureaucrats viewed penal legislation as a tool to refashion society and this reconstructive 
project appeared more urgent after the abolition of serfdom but never sought to repudiate 
the penal complex’s traditional terms but instead adjust them so that it functioned as a 
more effective means of ordering Russian society and bolstering autocratic rule.18 When 
necessary, the state would engage in ‘humane’ or ‘liberal’ reforms, but the ultimate aim 
was to protect the autocratic order while also retaining its potential for control.  
The counter-reforms, then, can be said to form a continuum, along with the great 
reforms, in the use of reform and state-directed social engineering to secure, revitalise 
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and renovate the autocracy. The state sought to permit necessary innovation without 
inviting internal revolution.19 As an example of this, Minister of Internal Affairs Dmitri 
Tolstoi, who spear-headed Alexander III’s counter-reforms, involved the gentry in the 
project and intended them to serve on his terms to restore administrative order and build 
rural support for autocracy.20 The 1889 Land Captain Statute was an effort to build 
capacity for state-directed change; the ‘rural’ crisis meant doing nothing was not an 
option.21 Thus, ‘conservative renovation’ makes sense in the context of the counter-
reforms by helping to reconcile its clearly conservative principles with the huge overhaul 
of the administrative framework. Francis Wcislo summarises this changing view of the 
counter-reforms rather neatly: ‘To interpret the counter-reforms as a reactionary 
phenomenon, a return to a political and social status quo ante, is to ignore the essential 
significance of these years in autocratic political history. This period… represented a 
conservative effort to mediate the political and social transformation of Russia’.22 By the 
late nineteenth century, legality emanated from the Tsar and the type of legality that would 
be pursued depended on the Tsar’s chosen ‘scenario of power’. Alexander III’s ‘scenario 
of power’ was based on a ‘national myth’ and a spiritual bond with the people; he also 
sought to return to an idealised seventeenth century version of national unity that simply 
did not exist.23 This attempt at the recreation of an imagined nation implied massive 
transformation; entirely new structures needed to be created.  
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Imperial and provincial bureaucracy 
The growing population and increasing complexity of Russia meant that rule through fiat 
alone was no longer possible while developing a governing strategy that met the 
autocracy’s key goals of effective government and securing the stability of the autocratic 
order had a profound effect on the development of the bureaucracy at both imperial and 
provincial levels.24 Seeing the provinces solely as resource gathering units and simply 
incapable of correct administration, the state responded to perceived poor provincial 
governance by relying on bureaucratisation and centralisation.25 A brief example will 
suffice in demonstrating the degree to which decisions were centralised; the nine-level 
review process in deciding upon tax levies created such a sheer volume of paper work 
that decisions had to be taken at the ministerial level.26 This increase in the bureaucracy 
and centralisation that took place in the nineteenth century can be understood as part of 
the capital-focused nature of the imperial Russian state. It led to the growth and 
centralisation of the state coupled with continual and systematic attempts to reorganise 
and integrate the provinces: ‘All capital-city ideologies, whatever their specific content, 
served to strengthen the impetus to bureaucratic expansion […]’.27 The impetus for 
expansion and control emerged strongly in the nineteenth century: ‘To Nicholas, the path 
to total control lay through total knowledge: if all information on every part of the empire 
could be collected and organised […] the capacity for perfect control would be one step 
closer’.28 Thus, in order to organise, administer and integrate the provinces, the 
bureaucracy grew exponentially. 
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This need for centralisation to ensure the Tsar’s continued control meant that the 
relationship between the bureaucracy and monarch was one of mutual dependence; the 
Tsar could not govern Russia alone.29 Thus, the role and composition of officialdom itself 
is important. Richard Wortman and Don Karl Rowney have argued that the search in the 
nineteenth century for good government led to the emergence of a class of officials who 
believed in law and order in and of itself. This then led to the creation of a system in 
which officials were to be guided by legality:  
Throughout the legislative code which defines the authority of the minister it is clear 
that the ideal state of affairs would be one in which the minister and his subordinates 
in both the central government and its local counterparts were always guided in their 
actions by the law, merely executing the decisions specified by the existing 
legislation.30  
During the reign of Nicholas I there was increased professionalisation with the breaking 
down of distinctions between service nobles and professional secretaries, and members 
of the lesser nobility beginning to choose the civil rather than the military service as a 
route to distinction.31 The civil service became a distinct professional career requiring 
specialised training prior to entry.32 This new class of officialdom owed their position to 
their education and service and brought new preconceptions and attitudes to their 
positions.33 Walter Pintner has argued that this professionalisation led to a revolution, not 
in social recruitment but in socialisation, and that there was a professional and social 
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cleavage opening up between the officialdom in the centre and in the provinces.34 
Secondly, senior officials became far more likely to be divorced from the land and 
dependent on the state for their economic livelihood and social progress than fifty years 
previously.35 Owing both their training and progression to the state, it is plausible to argue 
that they not only owed loyalty to it, but had also been trained to see in it the best form of 
governance for Russia.  
Other historians have taken differing positions. George Yaney sees the 
development and acceptance of systematisation by officials as a form of pretence or 
aspiration to operate within a formal legal-administrative system.36 He argues that 
‘system’ reflected how many officials believed that they should behave but that few 
expected their colleagues would behave this way and that the image of the absolute Tsar 
made sense to those who served the Russian state.37 Wcislo argues that for all the pursuit 
of 'reform', Tsarist officials still perceived themselves as conservators of order (poriadok) 
and that there was an inherent assumption that the autocratic regime was a guarantor of 
stability.38 We should also not discount the role of selection in reinforcing autocratic 
presumptions amongst officials; it is unlikely that anyone who openly advocated 
constitutional rule would have been hired. There is disagreement over the extent of 
selection based on personal influence and connections in the pre-reform period. Rowney 
argues that an individual’s ability to select based on personal connections was small as 
the sphere of personal control was limited, while Daniel Orlovsky finds the opposite, that 
the influence of the minister or a senior official was extremely important.39 Both suggest 
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that the system was essentially self-reinforcing; it selected individuals that met its existing 
composition.40 Orlovsky has shown that by 1881, and even in 1861, the dominant group 
in the Ministry of Internal Affairs was not 'enlightened bureaucrats' but relatively 
conservative officials.41  
Nonetheless, irrespective of why historians argue that imperial officials believed in 
strengthening and expanding the bureaucracy, historians concur that there was a growing 
move towards the integration of provincial institutions in the nineteenth century. Peter 
Waldron illustrates the view that the centre administered the provinces from the viewpoint 
of both total control and vertical integration:  
The state's preferred method of governing the provinces of the empire was to impose 
its power through officials who were directly responsible to St. Petersburg and who 
could exercise authority with the same latitude as central government […] local 
administration was precisely that - the administration on the local level of policies 
determined in St. Petersburg.42 
In the nineteenth century this was embodied most clearly in the governor: the provincial 
representative of the Tsar’s autocratic power.43 Richard Robbins’ key concerns are 
whether the governor was the Tsar’s ‘viceroy’ in the province, and the evolution of the 
position of the governor and the changing relationship between the governor and the Tsar. 
He argues that the link to the Tsar was, as the nineteenth century wore on, of decidedly 
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little value other than in a psychological and ideological sense.44 The personal meetings 
between the Tsar and the governors had ceased to take place or had become just brief 
audiences; it had been reduced to a series of annual reports detailing received and sent 
correspondence.45 As the governor was often simply an errand boy of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, Robbins poses the question as to whether the governors were viceroys 
or flunkeys.46 The overwhelming volume of instruction leads Robbins to reinterpret one 
of the most traditional claims against governors, that of their arbitrariness. 
Acknowledging that there were arbitrary and oppressive governors, he argues most 
governors ‘were open to all kinds of pressures and even humiliations’ and that ‘far from 
being satraps, they were often supplicants’, concluding that ‘it is easy to forget when 
encountering an act of gubernatorial proizvol, that the nachal’niki gubernatorii possess 
few direct controls over self-government’.47 This is a very important insight; arbitrariness, 
in this context, is not always negative. They were arbitrary because they had to be; the 
list of tasks and responsibilities was long, time was short and there was relatively little 
guidance from the centre. Thus, we see the governor as men in the middle, subject to all 
kinds of pulls and pressures from both and above below.48  
The highlighting of the lack of institutional capacity by Robbins, therefore, means 
that we need to look at the power of the governor as an individual. Yaney and Robbins 
have conflicting views on the importance of the governor’s personal authority. Yaney 
argues that the governor’s personal authority had declined and that, by the time of the 
famine, he had become more like the director of an organisation and that ‘the despot had 
given way to the manager’.49 Robbins argues that it was because of this increased 
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 71. 
45 Starr, Decentralisation, p. 35. 
46 Robbins, The Tsar’s Viceroys, p. 66, p. 72, p. 75. 
47 Ibid., p. 243. 
48 Ibid., p. 63. 
49 Yaney, Systematisation, pp. 21-23. Wortman, The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness, pp. 
320-322. 
65 
 
 
 
managerial role that the governor’s personal authority and relationships became more 
important; bureaucratic underdevelopment and an almost total lack of unity and 
consistent direction from St. Petersburg meant that consensus and personal authority were 
necessary to fill this vacuum.50 Robbins’ interpretation that the governor was now just 
akin to a director is more plausible as it is impossible to manage a large organisation 
without attempting to establish consensus based on your personal authority and 
relationships. The ‘despotic’ personal authority Yaney refers to was indeed gone, but it 
had been replaced with a new form of personal authority, that of the ‘negotiator’.  
 
The structure of provincial government 
How was provincial government structured in late imperial Russia at the time of the 
famine? What were the reporting lines? How, according to legislation, was provincial 
government supposed to work? What tensions, if any, were present in the system? If we 
keep these issues in mind and focus explicitly on the specifics of provincial government 
we can more effectively relate what actually happened to it, to see how far they 
corresponded. 
The grand centring of power around Muscovy had established a territorial rift 
between centre and periphery that would have a profound impact on Russian governance; 
this concept of the territorial relationship, whereby the role of the periphery was to 
respond to the centre, went hand in hand with the autocratic nature of imperial 
government and one of the most important developments in late imperial governance, the 
rise of the bureaucracy.51 As the imperial state developed it became increasingly clear 
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that a more regular and systematic form of administration was necessary. The empire was 
simply too large to be administered by either the Tsar alone or the arbitrary, often despotic 
officials such as the voevoda or the military-governor. Thus, the government embraced 
bureaucracy and ‘systematisation’ to regularise and standardise administration while 
seeking to suborn it fully to the centre.52  
This drive for better, regularised administration led to a considerable tension 
within the growing imperial bureaucracy between the desire for legality and the need to 
maintain the autocratic prerogative of the Tsar. Indeed, some historians have attributed 
this as a leading cause for the ultimate collapse of the regime.53 Richard Wortman, in his 
classic study of the evolution of a Russian ‘legal consciousness’, attributes this tension to 
the emergence of a class of officials who believed in law and order in and of itself, outside 
of the Tsar’s decrees.54 It may be more convincing to turn to Francis Wcislo’s formulation 
that for all the pursuit of 'reform', tsarist officials still perceived of themselves as 
conservators of order (poriadok) and that there was an inherent assumption that the 
autocratic regime was a guarantor of stability.55 One of the reasons for this is that in the 
1880s, one of the most significant periods for the state’s bureaucratisation of the 
provinces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) was dominated by relatively 
conservative officials.56 Thus, while the tension still existed, Wcislo sees it not so much 
as a function of a divide between legality and arbitrariness, but rather as the corollary of 
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an attempt to use better administrative methods and legality to give effect to the Tsar’s 
autocratic decrees. 
This emergence of bureaucracy and the privileging of the centre as the sole 
repository of good governance led to increased efforts to control the periphery. A 
significant issue with imperial attempts to control, regulate and administer the provinces 
however was the fact that central legislation often bore little connection to the reality ‘on 
the ground’ and was thus impossible to implement.57 The centre interpreted this disparity 
between its aims and the circumstances in the periphery as a sign of the inability of the 
centre to impose its will on the provinces.58 The response of the imperial government to 
this was generally twofold. Firstly, it would, somewhat haphazardly and sometimes 
ineptly contravening local developments, react with more central legislation.59 However, 
the preferred method of governing the provinces of the empire was to impose its power 
through officials who were directly responsible to St. Petersburg. In 1845 the governor 
was made responsible for seeing that ministerial decisions were executed.60 This played 
on the governor’s position as both the Tsar’s viceroy and the province’s manager 
(nachal’nik). This inability to enforce its will and the subsequent resorting to powerful 
figures was due in part to the fact that serving in local government was often seen by the 
local nobility as an unwelcome burden.61 Indeed, the state often found it difficult to fill 
positions in the various corporate bodies it had established.62 In a touch of irony, one of 
the main reasons for this disdain of local service was the centralised nature of the imperial 
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Russian state and the feeling of powerlessness and irrelevance that undoubtedly 
engendered. 
By the outbreak of the 1891 famine, then, the approach of the imperial government 
to the periphery was one that emphasised the subordination of policy making to the centre 
in the name of better administration.  But how was this implemented in the province, 
starting with the most senior level and working downwards? 
The governor was the most senior official in the provincial administration and a 
new governor was welcomed with elaborate ceremony.63 The position was strengthened 
after 1837 with the abolition of the governors-general and the governor became the 
immediate manager of the province, with responsibility for its social, economic, 
administrative, legal and moral oversight and accountable to central government.64 By 
the 1890s however there had been considerable change. The provincial board (gubernskoe 
pravlenie), introduced in 1775 and chaired by the governor, grew more significant and 
was supposed to make many of the decisions on general welfare and matters such as 
policing.65 It had a general assembly comprised of key provincial officials and a 
chancellery of five departments to handle paper work and decisions were to be made 
collectively.66 This led to a transformation in the governor’s role and place in the 
administrative framework; having long enjoyed vice regal status as a noble and direct 
appointee of the Tsar, the governor became less of a satrap and more of a manager. While 
acknowledging this transformation, there has been disagreement amongst historians as to 
whether this resulted in a decline or rise in the importance of the governor’s personal 
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authority.67 An increase in the importance of personal authority is most likely; if the 
governor was just akin to a manager or director, it would have been impossible to manage 
such a large organisation without attempting to establish consensus based on one’s 
personal authority and relationships. The ‘despotic’ personal authority was gone but had 
been replaced with a new form, that of the ‘negotiator’. 
Running both parallel to and below the governor and the pravlenie was the 
zemstvo. Introduced in 1864, it was responsible for looking after the welfare and needs 
of the province and the uezd such as managing the zemstvo’s finances and property, 
famine relief, the administering of mutual insurance, custody over the development of 
local trade and education, and presenting, through the provincial administration, 
information to the centre on local conditions and needs.68 There was both a provincial and 
uezd zemstvo assembly (with a prohibition on organising at the volost’ level), and the 
uezd zemstvo was elected by curia with one for landowners, urban dwellers and the 
peasantry, with the system weighted towards the landowners, a balance which became 
more pronounced in 1890.69 While the zemstvo was granted autonomy in much of its 
affairs, a level of control and integration existed. The original 1864 Zemstvo Statute 
allowed the governor to overturn any zemstvo decision that was illegal or against the 
‘general welfare’ while the 1890 Zemstvo Statute explicitly states that the ‘Governor has 
supervision over the correctness and legality of the actions of the zemstvo institutions’.70 
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The 1890 Zemstvo Statute remains controversial. Several historians see it as limiting the 
power of local government and re-privileging the gentry.71 However, Wcislo contends 
that it was part of a conservative effort to renovate government and mediate the political 
and social transformation of Russia as it clarified many of the zemstvo’s duties and 
expanded some of them.72 
The volost’, the level immediately below the uezd, was governed by peasant self-
administration which, at the time of the famine, was overseen by the land captain. The 
Land Captain Statute of 1889 declared that the main cause of the ‘difficulties’ faced by 
the peasantry ‘resides in the lack of a firm government authority close to the people that 
would combine guardianship over rural residents with care for the conduct of peasant 
affairs […]’.73 The imperial government, and in particular, the bureaucracy had come to 
see peasant administration as chronically and woefully under-managed; as Yaney has 
argued, ‘From the administrator's point of view, the uezds and below were a chaos […]’.74 
The 1889 Statute represented a culmination of these concerns and a concerted (and 
conservative) attempt to address them. The powers of the land captain in his precinct 
(uchastok) can be grouped into three main categories: social, administrative and 
judicial.75 Perhaps the most significant power the land captain held was that he was 
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responsible for the villagers’ economic and moral well-being and could recommend the 
cancellation of any township (volost’) resolution if he felt it was illegal or harmful to the 
interests of the village.76 According to Aleksandr Novikov, a land captain in Tambov 
province, the power of the land captain went beyond what was in the legislation: ‘I prefer 
not to talk about the law but about reality…in reality the power of a land captain in his 
own precinct is colossal’.77 The land captain reported to a District Congress made up of 
land captains and representatives from the zemstvo and the nobility.78 
Linking the volost’ and the uezd and, as a consequence, the land captain and the 
zemstvo was the system of famine relief. It was a three-tiered system comprised of 
communal granaries and provincial and central capital funds, and overseen on the local 
level by the uezd zemstvo.79 While the zemstvo had overall responsibility for the system, 
it is clear that any crisis would necessitate the involvement of the land captain. In order 
for any action to be successful, the land captain’s involvement with and influence over 
peasant self-administration was a critical necessity.  
By 1891 then, the structure of provincial government was complex, with a series 
of tiered authorities, each owing their creation to differing conceptions of authority, from 
the vice regal (the governor), to the collegial (the pravlenie), self-government (the 
zemstvo) and personalised supervisory power (the land captain). How was the structure 
supposed to operate? The governor was the link to the centre, sending information and 
receiving instructions while ensuring local institutions did not exceed their legal 
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responsibilities.80 The pravlenie was the nerve centre of the provincial administration, 
bringing together key non-zemstvo functions and designed to act as a brake on 
gubernatorial despotism. The zemstvo had, by 1891, become mainly a body to oversee 
local welfare and services while the land captain administered peasant administration and 
justice. The framework was designed so that each area was self-contained (under the 
ultimate supervision of the governor) but, in the event of a crisis, coordinated action, in 
the manner strictly provided for by law, would be possible. The differing sources of 
authority, the parallel structures and often competing responsibilities (such as the 
zemstvo’s responsibility for famine relief but the land captain’s sole right to administer 
the volost’) were likely sources of tension. Pressure points existed at every level of the 
provincial administration; the argument over the course of this thesis is that Tambov 
responded to this challenge through decentralisation in an effort to diffuse and dissipate 
this pressure.  
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Profiles of officials in Tambov province in 1891-2 
Although an understanding of the theory and culture of legality and the bureaucracy is 
vital, a regional history that neglects regional examples is, as Smith-Peter points out, 
simply theory.81 Any regional study needs to take account of the individuals who felt and 
responded to the pressure created by the responsibilities, tensions and contradictions we 
have just discussed.  In the case of the famine in Tambov province, it is crucial to 
understand the personality and character of the individuals managing the relief effort. Due 
to serious structural defects in the Russian governmental apparatus and an ideological 
preference for power concentrated in individual hands, an individual’s character could 
have a profound impact. Indeed, a key argument of this thesis is that the relief effort was 
often heavily dependent on the actions and efforts of individuals, which were required to 
compensate for structural defects. Here we will look at the character and background of 
individuals who were crucial to the relief effort at both provincial and uezd levels.   
 
a. Governor Baron Vladimir Platonovich Rokasovskii 
‘Dissolute’, ‘irresponsible’, ‘mediocre’, ‘vulgar’, ‘generous’, ‘clever’ and full of ‘energy 
and good words’: these are some of the adjectives applied to Vladimir Platonovich 
Rokasovskii in his seven years as governor of Tambov province between 1889 and 
1896.82 His record creates a contradictory picture of a man promoted for excellent and 
diligent service, awarded bonuses for meeting goals and ultimately dismissed for 
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exceeding his authority.83 To some officials in St. Petersburg he was seen as simply a 
favourite of Durnovo, more interested in social functions and quarrelling with the nobility 
than governing, yet within the province he attracted poems and votes of praise for his 
actions during the famine and cholera crises.84 Having left no memoirs and only a 
relatively prosaic career file, Rokasovskii is not an easy figure to understand. 
Nevertheless, from the available material we get a sense of a man who, despite his 
shortcomings, appears diligent, genuinely concerned at alleviating suffering and 
determined to do so fairly, in accordance with the rules. 
 It is relatively easy to see how Vladimir Rokasovskii was shaped into the diligent 
if doctrinaire governor he seems to have become. Born in St Petersburg province in 1851, 
the son of a former governor-general of Finland who was ennobled for his service, 
Rokasovskii joined the Imperial Corps of Pages and entered the military; from 1871-80 
he rose rapidly, serving in the Preobrazhenskii guards and the tsar’s honorary escort.  He 
was made an aide-de-camp to the tsar in 1880.85 He served with distinction in the Russo-
Turkish war, receiving a commendation for bravery and was involved in key encounters 
at Lovech and Shipka Pass.86 Raised in a household where service to the sovereign had 
transformed the family’s status and then serving in an elite regiment closely connected to 
the tsar, he experienced consistent reinforcement of the values of service, duty and 
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obedience. Like Tsar Nicholas I’s own sons, Rokasovskii internalised the idea of the 
autocracy as a guarantor of stability, becoming a ‘conservator of order’.87  
 These values, combined with personal connections and several strokes of good 
fortune, would help Rokasovskii in his career. Appointed vice-governor of Ekaterinoslav 
province in 1881, Rokasovskii was transferred to Tambov in 1888 and became acting 
governor a year later after the retirement of the previous governor, Baron A. A. Frederiks, 
due to ill health.88 He was formally appointed to the position in 1891, when he was also 
promoted to rank four, becoming an actual state councillor and chamberlain of the 
imperial household.89 From 1881-2 he served under I. N. Durnovo, the Minister for 
Internal Affairs during the famine crisis. Both Rokasovskii’s contemporaries and 
subsequent historians have disparaged his connection with Durnovo as the principal 
reason for his promotion to Tambov province and subsequent appointment as governor.90 
It is difficult to establish the veracity of such claims as there is no direct evidence: D. A. 
Tolstoi’s order appointing Rokasovskii to Tambov province only mentions his ‘useful 
service’, though Tolstoi was known for not necessarily having met the people he 
appointed.91 By the end of the nineteenth century, the MVD favoured previous experience 
in uezd or provincial administration in its candidates for governorships. In the early 
1880s, however, Rokasovskii’s career trajectory of military service followed by two 
‘apprenticeships’ as a vice-governor was entirely normal, though he was marginally 
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younger than the average governor.92  Following the serious illness and rapid retirement 
of Governor Frederiks, the MVD might reasonably have prioritised stability and 
Rokasovskii’s eight years as vice-governor was regarded as sufficient experience for his 
promotion. Even if this owed something to his connections with Durnovo, such patronage 
would hardly have set him apart from the remainder of the Russian governing elite in the 
reign of Alexander III.    
 From 1889-96 Rokasovskii would govern Tambov province in line with those 
values of order, fairness, duty and fealty to the autocrat. The record of his last four years 
as governor shows that the tension between proizvol and zakonnost’, and the search for a 
‘regularised autocracy’, which was beginning to undermine the autocracy, consumed and 
ended Rokasovskii’s career.93 Count Bobrinskii and Polovtsev may have seen him as 
‘mediocre’ but perhaps a fairer assessment is that his governing style, while increasingly 
out of touch with a rapidly changing Russia, often met the specific requirements of the 
famine crisis. As Robbins points out, governors became symbols of all that was wrong 
with the autocracy and even figures such as Stolypin would struggle to balance the 
competing tensions at the heart of imperial governance.94 
 Yet governors were obliged to manage these competing tensions, in addition to 
being pulled between the province St. Petersburg ‘entrusted to them’, in order to fulfil 
their legal obligations as the Tsar’s viceroys. This was an almost impossible juggling act 
and we should remember that what seems like an arbitrary action could also be an attempt 
to reconcile the almost limitless workload and instructions with a severely limited time 
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frame. Rokasovskii’s response to the challenge, especially during the famine crisis, was 
to combine a strict adherence to the letter of the law with personal inspections designed 
to make the most of what remained of his authority as the tsar’s viceroy.95 This led to a 
variety of seemingly contradictory actions: he exiled some of those peasants accused of 
spreading rumours during the 1892 cholera epidemic to other uezds in the province; he 
had others arrested; yet he also demanded the release of at least one peasant arrested for 
criticising government commands.96 As Susanne Schattenberg emphasises, simple 
actions or statistics do not tell us everything; understanding why people acted the way 
they did is vital.97 Taken together, Rokasovskii’s verdicts can easily seem erratic.  In each 
case, however, Rokasovskii judged the action by the threat it posed to public order; the 
same concern prompted him to establish a food aid appeals process (see Chapter 4).  He 
took the same approach to officials as he did to the peasantry, replacing or admonishing 
several who deviated from established procedures. Rokasovskii, as a dedicated servant of 
the imperial system, equated fairness with the application of the law as written and this 
was a key aspect of his response strategy; the population’s best interests were protected 
by the vigorous application of the law. 
 We can only imagine, therefore, how devastating it must have been to Rokasovskii 
to find that, after twenty-five years of loyal service, the state deemed him a danger to its 
project for a more regularised autocracy. In 1894 Rokasovskii ordered that a merchant, 
Varzin, be given twenty-five lashes of the birch for seeking to organise a revolutionary 
circle from his traktir, inciting resistance to the authorities and refusing to comply with 
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an MVD order expelling him from Tambov province for two years.98 What followed this 
order illustrates the confused and deeply complex relationship between law, order, 
political stability and justice in late imperial Russia. As Abby Schrader notes, the laws 
surrounding corporal punishment were amended, not primarily out of humanitarian 
concerns, but to refashion the social order, thereby renovating, strengthening and 
supporting the autocracy.99 Rokasovskii clearly thought his actions fitted within these 
categories: he defended the punishment on the basis of the law and a secret MVD directive 
from 1885 authorising governors to take all necessary measures in ‘extraordinary 
circumstances’.100 Rokasovskii’s letters to the MVD in 1894, detailing concerns over 
‘insufficient police supervision’, a long running conflict with the Lipetsk uezd marshal of 
the nobility, an ‘unexpected liberal air’ and influence in the provincial zemstvo and the 
economic situation of the peasantry, makes clear that he imagined his administration and, 
by extent, the tsar’s authority, to be under threat.101 There was an implicit connection 
between the authority of the governor and that of the throne where resistance to one was 
resistance to both. 
 The eventual decision of the Governing Senate in early 1896, nearly two years 
after Varzin appealed, came as a shock. Finding against him, the Senate did not hold back: 
not only were his actions illegal, they ‘could only serve to diminish and humiliate the 
high position in the province’ that he held.102 Perhaps even more galling was the Senate’s 
judgment that, as governor, his main duty was not ‘to keep order, or be the chief steward 
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of the province’s management but, firstly, to be a custodian of the law and fairness’.103 In 
a letter, the tone of which indicates a broken man, Governor Rokasovskii formally 
resigned as governor of Tambov province shortly after, to be replaced by the vice-
governor of Simbirsk, Sergei Dimitrievich Rzhevskii.104 In other words, Rokasovskii’s 
career ended over a perceived failure to uphold the very values he lived by.  
Conditioned to understand and apply the law in a straightforward and relatively 
inflexible way, this former military officer was ultimately caught out by these tensions. 
Rokasovskii was unable to keep pace with the changing way proizvol and zakonnost’ 
interacted in St. Petersburg. The records show that he could not grasp why he was being 
disciplined: in his testimony to the Senate he argued that the governor had an 
‘unconditional obligation to end incitement of the population’ against the authorities.105 
Even in dismissal, Rokasovskii remained bound by his conception of his duty and 
responsibility. As he saw it, he was simply doing his duty: protecting the province 
‘entrusted to him’ by the autocrat.  
Rokasovskii’s career tells us something emblematic about governors at the end of 
the nineteenth century. Empowered as viceroys of the tsar, they were the symbolic and 
literal representatives of the throne in the various provinces. Yet in the end, they were just 
another set of individuals forced to confront the contradictory tensions gradually eating 
away at the empire’s foundations. Like the vast majority of governors, Rokasovskii was 
perhaps not a brilliant man, but he was diligent, determined to do his duty fairly and 
according to the law and was capable of strategic mistakes, flexibility and astute political 
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positioning. There was a final irony however: after his case the Committee of Ministers 
initiated a project to review the power of governors in criminal cases.106 Governor 
Rokasovskii had a much greater impact on the governance of the empire in disgrace than 
he did while in office.  
 
b. Leading provincial figures 
Governing Tambov province was an exercise in negotiation and moving between formal 
structures and personal networks and relationships. The influence of provincial and uezd 
officials was considerable and imperial and local officials, of differing political hues, 
attested to their centrality to the relief effort and general administration.107 Since few 
archival records survive to give information on their backgrounds, we will focus here on 
a brief biography of a few key figures and tease out the specific relationships in later 
chapters. What we will see is that, in certain key positions, the province had dedicated 
officials for whom service to the province was a key motivational goal. 
One of the most important roles in the province, apart from governor and vice-
governor, was that of the provincial marshal of the nobility. As land captain Aleksandr 
Novikov maintained, the marshal of the nobility had an extremely difficult job: holding 
an important and ‘honourable’ position, they chaired many of the province’s institutions 
(including the zemstvo assembly) but had little direct control.108 Their legal 
responsibilities were broad: all marshals of the nobility had an obligation to intercede in 
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matters of public and benefit, while the provincial marshal was involved in institutions as 
varied as the provincial committees on prisons, orphanages, temperance, administration 
and finance.109 As we will see in Chapter 2, in 1891-2 Tambov province was experiencing 
a period of significant instability with wholesale change at almost every level of 
officialdom. Into this chaotic environment as provincial marshal of the nobility would 
step Prince N. N. Cholokaev, a land owner from Morshansk uezd who would, against the 
odds, hold this position until 1917.110 In some ways, it is surprising that he never 
progressed to a vice or full governorship; if the late imperial era MVD sought provincial 
experience, Cholokaev more than fitted the bill. He served on a commission to improve 
the lives of serfs, then served as a peace arbitrator, justice of the peace and, while marshal 
of the nobility, regularly served on the zemstvo’s reporting commission, helping to 
formulate its budgets.111 Cholokaev appeared to have a natural talent for administration 
and coordination: during the famine crisis he was asked to oversee the relief effort in 
Morshansk uezd and the provincial zemstvo declared that his chairmanship greatly aided 
their ability to coordinate and determine relief policy.112 
The ascent of Prince Cholokaev as provincial marshal of the nobility, his 
longevity and leading role in the provincial zemstvo assembly, in some ways represents 
a changing of the guard in the province. For his appointment shortly preceded the death 
of the province’s other towering administrative figure, Lev Vladmirovich Vysheslavtsev 
(1830-92). Vysheslavtsev epitomised, in many ways, those performers of provincial 
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identity identified by Evtuhov: a member of the province’s archival commission, to which 
he made significant donations, he chaired the provincial uprava for a remarkable twenty 
years (1872-92) and his family was known for its charitable activities, such as funding an 
orphanage in Tambov town.113 The provincial zemstvo, which had a strong tendency to 
commemorate and celebrate even the smallest demonstration of consistent competency, 
renamed this orphanage in his honour following his death in 1892.114 While many of 
Russia’s most talented individuals came from its provinces, the idea that provinces 
themselves had an established culture and network of intellectuals that stayed within its 
borders has only recently begun to be accepted. Prince Cholokaev’s dedication to local 
service, and Vysheslavtsev’s prominent role in general, shows that provinces were 
creating an administrative and intellectual culture that was tailored to their specific needs.  
Boris Chicherin, himself born in Tambov province, captured the essence of such a culture 
by describing Vysheslavtsev as ‘an honest and decent man, of a modest liberal direction, 
modest and quiet […] but fairly quiet with a limited intellect’.115 
Chicherin himself could by no means be characterized as having ‘limited intellect’. 
Regarded as one of the leading theoreticians of Russian liberalism, he returned to his 
native Kirsanov uezd in 1883 after two years as chair of the Moscow city duma.116 
According to the leading student of his thought, Chicherin passed through two main 
ideological phases: ‘conservative liberalism’, according to which a strong state delivered 
liberal policies and, after 1866, ‘classic liberalism’, advocating civil and political rights, 
along with the necessity of a free market.117 In a way, ‘conservative liberalism’ was not 
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entirely incompatible with the ‘conservative renovation’ or ‘regularised autocracy’ 
concept that became a dominant ideological current in the reign of Tsar Alexander III. 
Underpinning both of Chicherin’s ideological phases, however, was, as Igor Yevlampiev 
argues, a recognition of the absolute value and freedom of the person and the need for a 
strong state to enable the principle of freedom to be realised completely.118 
Unsurprisingly, Chicherin’s estate served as a cultural centre for the province; active in 
the uezd and provincial zemstvos, his influence can be seen in the fact that his health was 
considered worthy of discussion by the provincial zemstvo assembly.119 
This very brief biography of three leading figures within the province shows that the 
potential for talented and dedicated, if limited, individual action. Admittedly a world 
away from the draw and spectacle of the two capitals, Tambov province nonetheless 
developed a self-sustaining provincial administrative culture. In each of the three cases, 
we can see a strong sense of provincial identity at work; the service ethic was not 
explicitly tied to the imperial government. Dedication to the province, as we will see in 
Chapter 2, was alive and well in Tambov. 
 
c. Uezd figures: Governance in Kozlov uezd 
The relationship between the province and the uezd can be seen as a reflection of that 
between the centre in St. Petersburg and the periphery (i.e. the provinces) as a whole. The 
‘centre’, however it was geographically defined, simply lacked the resources or structural 
capacity to fully govern or administer the lower levels. The resulting decentralisation out 
of necessity best expressed itself in two individuals, the uezd marshal of the nobility and 
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the land captain. They were given broad responsibilities and powers: the uezd marshal, in 
addition to uezd versions of provincial committees, oversaw land redistributions, issued 
certificates of poverty and managed charitable property, while to the peasants, the land 
captains could do ‘everything’ and resembled the old barins.120 During the famine crisis, 
they also oversaw the charitable relief effort and the land captains were responsible for 
inspecting and verifying aid requests. Thus, a disengaged and detached individual holding 
either of these posts could have potentially disastrous consequences. 
 Kozlov uezd was fortunate enough, in uezd marshal of the nobility Iu. A. 
Oznobishin (1842-98) and land captain A. I. Novikov (1861-1913), to have two 
individuals who not only took an active part in the relief effort but knew each other and 
seemingly cooperated where possible. Oznobishin’s career fell into a familiar pattern: 
service to the state followed by the taking up of a local position, the peace arbitrator, 
followed by election to the local and provincial zemstvos. Oznobishin’s military career 
was short but impressive: having served in the 18th rifle battalion, he participated in the 
conquest of Dagestan and was awarded the Order of St. Stanislav, third class, at the age 
of twenty.121 Like Cholokaev and Vysheslavtsev, Oznobishin had a long career, serving 
as Kozlov uezd’s marshal of the nobility for twenty years (1875-95) and eventually 
having a school named after him following his death in 1899.122 Such longevity might 
symbolise both stagnation and a dearth of talent or, conversely, a pragmatic recognition 
that allowing one competent individual to remain in post was a way of coping with the 
structural fragmentation and under-resourcing endemic to uezd administration. This latter 
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view is strengthened by Oznobishin’s key role in the charitable relief effort, ensuring aid 
was allocated early in the uezd, and his assistance to the provincial uprava.123 
 This, of course, is not to say that one needed to remain in post for a long time in 
order to be seen as a competent official in the provinces. In fact, some careers burned ever 
more brightly for their brevity as exemplified by the case of A. I. Novikov, a land captain 
in the ninth precinct of Kozlov uezd. Born in 1861, the son of a noted Slavophile, he went 
on to an extraordinary career, serving as land captain from 1891-96, then briefly as uezd 
marshal of the nobility before leaving Tambov province. Following a surprise nomination 
and election, he served as mayor of Baku from 1902-04.124 Novikov would achieve 
notoriety around the time of the 1905 revolution, publishing several articles and memoirs 
of his time as a land captain and mayor, even visiting Witte around the time of Bloody 
Sunday, before being exiled several times for ‘extreme opinions’.125 Ramer, in examining 
his career, sees Novikov as sharing many of the traits of the radical intelligentsia: 
committed to equality and preferring local institutions to tyranny, he was nonetheless 
uncomfortable with political realities and local intransigence, displaying a degree of 
moral pretentiousness and the self-same authoritarian behaviour he decried.126  
 Novikov’s memoir of his time in Kozlov uezd, the Zapiski zemskogo nachal’nika 
(‘Notes of a land captain’), covers not just his own role but also almost every aspect of volost’, 
uezd and provincial life. While lacking many direct historical examples, it is nonetheless an 
excellent resource for the historian. The crisis, as we will see, had a profound effect on many 
officials in Tambov province, with policies and priorities shifting as a direct response of 
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circumstances.  According to Novikov, his experience as a land captain radically altered his 
entire outlook on life. Originally supporting the 1889 Land Captain Statute as a way of 
‘pulling up’ the peasant, he later came to regard this view as ‘morally monstrous’, feeling that 
the law relied on fear and arbitrariness: ‘I prefer not to talk about legality but reality […] to 
concentrate too much large power in one pair of hands is dangerous […]’.127 To Novikov, the 
solution lay not in the imposition of paternalistic authority, but instead in legality and moral 
education. Schools were the ‘salvation’ of Russia and moral education involved the use of 
Christian morality to anchor the peasantry, reinforcing the line between good and evil; as the 
people became more legally empowered and aware, their stronger moral core would allow 
them to use the law in the manner of a full, dedicated citizen.128 They were connected into a 
single ideological project: as the level of administrative arbitrariness was decreased, the level 
of education of peasantry should be raised.129 This idea bore a striking resemblance to the 
principles behind Alexander II’s Great Reforms and shared, in some ways, the same goals as 
Stolypin’s reforms though with the deliberate absence of ‘disciplinary’ authority.130 From an 
early stage then, Novikov was on a collision course with the very governing principles of the 
imperial state. Yet his actions show that he while he derived different ideological conclusions 
from the same events, he was flexible, engaged and cooperative, crediting Iu. Oznobishin as 
a major influence on his development, character and actions.131 He was extremely active 
during the famine and subsequent cholera epidemic, funding aid loans in 1892 when the 
zemstvo reduced the allocation, providing fodder for 1,000 horses and funding six medical 
staff.132 
                                                 
127 Novikov, Zapiski zemskogo nachal’nika, p. 2, pp. 8-9, p. 58, p. 96. 
128 Ibid., p. 5, p. 8, pp. 139-46. 
129 For a detailed description of Novikov’s views see Novikov, Zapiski zemskogo nachal’nika, pp. 3-6, pp. 
35-9, pp. 96-103, pp. 139-46. 
130 Judith Pallot, ‘The Stolypin land reform as ‘administrative utopia’: images of the peasantry in 
nineteenth-century Russia’ in Social Identities in Revolutionary Russia, ed. Madhavan K. Palat (New York: 
Palgrave, 2001), p. 116. 
131 Aleksandr Novikov, Zapiski gorodskogo golovy (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia M. M. Stasiulevich, 1905), 
p. 9. 
132 Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik, No. 106 19 May 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 64-ob-66, Zhurnaly 
Kozlovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 39-43. 
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 Whether it was a noble or an increasingly radicalised official, the common 
denominator was a sense of service and commitment to the province. Oznobishin and 
Novikov may have been superlative examples, other uezds were not as lucky, but even in this 
they illustrate the extent to which individual character determined the success of the relief 
effort and a certain degree of robustness within the province. In later chapters we will see that 
the inherent capacity of the administrative structure to manage the crisis was low; on paper it 
was a fragmented and under-resourced system with far too many contradictions to simply 
function automatically. In a way that the imperial government had not intended, provincial 
and uezd administration really was individualised as it took commitment and dedication to 
start and maintain the machinery of the relief effort. In these brief biographies we have shown 
that these individuals did exist in Tambov province at every level; they were not as brilliant 
or gifted as other figures perhaps, but that is to unfairly skew the parameters. That the 
province produced a number of them, at a variety of levels, all of whom preferred a high 
provincial status than a low imperial one, illustrates a certain degree of vitality, robustness 
and provincial identity. 
 From its doctrinaire Governor to the honest if ‘limited’ chair of the provincial uprava 
and the increasingly radical land captain A. I. Novikov, Tambov province was administered 
by officials with a wide range of backgrounds and beliefs when the famine crisis began in 
1891. Meshing these various personalities and conceptions together was a challenge in and 
of itself; how would Governor Rokasovskii, a first time governor, work with Lev 
Vysheslavtsev, who as chair of the provincial uprava had outlasted several governors. While 
St. Petersburg constructed provincial administration on a conceptual level, it was up to 
individuals such as these to make the system work, no easy task at the best of times. The 
famine crisis forced them to work together and it is in the next chapter, which looks at the 
initial institutional response to the emerging crisis, that we will see how successful this 
meshing of their various interests and priorities truly was.  
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Chapter 2  
Building the relief effort: provincial and uezd institutions, June – 
December 1891 
 
Introduction  
Obliged to enforce the tsar’s will and laws and responsible for the general welfare of the 
population, governors often found it clever politics, in their annual report to the tsar, to 
suggest that stable, harmonious conditions prevailed in the province ‘entrusted’ to them.1 
It was in this vein that Governor Rokasovskii sought to turn crisis into success in his 
report for 1891, noting that despite the severe crop failure, the province’s institutions, 
especially the land captains, had come together and cooperated fully.2 Yet in the summer 
of 1891 there were warnings that more needed to be done to avoid starvation in Tambov 
province, with doubts over the province’s readiness and structures going back to 1890.3 
Rokasovskii inadvertently endorsed these critiques of provincial and uezd administration 
by admitting that the resource shortage was so severe that only loans and ‘extraordinary 
measures’ from the centre could deal with the crisis.4 
 These ‘extraordinary measures’ included requiring or suggesting the 
establishment of a new and specific institutional architecture and the issuing of 5.7 million 
roubles in imperial loans.5 In explaining how the province constructed this architecture, 
                                                 
1 Robbins, The Tsar’s Viceroys, pp. 65-7, Svod zakonov, t. 2, Obshchee uchrezhdenie gubernskoe, razdel 
2, glava 2, otdelenie 2, st. 270-5. 
2 Annual Report of Governor Rokasovskii on Tambov Province for 1891 RGIA, f. 1284, op. 223, d. 194, 
ll. 1-10. 
3 Count Pavlov to MVD 15 June 1891, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, l. 5, Robbins, Famine in Russia, p. 
1, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 13-4, Annual report of the Kozlov 
uezd ispravnik 28 March 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4174, l. 313. 
4 Annual Report of Governor Rokasovskii on Tambov Province for 1891 RGIA, f. 1284, op. 223, d. 194, l. 
5. 
5 On the loan totals see Correspondence between Rokasovskii, Durnovo, MVD Economic Dept. and the 
Committee of Ministers, 9 November 1891 – 4 January 1892, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 126-58.  
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which evolved from ad hoc measures to a formalised response, we will look at notions of 
provincial identity, moral responsibility, and the attempts to overcome structural and 
created defects. Ultimately this chapter will argue that Governor Rokasovskii’s assertion 
that the province’s institutions had a mutual and reciprocal relationship needs 
modification. Sharing a common moral and provincial sense of responsibility, they each 
had the same goal: tackling the crisis, limiting suffering and preventing starvation. 
However, this chapter will show that their strategies, often based on their role in the 
imperial hierarchy, differed and the efforts to build response architecture are best 
understood as attempts to work out this tension. 
 
Provincialism and moral responsibility 
Over the course of centuries, Russia’s geography has been divided and reconstructed into 
specific localities, giving rise to the modern, relatively stable, provinces of the nineteenth 
century and, in turn, a sense of community.6 This process resulted in often dramatically 
different views of the ‘province’. To many contemporaries in the nineteenth century, and 
some modern historians, provinces were monotonous, containing miserable provincial 
towns where abuses were possible because they were provincial, a ‘truly Gogolian picture 
of backwardness and neglect’.7 By the end of the nineteenth century, however, there was 
an increasing awareness of the perceived need for Russian society to ‘rediscover’ Russia: 
from the 1870s on many artists started depicting the peasantry or the native Russian soil 
and revelled in provincial ‘monotony’; there was nationality and pride in Russia’s 
                                                 
6 Ely, This Meager Nature, pp. 3-26, Raleigh, ‘Introduction’, pp. 1-13. 
7 Lounsbery, ‘”No, this is not the provinces!”’, p. 268, ‘”To Moscow I beg you!”’, 
(http://www.utoronto.ca/tsq/09/lounsbery09.shtml), Pintner, 'Civil officialdom, pp. 27-8. 
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difference, even it was a generic, non-specific ‘Russia’.8 Within the provinces 
themselves, this exploration of local identity and sense of community expressed itself 
culturally across the empire in a variety of ways, from stories of village origin to archival 
commissions, each centred on exploring local identity and symbols.9 
 On a more local level, this search for ‘Russianness’ quickly turned into a search 
for local and provincial identity, generally starting with historical investigations. A 
meeting point between the search for provincial identity and state initiatives, archival 
commissions were established by imperial decree in several provinces, Tambov included, 
in 1884.10 As in many other provinces, the Tambov Archival Commission appeared to 
focus primarily on cataloguing the history of buildings (especially churches and 
monasteries) and assisting in the preparation of exhibits.11 The connection between this 
cataloguing and a search for ‘Russianness’ would remain strong. In the first of his 
volumes on the history of Tambov province, I.I. Dubasov noted that looking at provinces 
would ‘develop our national consciousness’ and that it was in provinces that the ‘essence’ 
of Russia resided.12 
For others, however, provincial identity was expressed through action be it 
through social unity and resolving problems ignored by the state via charitable activities 
and organisations or local government.13 Hari Vasudevan contends that, in Tver, zemstvo 
                                                 
8 Hellberg-Hirn, Soil and Soul, pp. 126-30, Ely, This Meager Nature, pp. 3-26, pp. 192-7, pp. 223-9. 
9 Chris J. Chulos, ‘Stories of the empire: myth, ethnography, and village origin legends in nineteenth-
century Russia’ in Imperial and National Identities in Pre-Revolutionary, Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, 
eds. Chris J. Chulos and Johannes Remy (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2002), pp. 115-34, Evtuhov, 
Portrait of a Russian Province, pp. 206-26. 
10 PSZ, 3rd series, t. 4, 13 April 1884, No. 2149.  
11 See, for example, Minutes of the meeting of the Tambov scientific archive commission 11 December 
1890, 8 February 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4174, ll. 74-150. For more on the activities of the archive 
commission in Nizhnii Novgorod, see Evtuhov, Portrait of a Russian Province, pp. 220-5. 
12 I. I. Dubasov, Ocherki, t. 1, p. 3. 
13 Adele Lindenmeyr, ‘The ethos of charity in imperial Russia’, Journal of Social History, Vol. 23, No. 4 
(Summer, 1990), p. 683, Hubertus F. Jahn, ‘Charity and national identity in late imperial Russia’ in Imperial 
and National Identities in Pre-Revolutionary, Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia, eds. Chris J. Chulos and 
Johannes Rem (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2002), pp. 135-49, Hari Vasudevan, 'Identity and 
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programmes and their identification with ‘province’ were simply a framing device for 
liberal claims for greater autonomy.14 There are strong signs, however, that in Tambov 
province, provincial identity created a sense of moral responsibility to the population that 
helps to explain their actions when the crops first failed in 1891. This led to innovation 
and suggestions or requests for action that, though they were firmly rooted within the 
existing legal framework, exceeded the centre’s intentions and forced St. Petersburg to 
react.15 Uezd and provincial authorities (including Governor Rokasovskii) did not shy 
away from pressing the centre to accept responsibility for meeting its demands yet at the 
same time local demands prevailed only if they meshed with central requirements.16 
This meshing posed greater problems and conflicts for Governor Rokasovskii than 
for any other official in the province. In trying to balance them he appeared to be 
financially conservative and loyal to the centre and province in equal measure. It was 
sometimes possible to balance the competing loyalties of centre and province but this 
became more difficult from June 1891. Early that month, Rokasovskii attempted to 
reassure the MVD that he was not only taking measures to protect the population, as a 
representative of the tsar and thus of a benevolent autocracy, but also limiting the 
‘exaggerated’ zemstvo requests for imperial loans to 2,000,000 roubles by the ‘most 
accurate prudence’.17 Beneath this positioning as loyal and prudent servant lay a move 
designed to secure the province’s best interests. Attempting to ensure that any further 
                                                 
Politics in Provincial Russia: Tver, 1889-1905’ in Social Identities in Revolutionary Russia, ed. Madhavan 
K. Palat (New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 34-64. 
14 Vasudevan, 'Identity and Politics’, pp. 45-51, pp. 54-8. 
15 Evtuhov, Portrait of a Russian province, pp. 134-64. 
16 Paula A. Michaels, ‘Mobilising medicine: medical cadres, state power and center-periphery relations in 
wartime Kazakhstan’ in Provincial Landscapes, Local Dimensions of Soviet Power, 1917-1953, ed. Donald 
J. Raleigh (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), p. 235. While this article relates to the Soviet 
experience, he describes a pattern of peripheral resistance and pressure that is similar to that witnessed on 
a regular basis in the late imperial period. 
17 Correspondence between Rokasovskii and MVD Economic Department Director A.G. Vishniakov 7, 15 
June 1891, RGIA, f, 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 1-4. 
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requests for imperial loans from Tambov province should be realistic, Rokasovskii asked 
how far the famine had spread and urged loans to be issued quickly.18 Seemingly 
innocuous, this request did several things: it sought information as to what the most the 
province could expect was to save time, made clear that there would be future requests, 
and played on the potential suffering of the people as a way to speed up this allocation. 
A far less subtle attempt to press provincial needs upon St Petersburg came in 
mid-June when Rokasovskii directly opposed the law he was required to enforce. The 
Shatsk uezd zemstvo assembly, breaching articles sixty-nine and eighty of the 1889 Food 
Security Statute, voted to issue loans in grain, not cash, and to begin immediately without 
waiting for resolutions from village societies.19 Despite telling the MVD and provincial 
uprava that he agreed with the action, which he considered sensible in the context of  rye 
prices rising ‘not by the day but by the hour’, the governor was forced to use his powers 
under the 1890 Zemstvo Statute  formally to protest Shatsk’s actions.20 Rokasovskii 
presented an alternative: allowing Shatsk to issue loans in grain and prioritise purchasing 
from other parts of the empire, rebuilding local grain stores.21 This was less a rebellious 
governor and more one who combined his duty, enshrined in the tsar’s law and will, to 
protect and promote the general welfare of the province ‘entrusted’ to him, with that of 
ensuring the regime’s stability.  
The imperial regime viewed provincial stability, and governance in line with its 
priorities, as essential. George Yaney argues that the 1864 Zemstvo Statute worked 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Rokasovskii to Durnovo 17 June 1891, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 7-8, Rokasovskii to Tambov 
provincial zemstvo uprava 16 June 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 2192, ll. 16-7, Svod zakonov, t. 13, Ustav o 
obespechenii narodnogo prodovol’stviia, razdel 1, glava 4, otdelenie 1, st. 69, razdel 1, glava 4, otdelenie 
3, st. 80. 
20 PSZ 3rd series, t. 10, 12 June 1890, No. 6927, glava 3, otdelenie 2, st. 87, Rokasovskii to Durnovo 17 
June 1891, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 7-8, Rokasovskii to Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava 16 
June 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 2192, ll. 16-7. 
21 Ibid. 
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against this perception: the latitude granted to the zemstvos gave the centre the impression 
of provincial chaos.22  However, as Catherine Evtuhov argues in the case of Nizhnii 
Novgorod, provincial identity expressed itself through practice and institutional 
innovation. While the centre delineated and structured the periphery, it was the operation 
of this framework that gave meaning to emergent provincial and administrative cultures.23 
While we will see that personal and informal arrangements were essential, these 
arrangements were less chaotic and more an attempt to overcome and navigate obstacles 
that threatened a successful relief effort. With the information link on food security 
weakened by the 1890 Zemstvo Statute, in July 1891 the provincial zemstvo assembly 
and the uprava used the various legislation governing food security, local government, 
and MVD circulars to construct an explicit responsibility for each official to aid the 
peasantry and for the zemstvo to provide economic aid.24 The construction of this sense 
of responsibility was the explicit result of the need to innovate in order to address the 
province’s needs; practice developed the sense of identity, showing that Evtuhov’s 
interpretation also applies to Tambov province.  
This sense of solidarity went beyond just the provincial zemstvo and encompassed 
all levels of the administrative structure. In the Borisoglebsk uezd zemstvo assembly there 
was a dire warning of a ‘full famine’ while the Tambov uezd zemstvo uprava member 
Viktor Kosmin warned that ‘a public calamity is about to happen - a famine with all its 
                                                 
22 Yaney, Systematisation, p. 338, p. 346. 
23 Smith-Peter, ‘Bringing the provinces into focus’, p. 84 and Evtuhov, Portrait of a Russian province, p. 
248. 
24 This weakening was done via the overturning of article thirty-nine, requiring regular reporting from 
volosts to the uezd upravy, PSZ, 3rd series, t. 10, 12 June 1890, No. 6927, V, Svod zakonov, t. 13, Ustav o 
obespechenii narodnogo prodovol’stviia, razdel 1, glava 4, otdelenie 1, st. 69, razdel 1, glava 2, otdelenie 
2, st. 39. On the report by the uprava see Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 
goda, pp. 33-37 and the specific articles can be found in PSZ, 3rd series, 12 July 1889 No. 6196, razdel 1, 
glava 6, st. 61; 2nd series, t. 39, 1 January 1864 No. 40457, glava 3, st. 69 and Svod zakonovi, t. 13, Ustav 
o obespechenii narodnogo prodovol’stviia, razdel 1, glava 4, otdelenie 1, st. 70, otdelenie 3, st. 80, st. 88-
91. The specific MVD circulars are Nos. 6429/30, 10 July 1868. 
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terrible companions’.25 Both the Borisoglebsk assembly and Kosmin urged imperial loans 
and active measures by the zemstvos, Kosmin calling for ‘extraordinary measures’. 
Governor Rokasovskii immediately passed on the provincial uprava’s request for help to 
the land captains, often exhorting them (as he lacked the power to compel) to cooperate 
with the zemstvos in this ‘extraordinarily important matter’ of inspecting aid requests and 
issuing loans.26 These are not examples of groups seeking to augment their power, but 
rather officials genuinely concerned at the crisis unfolding before their eyes, affecting the 
very people they were responsible for (and, to a limited extent, responsible to). Indeed, 
this sense of obligation had little political impetus behind it; the legal obligations of the 
governor and the zemstvos were developed and expanded into a common responsibility 
while the language used clearly shows that they felt attached to the ‘province’ and bound 
to help its population. 
 
Warning signs and distress 
When looking at institutional responses to a past crisis, we should be wary of describing 
them exclusively in terms of modern approaches or examples as this ignores the context 
and challenges of the time and potentially obscures successes within given resource or 
conceptual constraints. Nevertheless, by applying recent scholarship on famine, its causes 
and prediction we can identify a serious flaw in the imperial Russian structure: its 
fragmented nature prevented both information sharing and the development of a proper 
warning system and thereby fostered an inability to notice a slow-burning agrarian crisis. 
                                                 
25 Borisoglebskoe uezdnoe zemskoe sobranie, Zhurnaly s dolakadami I drugimi prilozheniiami 
Borisoglebskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia: ekstrennogo i ocherednogo 8-go I 9-go ianvaria, 27 iiunia, 
11, 12, I 13 oktiabria 1891 goda (Borisoglebsk, 1891), p. 34, Zhurnaly Tambovsogo uezdnogo zemskogo 
sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 13-4. 
26 Correspondence between the Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava, Rokasovskii and all land captains, 
GATO, 8, 15, 25, 27 July 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 39-41, l. 46, l. 79-81. 
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While agronomy was a rapidly developing science in imperial Russia, mainly 
thanks to the work of the soil scientist Vasilii Dokuchaev, a much simpler understanding 
of the relationship between cause and effect predominated in the imperial 
administration.27 Governor Rokasovskii, the Kirsanov uezd zemstvo uprava, the Ministry 
of Finance and M.N. Raevskii, director of the agronomy depart of the Ministry of State 
Domains, all laid direct blame for the crisis on the cold winter of 1890 and, above all, the 
drought of summer 1891.28 Yet we know now that while famine and drought are linked, 
the latter does not always precede the former. Modern famine theory has shown that while 
drought may be a trigger for famine, or may even exacerbate it, it is not the underlying 
root cause. Famine can push a community over the edge but the key issue is an area’s 
vulnerability to famine or, in other words, what happens when a crisis hits and lowers 
food supply, a community’s entitlements or clashes with government priorities.29  
Understanding vulnerability leads us to the next issue, distress. Famines have been 
divided into a three-phrase process: dearth or economic distress, famishment and 
starvation, deaths and a morbidity peak (usually caused by epidemics).  Some scholars 
therefore see famine as ‘the final stage of a disease which, though not always 
conspicuous, is ever present’.30 The existence of such distress is a strong indicator that 
something was going badly and structurally wrong in Tambov province even before a 
crisis such as the crop failure. With a day’s wages for a peasant buying less than half the 
                                                 
27
 See, for example, David Moon, ‘The environmental history of the Russian steppes: Vasilii Dokuchaev 
and the harvest failure of 1891’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Sixth Series, Vol. 15, (2005), 
pp. 149-74; ‘The Russian Academy of Sciences Expeditions to the Steppes in the Late Eighteenth Century’, 
SEER, Vol. 88, No. 1/2,  (January/April 2010), pp. 204-36, Evtuhov, Portrait of a Russian Province, pp. 
30-4, 165-81, 206-27. 
28 Annual report of Governor Rokasovskii on Tambov province for 1891, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 223, d. 194, 
l. 4 and Kirsanovskoe uezdnoe zemskoe sobranie, Zhurnaly Kirsanovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia: 
ocherednogo sentiabr’skoi sessii 1891 goda s prilozheniiami (Kirsanov, 1892), pp. 10-1. 
29
 Devereux, Theories of Famine, pp. 35-42, p.183, pp. 190-191, Locke, Ahmadi-Esfahani, 'Famine 
analysis’, pp. 363-76; Michael Ellman, ‘The 1947 Soviet famine and the entitlement approach to famines’, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 24, No. 5 (Sep., 2000), 24, p. 603. 
30 Sen, Poverty and Famines, p. 55, Watts, 'Entitlements or empowerment?’, pp. 17-8, p. 9. 
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rye it did from 1889-90 in the central black earth region, the distress was already well 
entrenched before the crops failed in 1891.31 
Modern scholarship suggests that when rural communities lack the resources to 
defend themselves, it is necessary to devise famine prevention systems that do not leave 
them to their own devices, as the 1889 Food Security Statute largely did in the Russian 
case.32 In order to prevent or mitigate the effects of a famine, it is essential to ensure an 
information flow and an early warning system that does not rely on terminal indicators of 
distress such as mass migration.33 These were precisely the elements that either did not 
exist or did not function at the start of the crisis in Tambov. 
One of the most intractable problems in imperial bureaucracy was the failure to 
build a full picture through effective co-ordination and this culture of 
compartmentalisation affected Tambov province deeply. All across the province there 
were diligent local officials, mainly uezd ispravniks, who noted ongoing agricultural 
distress in 1890 and attempted to sound the alarm.34 The Kozlov uezd ispravnik even 
argued that the zemstvo needed to help the peasantry and, foreshadowing the relief effort, 
should do so via low cost grain sales.35 The provincial uprava noted the severely depleted 
reserves and suggested various methods of replenishing them, primarily by collecting 
arrears in grain and not cash.36 Thus, by early June 1891 the peasantry of Tambov 
province were deeply vulnerable to any negative change in agricultural conditions, a 
common causal factor in famines, and this position was not helped by the province’s 
traditional role as a grain exporter to the two capitals and grain-deficient north.37 
                                                 
31 Wheatcroft, ‘The 1891-1892 famine’, p. 39. 
32 Devereux, Theories of Famine, p.183, pp.190-1, Drèze, Sen, Hunger and Public Action, p. 75. 
33 Drèze, Sen, Hunger and Public Action, pp. 81-4, Devereux, Theories of Famine, p. 190. 
34 See for example Annual reports of the Kozlov, Lipetsk, Lebedian, Usman and Borisoglebsk uezds for 
1890, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4174, l. 312, l. 336, ll. 425-6, ll. 366-7, l. 400. 
35 Annual report of the Kozlov uezd ispravnik for 1890, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4174, l. 313. 
36 Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava to the Tambov provincial zemstvo assembly December 1890, GATO, 
f. 4, op. 1, d. 4174, ll. 21-30. 
37
 Dugarm, ‘Local politics’, pp. 60-1, Lin, Tao Yang, 'Food availability, entitlements and the Chinese 
famine of 1959-61', pp. 138-40. 
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Unfortunately these warnings, which might have been assembled to form a picture of 
worsening distress across the province, were essentially lone voices.  
Both the deeply fragmented structure of provincial government, designed strictly 
to limit the interaction between institutions for political reasons, and the character of 
Governor Rokasovskii and the nature of his workload, prevented any co-ordination of 
these warnings. The information links within the various levels of the province were 
vertical, from uezd to provincial zemstvo and from ispravniks to the governor, and not 
horizontal. No single element of the provincial structure had all the relevant information 
but horizontal links could have facilitated communication and helped fill in these gaps. It 
was a serious failing, and a sign of the obsessive privileging of control and political 
stability that characterized the imperial state.  Compounding this problem was the fact 
that Governor Rokasovskii, who had ultimate responsibility for this information and the 
province, often failed to connect information or anticipate problems, reacting only when 
circumstances demanded it. This strategic limitation was not unique 
to Rokasovskii, reflecting more on the culture of the imperial bureaucracy, how it trained 
officials (or did not), and the overwhelming workload governors and their chancelleries 
had. Nonetheless, his strategic oversight was to be a consistent weakness which would 
affect the relief effort.38 
There was, then, a complete absence of any form of intelligent or even 
rudimentary warning system in place, despite the dependence of Tambov province on 
agriculture. This failing was essentially inbuilt however; while the uezd zemstvos were 
late in becoming aware of a problem, they did move quickly to establish its extent. By the 
end of spring 1891, several uezd upravy expressed fears over a colossal harvest shortfall 
                                                 
38 Robbins, The Tsar's Viceroys, p. 75. 
98 
 
and at the end of May the provincial uprava asked all uezd upravy to determine, by July, 
the state of spring and winter crops and the numbers and reserves of grain stores.39 The 
provincial uprava also moved to establish reserves held by landowners and traders. The 
provincial authorities were slow to notice something was going wrong but when they did 
know, moved as fast as the crippled, fragmented structures allowed.40 
 
Initial chaos and ad hoc institutions 
In June and July 1891 the provincial and uezd institutions were confronted not only by a 
worsening crisis, but also by a structure that was being pulled in different directions with 
evidence of growing instability within Tambov itself. While the province could and did 
innovate, this innovation occurred within the context of an administrative structure that 
militated against unified, systematic administration. Mixed messages came from the 
centre and the very top; patriarchal, modern, decentralising and controlling, the regime of 
Tsar Alexander III sent confusing signals to its provincial territories.41 Tambov itself was 
also experiencing a degree of turmoil. Over the course of 1889-92, the offices of governor, 
vice-governor, provincial marshal of the nobility and the chair of the provincial uprava 
had all changed hands, the land captains were introduced and 57 per cent of the volost’ 
starshins were in place for less than a year by 1892.42 Only two of these appointments 
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would last long: A.A. Choglokov served as vice-governor until 1902 while N.N. 
Cholokaev remained the provincial marshal of the nobility until 1917.43 The overall 
impact, however, was a province with neither institutions nor officials prepared to cope. 
Patchy and uneven, the initial relief effort relied on ad hoc institutions and policies to 
manage a problem that rapidly escalated beyond all of the province’s institutions’ 
capacity to manage. 
 These difficulties, which affected provincial and uezd administration generally, 
were joined by two further difficulties specific to food security. Tension was inherent in 
legislation on this subject as food security was a zemstvo issue though the grain trade had 
to be free under the ‘vigilant supervision’ of the governor.44 Compounding this tension 
was the fact that the network of grain stores in Tambov province, designed by the 1889 
Food Security Statute to provide grain reserves, were in crisis with huge arrears and 
frequent over-reporting by volosts of the actual reserves held.45 The zemstvos then, could 
guarantee neither the information from below nor the approach of the official above: the 
governor’s legal duty and false reporting by volosts pulled the whole system in competing 
directions. 
 Despite an overwhelming number of regulations and edicts, autocratic ideology 
conspired with the use of formal and informal rules and the prevalence of 
‘departmentalism’ to prevent a culture of consistency from developing at either imperial 
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100 
 
or provincial levels.46 Inconsistency had long manifested itself in absenteeism in 
zemstvos throughout the empire (with Tambov an apparently frequent offender). Now it 
hampered the relief effort. Only four uezds - Kirsanov, Shatsk, Tambov and Borisoglebsk 
- held extraordinary meetings to tackle the crisis, with a meeting of the provincial zemstvo 
scheduled for early July.47 The lack of meetings in every uezd did not appear to concern 
Rokasovskii or the provincial uprava, who perhaps felt that nothing could be put in 
motion until the provincial zemstvo’s meeting. Nevertheless, the remaining uezds and the 
provincial uprava could at least have considered plans, even if they could not act on them. 
As a result, the relief effort was essentially stuck in neutral until July two months after 
even the defective warning mechanisms identified a problem. 
 Demonstrating a level of vitality and initiative, the four uezds who did meet before 
July generated a range of opinions and proposals on the scale of loans. Some requested 
no food loans at all, preferring to rely on existing grain stores.48 Meeting before the MVD 
imposed its initial cap on how much a province could expect in loans, the uezd zemstvos 
filled this vacuum by framing it in their own terms and embraced measures the 1889 Food 
Security Statute did not consider. As we will see in Chapter 3, this statute considered crop 
failures and famine relief purely in terms of supply and demand, a policy seen by modern 
scholarship on famine as deeply vulnerable to logistical and administrative failures.49 
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Moving beyond this, the Tambov and Borisoglebsk uezd zemstvos proposed measures 
including banning grain exports, delaying redemption payments, and controls on peasants 
yielding their allotments to wealthier peasants for ‘next to nothing’ due to ignorance of 
zemstvo aid.50 With little official guidance, several uezd zemstvos moved outside the 
space for famine relief established by the 1889 Food Security Statute to relieve the 
pressure their communities felt, again illustrating that the initiative now often lay with the 
periphery. Indeed, the provincial zemstvo assembly subsequently adopted several of the 
uezds’ proposals including applying to ban exports, delay redemption repayments and not 
wait for resolutions from village societies before purchasing aid.51 It also added its own 
voice, switching a proposed capital outlay for a psychiatric hospital to the relief effort.52 
 A closer look at the generation of these ideas suggests that the ‘vitality’ of local 
thinking should not be overstated. Like the majority of zemstvos, Tambov and its uezds 
relied on their upravy and the statutorily established revision commissions, which had an 
established responsibility for management, to develop and modify proposals.53 There was 
little in the way of debate within any of these meetings save objections in the provincial 
zemstvo assembly, all overruled, to banning exports and issuing loans to peasants who 
could not work.54 So long as they were capable of policy development, there was little 
issue with this. As we will see in chapter 5 however, when they failed to reach a decision, 
the result was often paralysis. Tambov’s institutions were simply not ready for such a 
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relief effort and it could be argued the assemblies waved through the recommendations 
simply to ensure that something was done. 
 This urgency, and sense of operating in a vacuum, was not confined to the 
zemstvos and governor. It applied equally to Tambov’s limited and scattered charitable 
infrastructure, comprising the Tambov Society for the Care of the Poor, five uezd 
societies and a local branch of the Red Cross. Most of these groups had existed only since 
1880, though the welfare society in Morshansk uezd was founded in 1868.55 Traditionally 
seen as a Christian obligation and targeted at specific categories of the ‘unfortunate’, 
charity became more ‘scientific’ in the 1880s thanks to the perceived need to tackle the 
social threat of poverty.56 Many of these institutions owed their existence to the absence 
of any official response to social problems, be it imperial or provincial: the zemstvos 
technically had responsibility for public welfare but few devoted significant resources to 
it while the law gave no indication how the zemstvos were to manage welfare.57 
 As with the uezd zemstvos, the first steps towards a concerted charitable relief 
effort demonstrated a messy and ad hoc vitality; in the absence of any delineated 
framework for activity, either legal or cultural, various organisations and individuals 
essentially created one for themselves. From July to September 1891, two main charitable 
institutions were established to collect donations and provide relief: the Special 
Committee for Collecting Donations in Favour of the Victims of the Crop Failure under 
the Tambov Society for the Care of the Poor (hereinafter the July 1891 Committee) and 
the Tambov Diocesan Committee for Collecting Donations in Favour of the Victims of 
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the Crop Failure.58 Although they provided a focus point for donations, these institutions 
lacked an on-the-ground infrastructure across the uezds and into the volosts that would 
enable them to raise local donations and allocate aid. The frequent identification of the 
state with society and the simple fact that officialdom was the only real form of universal 
infrastructure provided the solution. Mirroring the zemstvos and land captains in many 
ways, a network of uezd sectional committees with local committees (popechitel’stvos) 
in the volosts and uezds was established. Marshals of the nobility, mayors and land 
captains frequently chaired them, cementing the link between charity and officialdom.59 
The Diocesan Committee used the province’s deaneries as a structural model and 
functioned primarily as a transfer organisation, donating most of its money to the 
sectional committees and other charitable institutions.60 Once created, this new charitable 
space filled rapidly with nearly a hundred popechitel’stvos open by October and more 
opening all the time; Governor Rokasovskii was keen to stress that the only limit placed 
on their number was opportunity and the scale of need.61 A rare example of coordination 
between the state and civil society, it would continue throughout the crisis with charitable 
relief gradually evolving to fill the spaces left by the official relief effort. 
 The bureaucratic cultural values of the late imperial state expressed themselves 
even in this new charitable infrastructure. In many Russian provinces, charitable societies 
were open to all ranks and occupations.62 In Tambov, however, community links were 
emphasised: leadership roles were entrusted to local landowners, priests, teachers, doctors 
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and other ‘trustworthy’ persons.63 The rapid and ad hoc pace of capacity building also 
replicated that hallmark of tsarist administration: sparse and sporadic information. 
Governor Rokasovskii assumed that collections were proceeding ‘relatively successfully’ 
even though few accounts had been received by October.64 
 Slow to recognise that there was a serious crisis developing, the zemstvos, 
Rokasovskii and the province’s recently-established charitable institutions spent the 
summer of 1891 engaged in debate and rapid capacity building. Despite being 
prescriptive, legislation offered little guidance of what to do in this serious situation and 
the various institutions sought to fill this vacuum. Although we can rightly criticise the 
failure to coordinate from the beginning and the delay and paralysis in certain uezds, ad 
hoc institutions nevertheless served a practical purpose. Administrative machinery was 
notoriously cumbersome and the province prioritised brief discussion, rapid approval and 
execution over broader strategic thinking. A systematic approach to food and seed loan 
allocation was needed desperately but by August the province was still relying on the 
general principles established by the provincial zemstvo assembly in early July. 65  
 
The drive for institutional unity 
Throughout the entire famine crisis, the relief effort would be troubled by a fragmented 
structure and a lack of unity at every level from the imperial state to the volost’.66 The 
summer of 1891, when the focus was on defining the severity of the problem then rapidly 
developing a response architecture on an appropriate scale, marked the apogee of this 
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disorganisation. With the constantly ‘worsening’ situation of the peasantry, such as the 
drought devastating two thirds of the seed crop in Temnikov uezd, the ad hoc nature of 
the initial relief effort rapidly became unsustainable.67 The line between a healthy and 
vigorous expression of opinions and a chaotic and ineffectual response was a thin one. 
 Where one stood in relation to this line depended, it seemed, on one’s broader 
perspective on the way in which imperial Russia was governed. Governor Rokasovskii, 
understandably keen to stress his role as the nachal’nik gubernii, sought to give the MVD 
the impression that he was directly tackling rising grain prices while all of the officials in 
the province were cooperating and playing their respective parts.68 Aleksandr Novikov, a 
land captain who was clearly radicalised by his experience, argued that the main problem 
in defining the scale of the problem and dealing with it was the distrust between the 
various officials.69 As we will see in later chapters, disunity would indeed be a recurring 
theme though Governor Rokasovskii acted reasonably decisively in tackling it. The truth 
was probably somewhere in middle, in line with the opinion of the captain of the Tambov 
provincial zhendarmskaia uprava who noted that it was impossible for there to not be 
complaints about how relief was managed.70 
The need to have the each of the institutions of the relief effort working from the 
same plan now became urgent, something that St. Petersburg realised relatively early. 
While failing to recognise that it was responsible for the structural defects that were now 
hampering the relief effort, it turned its attention to how best to structure that effort. With 
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millions of roubles in loans and the image of the tsar as a defender and protector of the 
people to uphold, political and financial self-interest met half way. 
The true extent of the centre’s power was nevertheless limited by the size of the 
empire: too large for St. Petersburg to rule directly, it was traditionally managed through 
a complex tangle of laws, decrees and instructions transmitted to the provinces. The early 
months of the famine crisis would prove no different. Over the course of June and August 
1891, Durnovo ‘suggested’ that governors hold conferences with those ‘familiar’ with the 
economic situation of the peasantry from marshals of the nobility, podatnyi inspectors 
and upravy chairs.71 ‘Familiar’, a word used casually enough by Durnovo, could only be 
a relative term; the degree of isolation and detachment from the peasantry, coupled with 
unreliable statistics, was to be something that the provincial uprava would complain 
about.72 The message coming from St. Petersburg was now clear however: transcending 
normal concerns, food security required all measures to be ‘strictly united’.73 
This drive for unity and coordination touched even charitable relief, an area where 
Durnovo received stinging criticism from contemporaries and historians alike.74 
Accepting that the crisis helped shift Durnovo’s opinion on the organisation of charitable 
relief, Lindenmeyr argues that he still delayed supporting reform and taking any action 
until late 1892, after the crisis had subsided.75 Yet in 1891 Durnovo made tentative steps, 
not to structurally reform charity, but to ensure greater coordination, at least in the matter 
of relief. While recognising the effort and commitment of the Orthodox Church and 
private charity, his instructions reveal a belief common to most imperial bureaucrats that 
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matters ran better under state leadership. Heavy on formalism and governmental 
supervision, the instructions placed the governor at the head of charitable efforts, 
responsible for authorising popechitel’stvos, overseeing the composition of uezd welfare 
committees and ensuring they did not compete with the zemstvos, focusing on those areas 
or people the zemstvo could not help.76 Read plainly, the guidelines were breathtakingly 
broad in scope but, in Tambov province, reflected changes that had already taken place.  
By the beginning of October the July 1891 Committee and the local Red Cross had 
officially merged their operations, though this may have been simply the formal 
recognition of pre-existing cooperation.77 Once again the centre was ratifying moves 
made by the periphery using strong language as a way to protect its symbolic primacy. 
 
Trying to feed the population: the provincial food conference 
The Tambov provincial food conference (TPFC) reflected imperial bureaucratic culture 
and its four meetings in 1891 enable us to examine the resultant tensions in detail. In this 
section we will see that the TPFC was a space where contested visions of the peasantry, 
the role of welfare, isolation from the peasantry and local officials and adaptability existed 
simultaneously and affected each other. The TPFC moved quickly from setting broad 
policies and goals to become a forum for sharing information. As the majority of its work 
was completed at its first meeting on 4 September, that meeting will be the main focus of 
this section. 
Maintaining the centre’s symbolic primacy often involved contradictions: seeking 
modernisation in a conservative manner with greater control, the regime was often 
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reactive and gave the periphery a significant role in shaping imperial rule.78 In seeking to 
impose its vision of greater unity on the relief effort in the summer of 1891, the MVD 
obliged all affected provinces to create provincial food conferences, an institution 
pioneered in Nizhnii Novgorod by Governor N.M. Baranov. What had begun as a 
provincial innovation now became to some extent an organ of central administration, 
having received the imprimatur of the MVD.79 Rokasovskii’s praise for the operation of 
the TPFC needs to be read in this light: imperial governance culture was often self-
referencing and self-reinforcing, with rituals or reports adopted for personal or 
institutional aggrandisement and as a means of showing loyalty.80  
Nevertheless, the contrasting examples of Tambov and Nizhnii Novgorod 
provinces show how important personality and local conditions were in the operation of 
institutions such as the food conferences.81 Governor Rokasovskii’s claim that the 
provincial food conference was the ‘leading organ’ is, we will see, a little wide off the 
mark but there is no doubt that it was an important part of the relief effort’s institutional 
architecture. In many provinces it played a key role in coordinating the work of the 
zemstvos and the government though it also often reflected the positions of the relevant 
governor.82 There was no single common approach, however, and the contrast between 
developments in Tambov province and Nizhnii Novgorod is illuminating. Baranov was 
an active and ‘energetic’ governor: credited by Robbins for establishing the prototype of 
the provincial food conference he first sought to use it to control the relief effort then 
modified it slightly to become the executive body, with him at the head.83 In contrast to 
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Baranov, Governor Rokasovskii placed less emphasis on the conference’s (and his own) 
direct control of the relief effort, focusing more on rule setting and compliance. It can be 
argued that this was because he lacked strategic insight or a talent for innovation, but 
given he would drive the TPFC's adaptation in December 1891, this seems unlikely, 
especially given his military background.84 In this commitment to procedure and the 
innate correctness of imperial policy, Rokasovskii was a personification of the 
‘conservator of order’ described by Francis Wcislo.85  
As the first four meetings of the TPFC show, centrally conceived institutions often 
developed in different directions in response to local conditions and personalities. What 
started off as a policy-making body soon became responsible for oversight and later, as 
we will see in chapter 4, evolved into an appeals board in 1892. This shifting role, and 
the way in which provincial interests took charge, reflect lasting tensions in the late 
imperial state: by seeking greater regularisation, integration and more efficient 
administration, the imperial state dismantled previous command networks and negotiated 
power more freely while continuing to seek compliance via traditional language and 
expectations.86 In line with this, the first meeting of the TPFC, held on 4 September 1891, 
complied with Durnovo’s instructions from August and included the governor, vice-
                                                 
84 On the background and training of the late imperial gubernatorial corps see Mosse, ‘Russian provincial 
governors’, pp. 225-39, Robbins, ‘Choosing the Russian Governors’, pp. 541-60. On Rokasovskii’s service 
career see Full service record of the Ekaterinoslav Vice-Governor, Lieutenant Colonel Baron Rokasovskii 
11 September 1881, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 45 (1881), d. 158, ll. 8-13.  
85 Wcislo, Reforming Rural Russia, pp. 306-8. 
86 For examples of this across areas as diverse as railways, educational societies and agrarian and judicial 
reform see Don K. Rowney, ‘Imperial Russian officialdom during modernisation’ in Russian Bureaucracy 
and the State Ofﬁcialdom From Alexander III to Vladimir Putin, eds. Don K. Rowney, Eugene Huskey 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 26-45; Pallot, ‘The Stolypin land reform’, pp. 113-33; Schrader, 
Languages of the Lash, p. 189, Lieven, Russia’s Rulers Under the Old Regime, pp. 151-2; Waldron, 
Governing Tsarist Russia, pp. 15-35, pp. 97-116; Whelan, Alexander III and the State Council, p. 41, p. 98, 
pp. 47-50, pp. 202-3; Orlovsky, The Limits of Reform, pp. 10-2, pp. 173-96; Joseph Bradley, ‘The St. 
Petersburg Literacy Committee and Russian education: government tutelage or public trust?’, The Russian 
Review, Vol. 71, No. 2 (April 2012), pp. 267–94; Kimitaka Matsuzato, ‘The creation of the Priamur 
governor-generalship in 1884 and the reconfiguration of Asiatic Russia’, The Russian Review, Vol. 71, No. 
3 (July 2012), pp. 365–90; Peter Holquist, ‘"In accord with state interests and the people's wishes": The 
Technocratic Ideology of Imperial Russia's Resettlement Administration’, SR, Vol. 69, No. 1 (Spring, 
2010), pp. 151-79. 
110 
 
governor, the podatnyi inspector, the provincial marshal of the nobility, and the provincial 
and uezd upravy chairs.87 Recognising the limits of imperial power, Durnovo did allow 
others with ‘close knowledge of food matters’ to attend and Tambov, presumably via 
Governor Rokasovskii, seized on this opportunity. In addition to the above, the Kirsanov 
uezd marshal of the nobility, all the members of the provincial uprava, the manager of 
the provincial kazennaia palata and V.M. Anosov, all attended this first meeting.88 The 
membership was reduced for all subsequent meetings: after September only provincial 
officials attended with none from any uezd bodies and V.M. Anosov’s attendance appears 
to have been a one off.89 Anosov was a Borisoglebsk landowner and grain trader who 
appears to have been very active in the relief effort: he was a member of the provincial 
zemstvo’s reporting commission and was one of the most significant grain traders on 
behalf of the provincial zemstvo though there was later a dispute over receipts for the 
operation.90 There are no records that the provinces had to inform the MVD of the 
membership of these conferences or instructions to narrow the composition so we must 
assume that this was done independently by the province, again presumably by Governor 
Rokasovskii. 
The narrowing of membership to purely provincial figures can be seen not as a 
centralisation but a conscious split and demarcation in roles between the province and the 
uezd in the relief effort. As we saw in the section on provincialism and moral 
responsibility, the provincial uprava and Rokasovskii constructed a sense of solidarity 
and duty for each level of the province’s administrative structure. The first TPFC meeting 
then, with its broad membership, represented the province ‘together’, symbolically and 
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literally deciding how aid was to be allocated fairly across the province as a whole. Unlike 
Nizhnii Novgorod where Governor Baranov attempted to use the provincial food 
conference to assert his authority, in Tambov province the TPFC was intended as a 
collective action. With the basic principles established, operational control could be 
devolved while keeping the TPFC as a loose oversight committee. Again, each level of 
the administrative structure was to play its clearly defined part. We know that 
Rokasovskii emphasised decentralisation while the provincial uprava saw itself as the 
main executive body, assisting the uezd upravy so this interpretation has a strong internal 
logic.91 
There were, however, deep psychological fault lines running through the TPFC 
that affected the way in which decisions were made.  While the various officials saw 
themselves as part of a common venture, the boundaries between them remained high; 
social and corporate identities had never fully coalesced while state policies forced a 
considerable amount of interest group formation and social flux.92 The committee 
members’ approaches were dictated in part by their different conceptualisation of the 
peasantry (discussed below), and partly by their social and political status. At a meeting 
focused predominantly on resources, the provincial uprava highlighted the shortfall and 
Governor Rokasovskii described the ‘exaggerated’ amount of aid requested by the land 
captains, totalling ten million roubles.93 (That the province would ultimately receive 
slightly more than that in loans would be an irony that was lost on the governor in 1892).94 
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Despite later extolling the land captains for being ‘close to the people’, here Rokasovskii 
was rejecting that very principle. The land captains had been created to assist the 
government in the management and control of the peasantry. They were an extension of 
the paternalistic project and connection between throne and people: independent initiative 
that put pressure on the treasury was not part of the bargain.  
Disagreements on scale aside, the TPFC had to set aid allocation levels; the 1889 
Food Security Statute made the specifics the preserve of the zemstvo upravy though the 
TPFC followed the MVD’s recommendations and set aid at thirty funts per ‘eater’ per 
month.95 However, while the MVD recommended that loans should be reserved for those 
of non-working age, it did not give further details. This gave the TPFC the freedom to 
design its own criteria and in doing so, it revealed a contest between images of the 
peasantry. In much the same way as picturing the provinces and the search for 
‘Russianness’ had become an imperative part of the national project in the nineteenth 
century, so too had imagining and defining the peasantry. By the 1880s, there was a 
consensus within the upper levels of officialdom that the peasantry were split into two: a 
grey, ignorant and blameless peasant and the ‘commune eater’ (miroed) or kulak, who 
exploited their fellow residents, undermining peasant institutions.96 The kulak was the 
village strongman; he was an intelligent and self-interested exploiter who blocked outside 
access to the village and hampered or prevented reform or positive change if it threatened 
his position and power.97 The antithesis of this was the grey peasant, the impassive or 
dark slate capable of positive or negative actions depending on the general cultural 
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environment and influences.98 At once compatible and mutually exclusive, the belief in 
their existence by officials undermined their efforts to impose order on social flux and 
introduced differentiation and division; in 1891 this made the specific and ‘correct’ 
targeting of aid a practical and moral necessity.99  
Sincere enough in its concern to distribute aid fairly, the TPFC, in trying to decide 
who ‘deserved’ aid, nevertheless found itself torn between these two deeply paternalistic 
images.  Both were relatively crude and constructed impositions, revealing the distance 
between the officials and the majority of the population and the ‘othering’ of the 
peasantry. As a conservator of order, a fiscal conservative and a defender of imperial 
power and priorities, Rokasovskii was logically led to be the proponent of differentiation. 
If, as he regularly complained, the kulak sought ‘an easy profit’ by exploiting the 
peasantry or manipulating them via alcohol, differentiation was essential: they could hide 
in plain sight, receiving aid they were not entitled to and potentially draw from the more 
deserving while also vastly increasing the cost to the imperial treasury.100 Thus, he 
proposed dividing the peasantry into categories with food aid available to widows, 
pregnant women without a ‘worker’ in the family, landless peasants, soldiers and families 
where ‘eaters’ far outnumbered workers.101 Contrasted against this were the marshals of 
the nobility and every representative of the provincial and zemstvo upravy who 
considered such division ‘inconceivable’.102  
In reconciling these two competing images of the peasantry, the TPFC embodied 
many of the trade-offs, compromises and displays of power that marked imperial 
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governance. After his initial proposals were rejected, Rokasovskii pivoted slightly and 
proposed that food loans would go only to the following categories: widows, pregnant 
women with no worker in the family, landless peasants, retired soldiers, and peasant 
families where workers were outnumbered by non-workers by a minimum of three to 
one.103 Rokasovskii compromised by allowing for loans outside these groups by uezd 
officials once the merit of the claim was attested to by local residents and approved by 
the provincial uprava.104 This compromise, however, did not change the fact that he had 
largely achieved his aims: there would indeed be differentiation, though with a certain 
degree of flexibility built in. This pattern of gubernatorial dominance in the provincial 
food conferences appears to have been common. Robbins does not explain why but a 
combination of the governor’s traditional power and link to St. Petersburg and his role as 
arbiter ‘above the fray’ seems the most likely.105 Now more managerial than vice regal, 
governors needed to be able to reshape proposals to reach a compromise; a skill 
Rokasovskii appeared to possess and would use often. This was a vital skill in a crisis; 
despite Governor Baranov’s undoubted ability, his uncompromising nature would lead 
him into serious conflict with the officials in Lukoianovskii uezd, delaying the relief effort 
and causing considerable amounts of unnecessary tension.106 Existing in a vague mid-
point between official and informal, the TPFC’s internal dynamics could be relatively 
fluid, something Rokasovskii recognised and navigated reasonably well.   
Aside from visions of the peasantry, the TPFC’s decisions reflected an 
internalisation of the centre’s conceptions on the role of the state in a social catastrophe, 
with harsh results. With limited funds available for public welfare, Tambov’s zemstvos, 
like most others, focused on the areas defined by law, institutions such as orphanages, 
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hospitals and schools.107 The provincial zemstvo had already reallocated some of the 
medical budget to the relief effort, further limiting what could be moved around.108 The 
explicit role of the state, or its provincial organs, was to provide social infrastructure and 
not charity. Combined with Governor Rokasovskii’s fiscal conservatism, this resulted in 
a move that seems unnecessarily parsimonious, arbitrary and cruel: as in other provinces, 
the TPFC denied food loans to children younger than two.109 There was also a strict divide 
in the responsibilities of charitable and official relief: welfare was to be the explicit 
preserve of private charitable institutions, aiding the zemstvos, while official aid outside 
of the limited food loans was to be mainly through the sale of rye or surrogates (preferably 
flour) at cost price or less, capped at sixty funts per ‘eater’ per month.110 The 1889 Food 
Security Statute treated famine relief as a market and supply issue while Rokasovskii saw 
aid as emergency assistance; not generous but sufficient to prevent starvation.111 Thus, 
those who were not in extreme need were expected to support themselves (and, it seems, 
their young children), despite the TPFC noting the absence of paid work and rising prices. 
However, as famine shifts communities from food producers to weakened market 
dependent consumers, it establishes an often brutal hierarchy of rights for access to food; 
if ever there was a time for universalism, it was surely then.112 As Amartya Sen highlights, 
focusing exclusively on supply and market functions does not treat the real problem: the 
ability to purchase food, not the availability of food.113 Yet we should recognise that this 
decision was framed by almost impossible resource pressures and an intellectual 
conception of welfare that is very different to modern ones. 
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 While we might feel uncomfortable at some of the TPFC’s decisions, it did 
complete its main task, the establishment of principles and policies for the relief effort. 
The entanglement of moral and practical considerations produced a thin safety net that 
would, as we will see in chapter 5, come under further pressure, occasionally proving to 
be insufficient. Operational control, for the rest of 1891, now transferred almost entirely 
to the provincial and uezd upravy with occasional case specific help from Rokasovskii. 
Essentially somnolent for most of the rest of 1891, the TPFC acted as way for the 
provincial institutions to be sure that the relief effort was proceeding consistently and 
successfully.114 This was not a derogation of responsibility but, instead, the first of its 
many adaptations. The relief effort was plagued by serious communication difficulties 
and information gaps; full of statistics and overviews, the TPFC became the solution to 
this gap, insofar as was possible. The TPFC was an ad hoc body imposed from the centre 
and Tambov’s response was to use it in a flexible manner to address specific 
circumstances as they arose. 
 
Requesting funding  
No matter how imperfect the relief architecture that emerged over the course of 1891, or 
the various tensions and mistakes that shaped it, vast amounts of money would be needed 
to achieve its aims, whether they were the correct ones or not. With a provincial food 
reserve of only 480,000 roubles, large arrears and financial difficulties affecting the 
provincial zemstvo and at least one uezd zemstvo, the province simply did have not 
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anything approaching the reserves needed.115 Indeed, the first TPFC meeting 
unanimously agreed that the first tranche of imperial loans was not even remotely 
sufficient to tackle the crisis.116 The TPFC’s sense of desperation is explained by the 
province’s complete dependence on irregular imperial loans to fight a crisis advancing 
with frightening speed and menace through the province’s towns and villages. 
 The focus of this section will be on this struggle to secure enough resources to 
fight the worsening crisis. Between July and December 1891 the province was allocated 
5.7 million roubles in tranches of 2 million, 500,000, 2.4 million and 1 million roubles; 
200,000 of this was redirected for insurance purposes.117 However it is not the amounts 
that are important here but the process. The process of interaction, between the province 
and the centre and within the province, swung between conflict, tension and cooperation; 
where one stood in the imperial hierarchy played a leading role in determining the 
approach one took. Imperial and official identity was a fractured entity with provincial 
identity cutting across it. 
 The relationship between a provincial zemstvo and the province’s governor 
embodied the complicated and fractured nature of these identities. Bound together by the 
law to serve the interests of the province and the empire, they occupied different positions 
in the imperial hierarchy and their responsibilities were frequently contradictory. 
Governors could, thanks to the 1890 Zemstvo Statute, intervene in zemstvo affairs and 
had to protect the free market in the grain trade while the zemstvos protected food security 
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in general.118 To this was added the complicated and dual nature of the governorship: a 
creature of the Tsar, he was St. Petersburg’s man while he also had to serve and protect 
the interests of the province.119 Governor Rokasovskii, by virtue of his position, needed 
to face in two different directions, upwards towards St. Petersburg and downwards to the 
province. Thus, while the very structure of government forced the zemstvos and the 
governor together for the welfare of the province, the expectations it placed on both 
institutions, especially Rokasovskii’s duty to the centre, pulled them apart at the same 
time.  
 The process of requesting loans from St. Petersburg crystallised tensions, not 
unusual during the crisis when, in many province, relations between governors and 
provincial zemstvos were ‘correct, if not cordial’.120 Along with many governors, 
Rokasovskii recommended a significant reduction in the provincial zemstvo’s loan 
estimates from 2.9 million to 1.5 million roubles.121 There is a possibility that Rokasovskii 
was in some way punishing the provincial zemstvo for its request: in June he had assured 
the MVD that, after his personal intervention, any request would be limited to 2 million 
roubles.122 The decision by the provincial zemstvo to request significantly more than this 
potentially undermined his image as an effective manager and viceroy: as we saw at the 
start of this chapter, it was in a governor’s best interests to present the image of a 
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harmonious province, with the governor the negotiator-in-chief, above provincial politics. 
Nevertheless, he continued to help the provincial uprava secure grain and involve every 
level of officialdom as doing so supported his strategy: moderate, fair and efficient - not 
profligate - spending.  
Focused on holding costs down as much as possible through moderating grain 
prices, zemstvo estimates and the use of loans, Rokasovskii’s strategy differed sharply 
from the provincial uprava’s.123 The provincial uprava adopted a simpler strategy based 
on moderating prices through a ban on exports, backed by a much larger allocation of 
loans from the imperial treasury. That two competing strategies could exist despite the 
common goal of ending the crisis speaks to the longstanding priorities of the imperial 
state. Tsars had often used disunity, fragmentation and institutional competition to control 
the machinery of state.124 Allowing relatively autonomous institutions far outside the 
capital to work together without central interference raised the possibility, however 
remote, of creating a space for further political resistance. As well as seeking to address 
the ‘chaos’ in provincial administration, the ‘counter-reforms’ sought to extend the state 
into the village, using this integration for greater central control.125 This move, and the 
MVD’s known hostility to the zemstvos, might have provided an opportunity for 
Rokasovskii to control the relief effort, as Governor Baranov had done in Nizhnii 
Novgorod.126   
                                                 
123 Correspondence between Rokasovskii and Durnovo 10, 16, 18 July 1891, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, 
l. 13, ll. 44-7, Special Conference with A. G. Vishniakov, Director of the MVD economic department 28 
July 1891, Rokasovskii to Durnovo 11 September 1891 and Minutes of the TPFC 4 September 1891, RGIA, 
f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 56-66, ll. 87-90, ll. 92-7. 
124 Pearson, Russian Officialdom, pp. 14-21. 
125 Gaudin, Ruling Peasants, pp. 28-49, Orlovsky, The Limits of Reform, pp. 202-205, 250, Pearson, ‘The 
Origins of Alexander III’s Land Captains’, p. 386, p.401. 
126 Correspondence between Rokasovskii and Durnovo 10, 16, 18 July 1891, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, 
l. 13, ll. 44-7, Pearson, Russian Officialdom, p. 211, Whelan, Alexander III and the State Council, p. 198, 
Manning, The Crisis of the Old Order, p. 44 
120 
 
However, the records show that the provincial uprava was often far more effective 
at implementing its strategy than the governor was. From July to September 1891 he 
demanded ‘extraordinary care and prudence’ in how need was defined (baulking at the 
land captains’ eventual estimate) and questioned how fast the upravy spent the first 
tranche of loans.127 By mid-September, however, he moved to requesting more than the 
provincial uprava.128 Governor Rokasovskii’s strategy to resist ‘exaggerated’ estimates 
of need had collapsed quickly; he ultimately become part of the provincial uprava’s 
strategy for securing funding. 
The provincial uprava achieved this by inverting the strategy and tactics 
employed by Rokasovskii and the MVD, altering and limiting the options open to 
Rokasovskii. After Rokasovskii succeeded in capping the initial tranche of imperial loans 
at 1.5 million roubles, only one narrative would emerge: a worsening crisis that, on the 
evidence of the provincial uprava, required ever increasing resources from the centre. 
Circumstances and the provincial uprava’s clever use of statistics, a resource implicitly 
trusted by the imperial government, pushed the governor into supporting the uprava’s 
strategy. From the reign of Tsar Nicholas I on, statistics were seen as a route to total 
information and control; information implicitly served the state as it prevented 
exaggeration, evasion or non-compliance.129 This privileging of statistics as a neutral 
arbiter could allow zemstvos to use them, if they had sufficient volume of information, to 
take control of the message that was being fed to St. Petersburg. To an extent, the 
provincial uprava used the MVD’s demands for more and better information against 
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itself.130 This re-purposing of structures and links intended to further MVD and 
gubernatorial control would re-emerge over the course of 1891. 
The provincial uprava’s successful strategic adaptation was achieved 
by repurposing the MVD's obligation that governors coordinate the relief effort 
architecture based on regular information from the provincial uprava.131 By switching to 
smaller, case-specific requests, accompanying them with as much information as 
possible, it circumvented Rokasovskii’s objections effectively; his military background 
and bureaucratic conditioning made him receptive to quantitative, verifiable information 
and direct human observation. The first and most significant step was made by 
Rokasovskii: after travelling to Lipetsk he informed the MVD, only two days after 
recommending the 1.5 million rouble cap that this would not be enough and further loans 
would be necessary in December.132 Seeking to get in front of the crisis, as he wanted to 
provide guidance to the provincial uprava on how much it could and should request, 
Rokasovskii inadvertently admitted that he had been wrong initially. Reflecting the 
tensions governors were subject to, Rokasovskii could now be seen as either flexible or 
vulnerable. 
In many ways, it is easy to see why Rokasovskii seemed to vacillate early on. The 
simple fact was that at the same time as the MVD expected more from governors, it 
undercut the governors’ ability to meet these increased expectations. Using the 
innovations and efforts of several provinces to construct a rudimentary template for the 
relief effort, the MVD emphasised the role of the governor as a coordinator. Durnovo was 
clear that the zemstvos should have a relatively free hand in the management of relief as 
conditions allowed.133 Thus, Rokasovskii was expected to coordinate the relief effort, 
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chair the TPFC, keep costs down for the MVD and respect the autonomy and authority 
of the zemstvos. Despite Rokasovskii's evident skills as a negotiator, and his sometimes 
calming presence (such as during the 1892 cholera epidemic), the truth was that the 
MVD's conflicting requests were often too hard to balance.134  
The relationship between a governor and the provincial uprava was a complex 
balancing act; the MVD’s encouragement of new structures created new public, 
provincial spaces in which not just information but the performance of power were now 
relatively open. Not a strong form of accountability, these new venues shifted Governor 
Rokasovskii’s role further to that of a manager; results could only be achieved by 
compromise. The pressure this put the governor under was plain to see: Rokasovskii now 
defended the provincial uprava’s pleas for more resources, even in the face of A. G. 
Vishniakov, the director of the MVD’s economic department who toured affected 
provinces, essentially brow beating them into lowering their requests.135 Vishniakov may 
have been a powerful official from St. Petersburg but Rokasovskii was a governor: 
managing a province involved a degree of practical politics, compromise and flexibility 
that a bureaucrat’s role often did not. Vishniakov’s presence in Tambov province was 
also temporary, Rokasovskii’s (while governor) was not. 
In the case of Rokasovskii, the idea of a governor’s ‘presence’ took on a very 
physical dimension and contributed to his gradual conversion to the zemstvo’s arguments. 
His background in the infantry shaped his approach to governing and managing a crisis: 
problems were best resolved through direct, hands-on inspection.136 Governor 
Rokasovskii clearly took the idea of ‘knowing’ the province to heart. As the tsar’s 
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representative in the province, physical tours acted as a manifestation of imperial power 
and ritual: a symbol that the sovereign was attuned to the needs of their subjects while it 
gave local figures an opportunity to demonstrate loyalty to the regime. A 
tour allowed Rokasovskii to perceive and understand the crisis for himself while also 
positioning him as a vigorous and caring governor. This was a tactic he understood well 
and had used previously in Ekaterinoslav province during a crop failure there, and so he 
toured Tambov province from July to October 1891. Unfortunately for St. Petersburg, he 
returned increasingly supportive of the provincial uprava’s requests for further loans, 
warning the MVD that ‘the critical situation of the peasantry has turned out to be in a 
much worse light’ than he had previously imagined.137 Personal tours, then, could 
strengthen the link between the regime and the people though there was a risk that a 
governor could go ‘native’. 
To a certain extent, the crisis forced governors to choose sides and through the 
provincial uprava’s clever use of new political spaces and circumstances, Rokasovskii 
was gradually manoeuvred into choosing the side of the uprava and the province. From 
his first admission that he underestimated the crisis’ severity and his defence of the 
provincial zemstvo to Vishniakov in July, on several occasions Rokasovskii consistently 
defended the provincial uprava’s claims that the loans from St. Petersburg were 
’completely insufficient’.138 Rokasovskii now generally accepted the estimates of the 
provincial uprava as accurate; the information battle was over and the uprava had won.  
Governor Rokasovskii backed the provincial uprava’s estimate of 6 million roubles in 
November and, to secure the release of 1 million roubles promised but not yet sent by the 
                                                 
137 For his personal tours, see Vice-Governor Rokasovskii to the MVD Department of General Affairs, July 
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MVD, he essentially threatened the MVD. 139 He told them he had issued commands 
spending the entire 2.4 million and needed the 1 million to prevent grain purchasing 
ceasing.140 Provincial zemstvos could, after an MVD decision, request loans at any time 
but permission for loans exceeding fifty thousand roubles legally required the permission 
of the Committee of Ministers.141 Rokasovskii effectively treated a preliminary 
notification as permission and spent the loan before it was transferred. Governor 
Rokasovskii fulfilled his duty to the centre by using the power bestowed upon him by St. 
Petersburg in service of the provincial uprava and the province ‘entrusted to him’. 
This necessity to immerse oneself in the province exposed the governor to the 
province’s politics. Tambov’s political identity was relatively strong and the provincial 
uprava was its strongest representative. For a start, it had vastly more knowledge of the 
province: its chair had served in that position since 1872 while another uprava member, 
A. N. Muratov, had been a member of the zemstvo since 1866.142 This level of experience, 
local knowledge and an established statistical bureau faced off against Governor 
Rokasovskii: only in the province since 1888, on his first (and it turned out, last) 
gubernatorial posting, with a new vice-governor and no time to form any major political 
alliances.143 This sense of isolation was likely quite pronounced in 1891: there were 
doubts over his conduct in St. Petersburg and long-running allegations of clashes with 
powerful provincial figures (which several years later spilled over into complaints of 
‘liberalism’ in the provincial zemstvo and a feud with the Lipetsk uezd marshal of the 
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nobility).144 A new arrival with few allies in the province, Rokasovskii arguably needed 
the provincial uprava more than it needed him. Allegiances could be few and far between 
for governors: often disliked or seen as an ‘outsider’ in their province and seen as a tool 
or resources to be managed by the MVD, it makes sense that Rokasovskii chose to stand 
with the provincial uprava. Also viewing the crisis from a provincial level, the provincial 
uprava presented itself as the firmest ally he could expect. A governor’s status was always 
in flux with little consistency on how a request or action would be received by the centre: 
cooperating with the provincial uprava offered control and a degree of certainty. His 
position, and the tsar, demanded harmony and ‘closeness to the people’; operating from 
an isolated centre governors were subject to strong pressures from above and below. The 
worsening crisis, the strategy of the provincial uprava, the centre’s slow response 
and Rokasovskii’s relatively short tenure as governor to date, pushed Rokasovskii to 
gamble that cooperating with the provincial uprava was the best way to meet the centre’s 
objectives.145  
Imperial and provincial identity often mixed in strange ways; if a former governor 
of Nizhnii Novgorod, Aleksei Odintsov, is right in saying that governors could do little 
good by intervening, only evil, a hands-off approach was the only way to guarantee 
good.146 Zemstvo deputies often saw themselves as outside government but were backed 
up by Rokasovskii, a creature of that very government, as he fought with St. Petersburg 
to secure sufficient funds to carry out the duties his imperial identity demanded.147 As his 
approach to the cost of the crisis shows, Rokasovskii was a curious mix of hands-off and 
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managerial; it was his hands-on approach of touring the province that helped to move him 
closer in the direction of allowing the provincial uprava to control the tempo of the 
operation and its cost.  
Every deceptively simple letter or telegram from Governor Rokasovskii regarding 
imperial loans for the relief effort was filtered and negotiated through a complicated web 
of politics and identity. Just like in the provinces, imperial officials also had a complicated 
and fractured identity; almost the inverse of Tambov, it was government staff who sought 
to deny or undermine funding requests while Durnovo was more open to them. As Yaney 
argues, the bureaucracy had ‘systematised’ by developing a ‘common pretence’ based on 
seeking and preserving a formal legal-administrative order.148 Yet the actions of these 
same officials appears to violate what Rowney sees as the normal and expected order, 
where the minister was superior and actions followed law, not vice versa.149 As discussed 
in Chapter 1, the development of legality with the autocrat as the source of this legality, 
made bureaucrats the defenders of ‘regularised autocracy’ and integrators of the province. 
In 1891, this meant attacking fellow servants of the tsar to achieve the same strategic goal, 
the fulfilment of their imperial duties. An anonymous report from the Ministry of Finance 
in August 1891 is typical: arguing that Tambov’s loan requests were based ‘solely on 
unverified data’, it claims the loans will be ‘squandered’ simply by virtue of being 
awarded to the zemstvos and sought to undermine the very nature of the crisis by arguing 
that the province was no worse affected than other areas.150 In an unnoticed irony, given 
that the ministry helped create this situation, it echoed several uezd zemstvos in 
complaining that the data was problematic as it came from volost’ boards.151 The 
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notoriously moribund and fragile MVD economic department joined in the attack: after 
failing to browbeat the province into reducing its future requests, Director A. G. 
Vishniakov persuaded Durnovo to call for a new inspection of need to tackle 
‘exaggerated’ requests, and again attacked the provenance of the zemstvos’ data.152  
The two imperial ministers, Durnovo and Vyshnegradskii, arrived at very 
different positions to the above bureaucrats despite similar attitudes to the province and 
the same information; hierarchical status appears to have produced distinct methods of 
conception, interpretation and political engagement. Durnovo, the MVD minister, was 
like Rokasovskii in many ways: generally competent and sometimes unable to impose his 
identity, though it seems that Rokasovskii was slightly more strategically able. As they 
served together in Ekaterinoslav province, this is not a huge surprise, they reinforced their 
common behaviour. Durnovo’s initial attempts to limit the loans to each province 
crumbled as the seriousness of the crisis, coupled with a lack of assistance from the 
Committee of Ministers, overwhelmed the MVD’s attempts to control the relief effort.153 
Ivan Vyshnegradskii, the Minister for Finance, was a different character; the infamous 
quote attributed to him, ‘we may not eat but we will export’, has long summed up his role 
during the famine for many. Seeing Vyshnegradskii’s vigorous fiscal reform policies, 
aimed at balancing the budget and reaching the gold standard, as abjectly sacrificing the 
peasantry for industry has been challenged: Russia’s economy and tax receipts recovered 
quickly from the famine and 162 million roubles were eventually spent on famine relief, 
in a state with a long history of deficits and a notorious dependency on alcohol 
revenues.154 Vyshnegradskii eventually sacrificed the campaign for the gold standard to 
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the relief effort by authorising the massive loan programme and banning exports of grain 
to ease domestic prices. The two ministers sacrificed various strategic approaches and 
goals for the broader one of imperial duty: for Durnovo it was control and mastery of 
events while for Vyshnegradskii it was the attempt to reach the gold standard. 
While Durnovo and Vyshnegradskii were largely personalities affected by events, 
there are two examples, one negative and one positive, that show how the reverse could 
happen. Imperial Russia was a society in which informalism, individualism and quasi-
officials network dominated and shaped much of the governing culture.155 The key 
dynamic in the below examples is power: in one an official seeks to demonstrate his 
power to reassert a perceived wounding of his authority, in the other an active and talented 
minister uses his status to cow Durnovo into releasing additional funds. Vishniakov, 
perhaps smarting from his failure to limit Tambov’s aid claims, fought the provincial 
zemstvo’s desperate requests to replenish its fire insurance fund, emptied by the drought’s 
extreme heat; despite Rokasovskii’s support for the claims, he eventually allowed only 
100,000 roubles for these claims, provided they were taken from the famine relief funds 
and made it clear that only Rokasovskii’s support had secured the release of the 
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funding.156 A relatively vindictive statement, it credited Rokasovskii with securing the 
province an effective funding cut, sold as being better than the alternative. There would 
be some relief, however, thanks to court politics and status. Count Illarion Ivanovich 
Vorontsov-Dashkov was the Minister of the Imperial Householder and a landowner in 
Tambov province; noticing that 15,000 desiatins of land were unsown he exerted pressure 
on Durnovo to release extra funding.157 The result, for this small amount of land, was an 
additional 500,000 roubles, an exhortation to Rokasovskii to care of the problem quickly 
and the recognition, even in the province, that it was the minister and not the governor 
who secured the additional funding.158 
In the end, Rokasovskii’s assertion that the province’s institutions had a 
harmonious and reciprocal relationship in 1891 was not strictly true. Neither was it 
entirely false. Broader themes such as loyalty to the tsar, the notion of public service, and 
occupying a relatively privileged service status bound officials of all kinds together but 
in 1891 the crisis was another, altogether more prosaic one. Yet this single purpose was, 
if not shattered, then certainly distorted by the fractured mosaic that was the empire’s 
administrative and cultural structure and hierarchy. Complicating this further was the 
notion of provincial identity; one’s geographical position determined the experienced 
political and cultural reality. Tambov’s response reflects all of these tensions; agreement 
and cooperation was difficult and not guaranteed. Yet, bound by provincial identity and 
a sense that something needed to be done, a lot was achieved. By December 1891 over 5 
million roubles in loans were secured, new structures established, Rokasovskii had 
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defended the province to St. Petersburg and food loans had begun. Hobbled by 
psychological and legal boundaries, the response architecture was far from perfect but 
represented the best the province could achieve. 
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Chapter 3 
The initial relief effort in action, June – December 1891 
 
Introduction  
On 15 June Vasilii Ivanovich Pavlov, the provincial marshal of the nobility in Minsk 
province who owned an estate in Usman uezd, wrote that the state of grain in Tambov 
province was ‘terrible’ (uzhasno); the wheat was exhausted, rye would produce only 
seeds while the millet and oat crops were ruined. Even more ominously, Pavlov warned: 
‘There will be a famine if measures are not undertaken’.1 While it took several months to 
establish the institutional superstructure of the relief effort, such as the food conference 
and charity committees, the work of physical relief demanded by Pavlov swung into 
operation almost as soon as the crisis became apparent, and it is on this relief effort that 
this chapter will focus. What emerged from the debates in these initial months was a relief 
effort based around two main operations:  the purchase of grain and seed to sow the fields 
for the next harvest, and the provision of food for the population.   
Did the relief effort work? The testimony of the uezd and provincial zemstvos at 
the end of the year gives a picture of unqualified success illustrated by various self-
congratulatory resolutions of thanks.2 Governor Rokasovskii also took this attitude and 
told the first TPFC meeting on 4 September that the ‘united’ efforts of the government 
and zemstvos had deterred peasants from abandoning sowing the fields and prevented the 
disaster that would have resulted. In his 1892 annual report to St. Petersburg he went 
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further still, claiming that it was the various government commands regarding the timely 
seeding of fields and delivery of food to the needy that had decreased the ‘sharp 
significance’ of the crop failure.3 Yet officials painted a different picture during the relief 
operation itself: in late July the provincial zemstvo informed Rokasovskii that it was 
having difficulty locating and delivering sufficient quantities of grain for sowing fields 
while in late November, Vice-Governor A. A. Choglokov told Rokasovskii that for grain 
bought in the North Caucasus, which was intended for food aid, ‘shipping goes extremely 
slowly’.4 There were also serious concerns in St. Petersburg at the relief effort as a whole: 
A.A. Polovtsev noted in October 1891 that all ministers were struck by the knowledge 
that it would take ‘ceaseless’ measures to deal with the crisis while the influential former 
Minister of Finance, A.A. Abaza, had become ‘sunken, drawn and aged’ by the crisis.5 
Even so, we cannot say that the relief effort over the first half of the crisis was a 
total failure; the difficulties experienced in Tambov bear witness to some of the wider, 
structural problems that affected the authorities’ response across the entire famine-
stricken area. Additionally, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the relief effort was 
established in a hurry with a reliance on ad hoc institutions and a strong desire to ‘do 
something’. Consonant with the overall argument of this thesis that while Tambov 
province’s institutions were structurally ill-prepared for such a crisis, they nevertheless 
did not collapse, this chapter will suggest that they coped as well as could have been 
expected in the circumstances by focusing on the relationships and interactions the relief 
effort necessitated. Since the Food Security Statute 1889 laid out how many of these 
interactions were to proceed, as well as how food relief was conceived, this legislation 
will frame much of the rest of the chapter. We will then look at the relief effort and, to 
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contextualise the broader issues, a case study of the Vice-Governor’s investigation of the 
management of relief in Spassk uezd, in December 1891. 
    
Food as ‘serious need’ 
In order to understand how food was conceptualised, we must understand how the central 
government in St. Petersburg had traditionally understood and structured the food relief 
problem. The central and provincial authorities conceived of ‘food’ in different ways, and 
the provincial argument that food was more than just a purchasable commodity was 
eventually victorious. St. Petersburg and Rokasovskii initially saw the famine as a supply-
led or economic crisis that could be tackled with financial aid and loans. However, 
pressure from regions such as Tambov province quickly changed this. Seeing the famine 
as a resource crisis where the priority was to take care of the growing hunger required a 
shift in the way the government thought of crises such as this, as well as a reinterpretation 
of the law.  
The Food Security Statute 1889 framed the overall way in which the government 
saw the crisis and made certain presumptions about how relief was to operate. The grain 
and livestock trades were to be free at all times, with the governor tasked with enforcing 
this.6 For famine relief, the provincial zemstvo uprava was to maintain local grain stores 
and a food capital reserve, loans from which were to be managed with the ‘closest 
judgment’, only on application from affected village societies and only issued in cash.7 
To respond to and prevent a crisis, the market was tasked with solving supply and 
distribution problems, revealing that the central government saw need as an issue of 
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purchasing power. A crude precursor of modern developments in famine economics such 
as the ‘entitlement theory’: however, such a view neglected issues such as price and 
supply competition and the fact that wealthier provinces, already at an advantage, could 
theoretically ‘suck up’ the majority of tradable grain reserves.8 Above all else, in the event 
of a widespread crop failure and food shortage, what exactly were the peasantry supposed 
to spend the cash loans on?  
With an economic view of the crisis and little sign of the coming distress, imperial 
officials (the MVD and Governor Rokasovskii) held that food loans were either 
unnecessary or could be kept to a bare minimum to replace the failed crops in expectation 
of the new harvest.9 We have already seen, in Chapter 2, Rokasovskii’s and the MVD’s 
initial reluctance to meet the provincial zemstvo’s requests for loans and the preference 
for aid via sales of cost price grain. This measure, and the lowering by the Ministry of 
Finance of rail tariffs for transporting grain to several affected provinces, can be seen as 
supply-led. The issue was price and supply and the MVD’s measures were aimed to 
unlock what they saw as a mismatch between the empire’s supply and the demand in the 
affected regions.10 The MVD also sought to tackle wage issues by advertising road repair 
programmes.11 The MVD and the governor had come to realise that a crisis of serious 
proportions was developing, but they still perceived it as an economic crisis. When food 
aid was mentioned, it was either in the context of moderating expenses, or as a problem 
of supply that could be tackled by easing distribution or increasing the purchasing power 
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of the peasantry. ‘Food’ was conceived as a generic economic term: there was little sense 
of it as the dividing line between life and death.  
This view of the growing crisis was undermined by pressure from the various 
provincial and uezd institutions. While by no means the only province to push for ‘food’ 
to be seen not as an economic issue, but one of desperate need, Tambov is useful to 
illustrate how pressure from the periphery could force a change in the policies of the 
centre. As covered in Chapter 2, pressure began as soon as a problem was noticed with 
Shatsk issuing aid in grain instead of cash, an action Rokasovskii supported in principle 
but objected to in practice. The governor asked the MVD for a decision on the matter and 
for permission to moderate prices by allowing the zemstvos buy grain from other 
provinces.12 While his concern was to lower the price of grain, he now recognised that 
the situation required food, not cash, and action had to be taken quickly. In this he was 
some way behind the provincial zemstvo, who had already taken a ‘food first’ stance, 
recommending that aid should be in kind and not cash, and had asked for a temporary ban 
on exports abroad.13 
Over the next few months this sense of a growing crisis in the basic availability 
of food continued to build. Rapidly overwhelmed by a shortage of officials, the uezd 
zemstvos persuaded Rokasovskii to ask all land captains to assist in verifying requests for 
loans.14 By August signs of distress were coming in from both the north and south of the 
province, which had been affected rather differently. From opposite ends of the province, 
the uezd marshals of the nobility in Kirsanov and Shatsk both warned of impending 
famine and urged a vigorous response.15 Police information revealed that one town in 
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Temnikov uezd went several days without food until private charity and the zemstvo 
intervened and that aid might best be issued in surrogate crops as ‘the need in the province 
is so great’.16 
From the crisis’ onset, Tambov’s provincial and uezd institutions pressured the 
governor, and therefore St. Petersburg, to see food policy in terms of urgent human need 
rather than economic management. This initially took the form of reports and aid requests 
borne out of analysis of harvest data. From the beginning of August 1891 we can see a 
distinctive change in tone; the evidence became more personal, direct and urgent. Now 
‘masses of hungry population’ and the ‘unfortunate’ were threatened by famine while the 
need in the province was ‘great’. 
What impact did all of this have on the position of the central government? 
Despite its commitment, for various reasons, to moderate expenses on the crisis and 
reliance on the market, reports from the provinces made it impossible for the MVD not 
to realise that what was happening was neither localised nor minor, but a systematic and 
catastrophic failure in the empire’s agricultural heartland. The MVD’s response, calling 
for cheaper surrogates to be used in aid instead of rye, may seem penny pinching, but the 
instruction was based on medical evidence that they provided better nutrition.17 Following 
shortly on from this, on 3 August, the MVD overturned sections of the 1889 Food Security 
Statute, allowing the zemstvos to issue food loans in grain and easing the restriction that 
they had to wait for requests from village societies before purchasing grain. This 
seemingly technical change unlocked the potential for a vast, if somewhat chaotic, 
programme of purchasing by the zemstvos. Illustrating the importance of a provincial 
case study in building a full picture of the relief effort, Robbins does not address this 
                                                 
16 Tambov provincial police board to the department of police 20 August 1891, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 
2132, ll. 83-86. 
17 Durnovo to all governors 11 July 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, l. 92. 
137 
 
 
 
change, an omission likely due to the fact that the relevant telegram seems to appear in 
provincial archives only. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, from August Durnovo began to press for 
greater unity in the relief effort, leading to the establishment of the food supply 
conferences while in September Rokasovskii made a request for food aid that went above 
that asked for by the provincial zemstvo. Finally, in late November the MVD instructed 
the Governor and the provincial zemstvo to start providing weekly updates on how much 
food was available, how much it had given out, where it was purchasing it from and if 
there were any delays in delivering it.18 Thus, the ways in which the imperial officials 
(the governor and the MVD) conceptualised food shifted rapidly as the crisis worsened, 
in response to pressures from below. The Food Security Statute and the initial response 
conceived of food as an abstract concept, where supply issues could be alleviated through 
market functions and food aid was to be provided in cash as an economic problem 
required an economic solution. However, the pressure from provinces such as Tambov 
forced a reassessment and a recognition that while the market would still be a key part of 
the solution, ‘food’ was more than just an abstract concept. It was an agrarian society’s 
most important economic unit but when it failed it became something infinitely more 
tangible, real and distressing –  a matter of life and death. 
 
Seed loans and sowing fields 
Sowing was initially seen as the key element in the attempt to avert a crisis; aid would 
only go so far but it was economics that would allow for long term recovery, an echo of 
                                                 
18 Durnovo to Rokasovskii 27 November 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 29-30. 
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modern famine response policy.19 The operation to sow fields for the winter harvest was 
vital because ‘giving help to seed fields means a good harvest in 1892 and the recovery 
of the population’.20 The sowing operation, which involved the purchase of one million 
puds of seed between July and 2 August and depended on the gradual, ad hoc release of 
funding, supports the argument that the province responded as well as could be expected 
in the circumstances.21 Aware of the need to ensure that fields were sown, the provincial 
and uezd authorities conducted their purchasing of seed grain in July. Since the vast 
majority of sowing in most uezds was completed by the third week of August, the whole 
operation took approximately eight weeks.22 While we can criticise the deficient 
information-gathering structures or the poor state of preparedness in general, it must be 
kept in mind that this was simply the reality of the situation and correcting it would have 
taken a wholesale change in the ways in which the provinces were governed. In this 
context, the eight week timescale surely ranks as a positive achievement and reflects an 
urgent yet broadly successful scrambling together of resources and manpower. 
 Of course, we need to drill down into the finer detail of the operation before we 
can reach any definite conclusion. Establishing accurate data or precise figures, however, 
presents as big a challenge for the historian as it did for the provincial officials in Tambov. 
An illustrative case in point is the operation to buy grain and sow fields for the winter 
harvest. Despite initial discrepancies between the total cost of the operation given by 
Rokasovskii and the provincial uprava, a cost of 1.35 million roubles at an average of 1 
                                                 
19 Sen and Devereux have argued that the issue in a famine crisis is not necessarily getting food into a 
region, it is about expanding a region’s ability to command food through entitlements and/or purchasing 
power. See: Sen, Poverty and Famines, pp. 162-6 and Devereux, Theories of Famine, p. 91. 
20 Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, p. 17. 
21 Rokasovskii to Governor Kladishchev, Riazan Province 14 August 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 
147-148.  
22 Provincial zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii 8 July 1891 and Rokasovskii to Durnovo 28 July 1891 GATO, 
f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll, 39-41, l. 83, Rokasovskii to MVD 16 August RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, l. 67, 
Tambov provincial police captain to department of police 20 August, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 83-
6, GATO, f. 4, op, 1, d. 4192, ll. 195-8, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 
goda, p. 17. 
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rouble 22.9 kopecks per pud was settled on.23 This illustrates the tendency towards 
rounding-up and the fact that full information on the management of the operation became 
available only after the crisis was over and the accounts could be processed in a less hectic 
fashion. We shall use the 1.35 million rouble figure as the general cost and take the 
average cost per pud on a case-by-case basis where necessary. 1.35 million roubles far 
exceeded the provincial zemstvo’s resources, and the provincial uprava was concerned 
about the burden that repaying this amount would place on the peasantry.24 It therefore 
recommended lowering the level of cash aid requested in the belief that the impending 
rain would provide a better harvest. It still recommended that 400,000 roubles (83.33 per 
cent) of the provincial food capital be spent on sowing fields, allocated proportionally by 
need.25  
What did the 1.35 million roubles achieve? While the statistics give only the basic 
detail and are not the main focus of this chapter, which is the process of relief, they are 
useful to gauge the success of the relief effort and to provide some overall context. 
Rokasovskii’s 1892 annual report and the provincial uprava agreed that just over 1.1 
million puds of seed, or 18.3 per cent of the annual total for the winter harvest, were 
purchased and distributed.26 While the 18.3 per cent could be seen as far too small a 
proportion, in the context of the severity of the crisis and the logistical challenges, this 
figure represents a relative success. There was, however, wide variation in the allocation 
of seed grain: it generally ranged from 10–28 per cent of the annual total but the highest 
                                                 
23 Rokasovskii to Durnovo 4 January 1892, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 156-8, Rokasovskii’s annual 
report gave the figure at 1,348,489r 55k at an average price of 1r 23k per pud while the provincial uprava 
calculated it at 1,343,598 roubles and the average cost at 1 rouble 22.9 kopecks. Prices paid ranged from 
1.14 roubles (Kirsanov uezd) to 1.38 roubles (Temnikov uezd) per pud per uezd RGIA, f. 1284, op. 223, d. 
232, p. 15 and, Otchet po prodovol’stvennoi operatsii, I, pp. 3-5, pp. 118-9. 
24 As the provincial uprava pithily noted, ‘in other words, for every chetvert of rye they will return three’ 
Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 38-44. 
25 Ibid, pp. 38-44, pp. 17-27. 
26 Annual report of Governor Rokasovskii on Tambov province for 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 223, d. 232, 
p. 14 and Otchet po prodovol’stvennoi operatsii, Vol. 2, pp. 4-14. 
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was Shatsk, considered to be the worst affected uezd, at 63.27 per cent (196,208 puds) of 
its usual sown total while the lowest was Lipetsk uezd at 0.006 per cent (25 puds) of its 
total.27  
What explains this variation? Lipetsk uezd did not initially request any aid to sow 
fields as its uprava, until the second half of June, believing that the harvest would be 
satisfactory and that any loans would be insignificant.28 While Prince Tsertelev29 raised 
the ‘serious discrepancy’ at the extraordinary provincial zemstvo meeting, it was simply 
passed to the provincial uprava to monitor.30 It seems likely that the issue stemmed from 
a simple (but potentially disastrous) misunderstanding: the provincial uprava misread 
Lipetsk’s cautious optimism while the Lipetsk uezd uprava initially underestimated the 
provincial uprava’s level of sensitivity to this.31 There was a breakdown at every single 
level of the zemstvo’s communication structure, highlighting that the institutional 
machinery was clearly a brittle reed. A simple misunderstanding could have profound 
effects: the peasantry were forced to rely on their own resources after the uezd’s land 
captains told them that the zemstvo had none.32 The communication structure was 
stronger within the uezd than between uezd and province and news of aid rejections were 
likely to travel fast. It is worth noting that information got from the uezd uprava to a new 
                                                 
27 This was the opinion of the Ministry of Finance and the provincial zemstvo reporting commission who 
noted that the uezd had lost nearly 68% of peasant fields to frost, Ministry of Finance internal report on 
Tambov Province, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 225-231 and Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo 
zemskogo sobraniia v dekabre 1891 goda, p. 17, Annual report of Governor Rokasovskii on Tambov 
province for 1892RGIA, f. 1284, op. 223, d. 232, p. 15. 
28 Zhurnaly Lipetskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 19-20. 
29 D. N. Tsertelev was a poet, essayist and philosopher and the son of the ethnographer and former inspector 
of schools for Tambov and Kharkov, Nikolai Andreevich, and the brother of the diplomat and general 
consul of the temporary Russian government in Eastern Rumelia after the Russo-Turkish War: Russkii 
biograficheskii slovar, Vol. 25, pp. 481-2. 
30 Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia v dekabre 1891 goda, p. 12. 
31 In May and June, the Lipetsk uprava voiced concern about the rye harvest though it felt the potato and 
millet harvest would be satisfactory. After the heat of the second half of July caused widespread devastation 
to the crops, the Lipetsk uprava appealed for aid and were awarded 26,050 roubles for food aid Zhurnaly 
Lipetskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 19-20 and Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo 
zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, p. 17. 
32 Zhurnaly Lipetskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 19-20. 
141 
 
 
 
and parallel institution faster and clearer than it did to the provincial zemstvo. Yet in 
attempting to correct this mistake there is a sign of adaptability and provincial initiative. 
The provincial uprava used an MVD circular to request permission from Rokasovskii to 
change the monetary and seed allocation to allow Lipetsk to receive aid, in accordance 
with ‘local conditions’.33 This permission was granted in July and, in August, two volosts 
in Lipetsk were granted six thousand roubles as there were large numbers who were 
unable to sow their fields.34 The case of Lipetsk shows, therefore, that while the system 
was undoubtedly fragile, the capacity also existed to attempt to repair the damage with 
the provincial uprava taking advantage of a central decision to attempt to minimise the 
mistake. 
This interpretation, where the upravy and assemblies attempted to compensate for 
structural limitations as best they could is the most convincing. Though the 
misunderstanding between the provincial uprava and the Lipetsk uezd uprava lends 
credence to the argument that provincial administration was in chaos, the picture from the 
remaining uezds is different. Of the eight uezds for which records survive, five (Tambov, 
Kirsanov, Usman, Borisoglebsk and Kozlov) carried out some form of detailed 
investigation of the harvest between May and June and the need for aid to sow fields for 
the next harvest. The uezd upravy of Tambov, Kozlov and Borisoglebsk all sent upravy 
or assembly members to gather information on reserves from village societies while the 
Kirsanov uezd uprava ordered volost’ elders to inspect the stores, uncovering huge 
shortfalls.35 This hands-on approach shows that the various upravy were aware of their 
                                                 
33 Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii, 30 July and MVD Circular No. 5035 18 July GATO, 
f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, l. 113, Durnovo to Rokasovskii 16-18 July 1891, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 44-
5. 
34 Zhurnaly Lipetskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 22-23. 
35 Zhurnaly Tambovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 8-9, Zhurnaly Usmanskogo 
uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 4-5, Zhurnaly Kozlovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 
1891 goda, pp. 67-69 and Zhurnaly Borisoglebskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 34-36, 
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information gap, were sceptical of the information they did have and addressed both of 
these issues by taking advantage of their legal responsibility for food matters and the grain 
stores.36  
Granted control of the sowing operation in July, the provincial uprava determined 
the policies and processes that the uezds were to follow, with supervision carried out by 
it and Rokasovskii.37 The provincial uprava quickly sent a letter to the upravy on how to 
conduct the seeding operation. It requested full operational details (including cost 
estimates), informed the uezd upravy that they expected prices to decline (a gross 
miscalculation, as events transpired) and that any loan from the imperial food capital was 
to be used for seed loans and would be allocated proportionally based on need (as with 
food aid).38 The letter instructed the uezd upravy to inspect all requests, provide full 
information, prioritise only extreme cases of need and await binding instructions on 
allocation.39 The uezd upravy were allowed, if it was useful, to hire an agent to purchase 
grain or to establish distribution points.40 The provincial uprava was clearly seeking to 
build a picture of how the uezd upravy intended to manage the sowing operation, 
presumably so they could coordinate it better and avoid situations such as inter-uezd 
competition. 
It is clear that this strategy went beyond supervision. The provincial uprava 
deliberately constructed it so that it was ‘concentrated in the closest hands’: the uezd 
upravy, the land captains and the uezd marshals of the nobility.41 The aim was to involve 
                                                 
Zhurnaly Kirsanovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 5-6, Zhurnaly Borisoglebskogo 
uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 34-6. 
36 Prohibited as they were from organising at the volost level, this offers the only plausible explanation as 
to how the Kirsanov uprava was able to instruct the volosts to reassess the stores. 
37 Rokasovskii to Governor Kladishchev, Riazan Province 14 August 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 
147-148 and Otchet po prodovol’stvennoi operatsii, Vol. 2, pp. 3-4. 
38 Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii 8 July 1891 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 39-41. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Otchet po prodovol’stvennoi operatsii, Vol. 2, pp. 3-4. 
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each and every element of the institutional structure to attempt to correct for general 
defects and its own; while the uezd upravy were given some leeway in how to procure or 
store the seed grain, the amount allocated and the process of determining who received 
aid were all fixed at the centre.42  
However, the provincial uprava was often forced to report that it lacked precise 
data on the relief effort as it had not been supplied it by the uezd upravy. By mid-August 
the provincial uprava could not say with any certainty how the sowing operation was 
progressing other than 101,000 chetverts were now being distributed amongst Temnikov, 
Elatomsk, Spassk and Shatsk.43 In late July these four uezds had asked the provincial 
uprava to handle the purchasing of seed; the only information that the provincial uprava 
could guarantee was that which it generated itself.44 However, we should be aware that 
the information of the uezd upravy had come primarily from the volost’ boards and was 
often incomplete or inaccurate. Ten uezd upravy were able to tell the provincial uprava 
in early August that they had purchased over 500,000 puds, even if they could not 
accurately say what they had done with it.45 This suggests that the problems were based 
in the volost’ and were compounded as they went up the structural chain. The provincial 
uprava’s isolation from the volost’ illustrates the structural nature of problems with the 
                                                 
42 The provincial uprava noted that isolation from the peasant soslovie made its task difficult, the Tambov 
uezd uprava saw the introduction of the land captains, and their legal responsibility for the peasantry’s 
welfare, as allowing the relief effort to be ‘well ordered’ while Count Bobrinskii told St. Petersburg that 
charitable efforts depended on the marshals of nobility for success, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo uezdnogo 
zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, p. 13, Tambov provincial uprava to Rokasovskii 7 September 1891, 
GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 275-278 and Count Bobrinskii to Pleve 14 March 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 
1, d. 100, ll. 134-42. Yanni Kotsonis noted that: ‘In a very real sense, fiscal practice at the turn of the 
[twentieth] century was a regime of compulsion tempered by the bureaucracy’s recognition of its own 
ignorance’: Yanni Kotsonis, ‘Face to Face”: The state, the individual and the citizen in Russian taxation 
1863-1917’, SR, Vol. 63, No. 2 (Summer, 2004), p. 228. 
43 Tambov provincial uprava to Rokasovskii 16 August 1891 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, l. 163. On 16 
August Rokasovskii admitted to Durnovo that they only had detailed information from Shatsk uezd 
Correspondence between Durnovo, Rokasovskii and the provincial uprava 13, 16 and August GATO, f. 4, 
op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 157-158, l. 163 and ll. 195-198. 
44 Tambov provincial uprava to Rokasovskii 26 July 1891 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 184-187. 
45 Tambov provincial uprava to Rokasovskii 5 August 1891 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 140-142. 
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relief effort. Communication was an essential part of the solution and the search for unity, 
control and consistency. It was regular but unsystematic, a knock-on effect of the 
haphazard way in which information was reported to it. While the MVD would later 
require regular updates on food loans, from the outset the provincial uprava sought to 
keep Rokasovskii ‘rigorously’ informed.46 The provincial uprava kept its word and there 
were regular communications and updates between itself and Rokasovskii though most 
of these were situational with few regular, overall updates.47  
The provincial uprava’s response to the problems on a lower level was to seek to 
formally involve the land captains in the relief effort; they moved from seeking a sense 
of common responsibility to asking the governor for help. While they had instructed the 
uezd upravy to ensure that the peasantry sowed fields from their own resources where 
necessary, the provincial uprava had also resolved to ask the land captains to assist in this 
task. Receptive to the requests Rokasovskii issued two circulars to all land captains in the 
province in July, asking them to carry out the above and to help the uezd zemstvos, owing 
to a shortage of officials, to inspect the resolutions requesting aid to prevent false or 
exaggerated requests.48  
The lines of communication between the provincial uprava and Rokasovskii and 
from him to other institutions were open, regularly used and vital to the relief effort. 
Where the request involved help in obtaining assistance or correcting errors in relief rolls 
(and thus potentially reducing expenditure), Rokasovskii was more than willing to 
cooperate. Both the uprava and Rokasovskii appeared to realise that coordination and 
communication were the only initial alternative in the absence of a cohesive 
                                                 
46 Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii 8 July 1891 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 39-41.  
47 Only the letter on 22 August was a specific, overall summary while the rest were situational, minutes of 
uprava meetings or a response to an MVD request. 
48 Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii 8, 25 July 1891 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 39-41, 
l. 79, Rokasovskii to land captains 27 July 1891 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, l. 46, ll. 80-1. 
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administration. Additionally, each used the channel of communication to meet their own 
goals and priorities: the provincial uprava was able to place itself at the centre of the relief 
operation (securing the land captains as an additional executive arm) while Rokasovskii 
was able to practice a decentralised approach while overseeing a coordinated response. 
He also had political goals however. He asked the land captains to stress that the uezd 
zemstvos and the government, working together, were taking measures to secure the food 
supply’.49 The eventual cost of the operation clearly concerned Rokasovskii, a fiscal 
conservative on public expenditure; he had also mentioned to the land captains the 
undesirability of burdening the province as a whole with excessive debt as a reason to 
encourage sowing from the peasantry’s own resources where possible.50  
Thus at the same time as trying to ensure the sowing operation did not slow, he 
was telling the MVD that the provincial zemstvo’s estimate for aid was too high. 
Rokasovskii was trying to ensure the sowing operation did not slow down while also 
eliminating ‘exaggerated’ claims for aid and minimising the province’s overall debt 
burden. Seemingly counter-intuitive, there was a logic behind this: as governor he had to 
defend the interests of the province by conducting a large relief effort and those of the 
imperial treasury by minimising the expense to the treasury of the relief effort. There was 
also some evidence for exaggerated claims being made by the peasantry.51 The 
‘togetherness’ and unity of the zemstvos and the central government was also 
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 Rokasovskii to land captains 27 July 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, l. 46, ll. 80-1. 
51 In June the Tambov uezd uprava voiced concern that their shortage of numbers meant that they may be 
forced to simply approve the requests from village societies, which may include those not in need, as 
opposed to checking them thoroughly. In late July a land captain in the fourth precinct of Kozlov uezd 
wrote to Rokasovskii and informed him that several societies, who had approached him for zemstvo aid for 
sowing, withdrew the request once they were made aware that the zemstvo would be providing food loans. 
The land captain concerned saw this as a sign that the peasants could sow from their own resources though 
it may also have been a strategy to maximise aid or wait until it was needed most, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo 
uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, p. 13 and Land captain of the 4th precinct, Kozlov uezd, to 
Rokasovskii 26 July 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, l.103. 
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emphasised; whether this was an attempt to show a united front (and thus prevent the 
peasantry playing the various institutions off against each other), or to show that the 
imperial government was coming to the aid of the peasantry in its hour of need, is unclear.  
What is clear however is that Rokasovskii emphasised unity at every turn, telling 
St. Petersburg that the provincial and uezd institutions co-existed harmoniously and that 
the land captains assisted the zemstvo in the relief effort.52 This unity was a deliberate 
construction, designed to correct the serious structural flaws that had become apparent. 
In terms of the sowing operation unity was essentially a byword for control of the process 
by the provincial uprava. They aimed to quickly establish a uniform approach, close the 
information gap and compensate for the absence of an institutional link to the volost’. 
These steps were largely effective and the sowing operation took just over a month to 
complete. Yet problems still emerged and the jerry-rigging of a response architecture 
should ideally not have been necessary. 
Securing the necessary resources emerged very quickly as a significant issue and 
the solution was again an ad hoc response and an appeal to Rokasovskii.  Such was the 
shortage of resources that the provincial uprava had sought to arrange a system of loans, 
overseen by the land captains, between landowners and affected peasants and had to buy 
grain from other provinces.53 But using a provincial uprava member and three agents, 
three hundred wagons of seed were contracted for in early July, mostly in Orel and 
Kharkov provinces and along the Graz-Tsaritsyn line though a lot of the actual grain came 
from Kiev and Bessarabia.54 Problems were evident almost immediately however; a delay 
                                                 
52 Annual Report of Governor Rokasovskii on Tambov Province for 1891 RGIA, f. 1284, op. 223, d. 194, 
ll. 8-9. 
53 Tambov provincial uprava to Rokasovskii 26 July 1891 and Rokasovskii to land captains 31 July 1891 
GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 84-7, ll. 89-90. Illustrating the potential flexibility of the relief effort, it seems 
that the idea to borrow from local landowners came from Temnikov uezd, where the uezd had asked local 
landowners to sell it rye to sow fields, Zhurnaly Temnikovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, 
p. 66. 
54 Tambov provincial uprava to Rokasovskii 28 July 1891 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 84-7. 
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in receiving additional resources from the centre slowed down purchasing while the 
northern uezds, the worst affected, had no easy rail access.55 Assuming that the grain 
would even get to the nearest train station was not something the zemstvo could rely on: 
seed grain began to back up in Penza province and it took a personal intervention by 
Rokasovskii with the governor of Penza to get things moving eventually.56 While not the 
zemstvo’s doing, this again illustrates structural vulnerabilities of the relief effort, and 
that the provincial zemstvo’s efforts to exert control and maintain a strong relationship 
with Rokasovskii were the most viable coping strategies.  
 Unfortunately, the provincial idea, which lets us see provinces as initiative 
holders and more than poorer imitations of the centre, has negative consequences which 
compounded the above problems. Other provinces displayed Tambov’s initiative and 
dispatched agents far and wide to find grain. In late July the provincial uprava repeatedly 
complained about other zemstvos purchasing grain in Tambov province, forcing 
competition and driving up prices; one provincial uprava member called for the 
establishment of lower norms to hold prices down.57 Rokasovskii opposed this as the 
zemstvo agents were from affected provinces and were no ‘less worried about the food 
question’; he personally attributed the blame to kulaks, traders and speculators who raised 
prices ‘in view of exploiting an easy profit’.58 The Food Security Statute 1889 also 
mandated that the grain trade was to be free and uninhibited, though Rokasovskii did seek 
                                                 
55 For example, Temnikov was over 150 versts from stations such as South Pochelma, the grain stores in 
the north were empty and the provincial upravas agents could not find any grain in Ufa, Nizhnem and 
Chistopal, Tambov provincial uprava to Rokasovskii 5 August 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 139-
142. 
56 Correspondence between Rokasovskii, Riazan governor’s chancellery and the Spassk uezd zemstvo 
uprava, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, l. 182, l. 191, l. 193, l. 200 and l. 204.  
57 Tambov provincial uprava to Rokasovskii 26 July 1891 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 84-87 and Special 
Conference with A. G. Vishniakov 28 July RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 56-66. 
58 Special Conference with A. G. Vishniakov 28 July 1891 RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 56-66. 
Rokasovskii would return to this issue of kulak exploitation; particularly in relation to alcoholism amongst 
the peasantry Annual Report of Governor Rokasovskii on Tambov Province for 1891, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 
223, d. 232, ll. 8-9. 
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resources and official support for a public works programme and railway construction.59 
It would seem that there was no escaping the inherent duality of his position. 
There was also no escaping the fact that not all problems were beyond the 
province’s control. For the first but not the last time, Morshansk uezd was a source of 
concern. As we saw in Chapter 2, the powerful Minister of the Imperial Household, Count 
Vorontsov-Dashkov, went over Rokasovskii’s head and secured an additional 500,000 
roubles for the province. This was not the only incidence of a powerful imperial official 
intervening in Morshansk’s affairs however. Prince Aleksandr Sergeivich Dolgorukov 
wrote to Durnovo and Rokasovskii in late July and listed five volosts that required loans 
over and above that issued by the Morshansk uezd uprava.60 That it took two St. 
Petersburg based officials to highlight shortcomings in the relief effort highlights once 
again how vulnerable the lines of communication were. 
Additionally, the response of the Morshansk uezd uprava does not suggest an 
authority in full control. In early August it questioned Dolgorukov’s account of how they 
allocated loans and appeared to have waited for the harvest to end before conducting 
further checks on aid requests.61 Despite two urgent notices and the MVD’s instruction, 
the uprava’s main response was the above reply and an appeal for their allocation to be 
restored to what they had initially requested in July.62 The provincial uprava backed the 
request and Rokasovskii authorised it in mid-August.63 It is hard to see the issue as one 
of just resources though; Morshansk was a distribution point for other uezds and by 
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60 Dolgorukov to Durnovo and Rokasovskii 28-31 July 1891 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 100-102, ll. 
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August it had not provided up to date information to the provincial uprava.64 Thus it 
would appear that the issue in Morshansk was structural in nature and located in either 
the separation between the volost and the zemstvo or a weak uprava. 
This is given further credence by the events in the uezd’s fifth precinct in late 
August. Land captain Nilov wrote to Rokasovskii on 22 August that he had compiled lists 
but they had not been inspected and he had not yet received any seed; Rokasovskii 
immediately instructed the Morshansk uezd uprava to dispatch an official and inspect the 
lists.65 Nilov seems to have blamed non-inspection on the uezd zemstvo agent, Vasili 
Goliaev, who apparently disobeyed Nilov’s instructions and refused to cooperate with 
him or the volost’ board. In addition, he also mentioned a miller, Efim Gordaev, who 
apparently did not see that wealthy peasants should not receive aid and complained to 
Rokasovskii over his exclusion. Nilov reported this in absentia; on his return he was 
informed of the irregularities and decided to halt issuing aid and sent the lists to 
Rokasovskii, seemingly to assuage the peasantry’s dissatisfaction.66 On 26 August the 
Morshansk uezd uprava responded to Rokasovskii’s instructions. Working with Nilov it 
had been established that the question of errors in the lists stemmed from two households, 
that the miller was genuinely in need (something Rokasovskii placed question marks 
beside) and that there were no other complaints in the precinct.67 Nilov later reported that 
a novel solution had been found: the miller had been given seed from the private resources 
of Nilov’s father, a landlord in the area.68 
                                                 
64 Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii, 5 August 1891 GATO, f.4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 139-
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The Nilov case is a microcosm of what could very easily go wrong: poor 
communication, a weak infrastructure and resource shortfalls. Yet the issue was resolved 
a mere four days after Rokasovskii was made aware of it, illustrating the potential 
efficiency of the relief effort and the sobering fact that displeasing the Tsar’s appointee 
often had more impact than local need. When the provincial authorities intervened, and 
intervene they did, each issue was usually corrected. Rather than fall apart, the provincial 
uprava, with Rokasovskii’s assistance, sought to impose some semblance of order and 
coordination. Given the lack of resources and ever changing situation, this was the only 
possible strategy. Perhaps seared by this experience, they ended the summer convinced 
that a more uniform approach was needed as they were facing into what would become 
the most serious element of the relief effort: food. 
 
Food Aid 
While the province was slow to detect the signs of the oncoming crisis and severely 
underestimated the extent of the crop failure, there was a recognition early on that food 
aid would be necessary. There were declarations from the Tambov provincial zemstvo, 
the Tambov uezd zemstvo and the Kirsanov uezd zemstvo about ‘urgent need’ for food, 
that there ‘were already hungry’ and that ‘famine, with all its terrible accompaniments 
[…]’ was about to happen.69 The official food aid programme did not begin until late in 
1891 when it began to escalate sharply. There is evidence however that food distress 
began in Tambov province extremely early; the Tambov uezd uprava started receiving 
requests for food aid in late May.70 The number of similar requests must have escalated 
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70 Zhurnaly Tambovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 12-3 
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sharply as Rokasovskii asked all land captains in late July to assist the uezd upravy in 
inspecting resolutions for food loans.71 Aleksandrovskii volost’ submitted three 
resolutions for food loans between July and August, with the last requesting 6,048 puds 
from the provincial food capital.72 
Despite this, there was an initial prioritisation of the sowing operation; the 
potential collapse of the harvest and the economic catastrophe it would bring meant that 
food aid was a lower priority. Kirsanov only requested ‘initial’ assistance while the 
Thatmbov uezd zemstvo uprava and the Aleksandrovskii volost’ board reduced their 
original requests owing to the prospect of a good harvest and potential earnings for the 
peasantry.73 The provincial zemstvo also decided to limit its request to cover food needs 
to October to December, as the annual meeting in December would have better 
information for the level of need after January. The provincial zemstvo assembly also set 
aside 80,000 roubles of its 480,000 roubles provincial food capital for food needs.74 The 
uprava however, had recommended that 200,000 roubles be allocated for food needs.75 
The assembly agreed with the reporting commission’s more optimistic assessment on the 
harvest and peasant economy.  
We have seen earlier that the zemstvos pushed throughout the summer for food 
not as an economic issue but as one of urgent, human need. However, the province did 
not assign immediate temporal urgency to food need. As the provincial uprava informed 
Rokasovskii in mid-August, it and the rest of the province would turn its attention to food 
aid once the sowing operation was completed.76 We may see this as hopelessly naïve: 
                                                 
71 Rokasovskii to all land captains No. 3297 27 July 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, l. 88. 
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73 Ibid. 
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75 Ibid, pp. 38-44. 
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prioritisation of the sowing operation meant it was a success but the institutions failed to 
devise a back-up plan if the extreme weather continued. Not absolving the institutions of 
responsibility, we should also understand the context: short on time and resources and 
faced with a crisis of uncertain scale that would quickly threaten to overwhelm. 
What emerges over the summer is an odd combination of poor analysis and an 
attempt at long term planning. The institutions severely underestimated the scale of the 
coming crisis, seeing food as a problem that would emerge once the harvest earnings 
finished. The provincial uprava opted instead to take a series of actions aimed at a form 
of long-term planning and a minimal amount of redundant capacity building. It 
recommended that the 200,000 roubles it requested for food should not be issued all at 
once and instructed the uezd upravy in early July that grain leftover from the sowing 
operation could be used for food aid in kind.77 Of the initial 2 million roubles granted by 
St. Petersburg over the summer, 470,000 roubles (26 percent), were spent on grain to 
store for food loans in the winter.78 
 Prioritising the sowing operation preparing for food distress in winter ties with a 
harsh reality that confronted the provincial uprava: the province simply did not have the 
resources to tackle food aid over the summer. Apart from imperial loans, the province 
had 355,370 roubles from various sources, 183,458 chetverts of crops in stores (though 
there should have been just over 664,000 chetverts) and the management of the village 
stores was strongly criticised.79 Rokasovskii described these resources as 
‘insignificant’.80 In the previous chapter we saw that shortly after trying to limit the 
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zemstvo’s requests for aid to 1.5 million roubles overall, he told the MVD that that would 
not be enough and new applications would be needed in December.81  
The provincial and uezd authorities had greatly underestimated the initial potential 
for food need, but had taken a number of steps to deal with some of the distress. On 28 
July, Vishniakov, of the MVD’s economic department, was briefed on these measures. 
While showing that Tambov was not ignoring the situation, the meeting’s minutes also 
reflect some of the administration’s structural weaknesses. Chief among them was again 
the way in which the province was structured; the uezd zemstvo could ‘not fully enter 
into all administrative actions’ while a raft of contradictory information was coming in 
showing that in some precincts there was an average harvest.82 This led Rokasovskii to 
evince considerable caution: he called for extraordinary care and prudence, and put 
responsibility on the land captains for careful evaluation of resolutions for food aid.83 
Thus, in an effort to limit mistakes, as there were two simultaneous relief operations and 
capacity and information problems, they slowed the food relief operation down, reflecting 
the higher priority on the sowing operation. The Kozlov uezd zemstvo appears to have 
been the only uezd zemstvo that took direct action against food distress early in the 
summer, selling grain at favourable prices and requesting 26,000 roubles for food aid in 
the summer.84 
The conference shows there was no overall institutional strategy for immediate 
food aid, an impression reinforced by the lack of specific rules for food loans even by 
mid-August, as the focus was on the shortage of rye.85 This shortage of rye, and the price 
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83 Ibid. 
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they had to pay for it, appears to have been a main concern at the conference. Kozlov’s 
sale of grain had aimed at meeting and the ‘removal of the despotism of the kulaks and 
their predatory means of profit’.86 Despite, or perhaps because of, the presence of a senior 
MVD official, it seems A.N. Muratov, a member of the provincial uprava, was not afraid 
to challenge; he also asked that the ‘significant’ commission expenses the zemstvo had 
to pay come from the zemstvo account not the relief loans.87 Muratov felt that non-
Tambov traders were responsible and called for lower norms to control this while 
Rokasovskii placed the blame on local traders, kulaks and speculators who had ‘intentions 
of exploiting an easy profit’, stating that the outside agents were concerned 
representatives of other affected zemstvos.88 The disagreement between Rokasovskii and 
Muratov highlights the tensions in their respective roles and the provincial idea. Muratov 
was concerned solely with Tambov’s interests while Rokasovskii sought to defend the 
zemstvo and peasantry but against what he saw as a local problem while also needing to 
act in the empire’s interests.  
 While lacking a coordinated institutional strategy for food need, it seems the 
province did have some form of response: the administration had outsourced the 
provision of food relief to private charity. The July 1891 Committee and its 
popechitel’stvos collected money and material and allocated them in towns and most 
zemstvo precincts.89 Specific details for August and September are sparse but grants were 
made to the Tulezhko bakery to ‘release grain free and at lower prices’ while in Tambov 
town  up to twenty puds of baked grain were made available free or at a discount of forty 
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percent to the market price.90 Details for the uezd sectional committees are patchy; a fact 
acknowledged by Vice-Governor Choglokov, but in September 146 puds of flour were 
distributed in Morshansk, Temnikov, Shatsk and Kirsanov uezds.91 Neither the 
institutional nor the charitable relief effort, as covered in the last chapter, had adequate 
links to the affected villages. This often led to reactions based on poor information but 
they do illustrate the cooperative relationship between charity and zemstvo. In August 
local welfare committees in Temnikov and Lipetsk distributed a total of 1,700 puds based 
on rumours of food shortages which had left peasants either without food or eating 
surrogates.92 While some of the rumours were apparently unfounded, the uezd zemstvo 
had begun, as a result, to collect information on ‘actual need’.93 Food aid at this early 
stage was not a coherent, unified programme, but the popechitel’stvos (opened based on 
need) and the zemstvos should be seen not as competing structures but as cooperating, 
parallel ones. The role of the former was to fill in the gaps of the latter and to help those 
who would not be entitled to zemstvo food loans. It was, in essence, a way to take some 
of the pressure off the over-stretched provincial institutions. This was explicitly endorsed 
by Governor Rokasovskii who told the first provincial food conference in September that 
the welfare committees ‘will of course operate under zemstvo institutions in cases where 
there is a need to immediately relieve need which has not yet been inspected in the normal 
procedure’.94 This aim would also find occasional expression in reality. In December, the 
land captain for the first precinct of Lebedian uezd told Rokasovskii that the sectional 
committee ‘appear as co-workers of the uprava in the food matter’ and that this reduces 
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the amount the uprava has to issue in loans or by sales, reducing the debt for them and 
the peasantry.95 
This pressure intensified rapidly in September with Governor Rokasovskii 
sounding the alarm to the MVD over the seriously increased scale of the problem; there 
were ‘many peasants […] in extreme need of food loans […]’ with up to 300,000 needing 
food aid.96 Rokasovskii did not share the provincial food conference’s view on the scale 
of food need but agreed that the resources of the zemstvos were insufficient and that the 
task was a deeply complex one.97 As we saw in the last chapter, Rokasovskii would start 
to press the centre to provide millions in loans to aid the relief effort. The crisis was 
immediate however and the province’s institutions were facing an unenviable situation: 
with food need sharply increasing the provincial zemstvo only had 500,000 roubles and 
300,000 puds left.98 This was clearly not enough: the Kozlov uezd zemstvo, despite using 
a particularly restrictive estimation of food need, calculated it would need 200,000 puds, 
which would cost nearly 300,000 roubles at the current price while in Lipetsk several 
peasants had apparently sold all their possessions to pay for food.99 The situation was 
even worse in the village stores: Tambov’s 2,970 stores only held 115,780 chetverts of 
all types of grain, again showing how vulnerable the province was to the crisis.100 Until 
extra resources arrived from the centre, the province would have to maximise its resources 
as best it could.  
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Rokasovskii and the provincial uprava set about doing exactly that as quickly as 
possible. The provincial uprava divided its 500,000 roubles, spending 150,000 roubles 
directly to feed the peasantry and allocated the other 350,000 roubles between the twelve 
uezds; this was inversely proportional to how much seed for food each uezd had.101 On 
Rokasovskii’s suggestion, the conference agreed to buy all available food resources, 
whether rye or surrogates, and that aid should primarily be in the form of selling these 
resources at cost price and to establish stores relative to need, using information from the 
provincial uprava.102 Taken together, these steps illustrate that the province had finally 
begun to take food need seriously and was developing a concrete strategy to tackle it. 
Spending the 500,000 roubles was an immediate relief for the most needy while 
Rokasovskii’s suggestions aimed at helping those not entitled to loans while also helping 
to ease the financial pressure on the zemstvos. The suggestion to purchase ‘all available’ 
food resources underscores the urgency; while the use of surrogates if necessary had long 
been accepted, now there was no real selectivity: if it could be eaten, it would be bought. 
The proposal to establish grain stores, and their location, illustrates that an element of 
strategic planning had finally begun to filter through. Their haphazard location, especially 
in the northern uezds, posed a serious problem and by establishing them where need was 
higher, the province was creating a relatively more efficient and concentrated network 
that would give it redundant capacity. All of these were comparatively small steps, and 
not revolutionary, but within the tight legal and fiscal context, were practical temporary 
solutions, again underscoring the key argument that the response was the best given the 
circumstances. 
From September on, however, intentions would clash with reality. The food aid 
relief effort from then until December can be split into two sections: the co-ordinated 
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effort to purchase grain and the internal, volost’ level difficulties that ran parallel to it. 
Focusing on the broader, macro level before turning to the micro aspect lets us see how 
the various institutions tried to grapple with the varied and changing problems that 
occurred. 
 While there was unanimous commitment to securing as many food resources as 
possible, this quickly proved difficult. Unable to source sufficient grain from 
neighbouring provinces, the province’s zemstvos turned to locations further away, and 
requested a funding advance to prevent this slowing down or stopping of the purchase 
and delivery of the badly needed grain.103 The zemstvo upravy remained in firm control, 
dispatching members to purchase grain and while local traders were used, this was under 
the ‘constant supervision’ of the uezd upravy.104 The determination to remain in control 
combined with the distances that were now being required stretched the province’s 
resources to the limit. Responding to an MVD request for detailed information in late 
November, Vice-Governor Choglokov laid bare the depth of the problems confronting 
the province’s institutions. The uezd upravy had bought 500 wagons of grain that had not 
yet arrived and Choglokov warned that ‘shipping goes extremely slowly’.105 This 
difficulty in sourcing grain would remain the single biggest obstacle over these few 
months. M.A. Kononov, a member of the provincial uprava, was dispatched to arrange 
contracts and shipping for grain. His report to the uprava in late November makes for 
sobering reading. The provincial uprava were contracted with the Skaramanga trading 
house but Kononov reported that some of the grain was not being transported because of 
problems on several rail lines. Kononov asked Skaramanga to consider alternative routes, 
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including shipping by boat.106 Kononov visited the uprava’s other agent, the local trader 
Blokhin, and found that while he was active, there were severe delays on the Vladikavkaz 
railway; he telegraphed Rokasovskii to ask him to personally apply for priority for 
Tambov.107 Rokasovskii, who was in St. Petersburg, acted quickly: several days later a 
command was issued from the ‘highest railway institutions’ to ship thirty wagons a day 
to the province.108 Kononov concluded that this would only supply one third of the 
province’s needs but unfortunately achieving even that was doubtful due to wagon 
shortages, despite the best intentions of the railway’s management.109 Yet there was little 
option but to seek grain from outside the province: purchasing from within reduced the 
amount available for local markets and was thus counter-productive so Kononov had 
ordered an end to local purchasing.110 The only bright spot in the report was that its agents 
were following the provincial uprava’s instructions, though Kononov requested more be 
appointed.111 
Kononov’s report highlighted just how serious the railway crisis had become. In 
late November Durnovo warned all governors that the Vladikavkaz railway, a crucial 
supply artery, was over capacity and zemstvo purchases were accumulating.112 Kononov 
and Rokasovskii had articulated similar concerns earlier with both preferring to purchase 
via south-western railways, mainly through Kharkov, which offered a quicker though 
more expensive delivery.113 A sharp rise in prices added to the notion of a perfect storm; 
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until October the uezds had been able to source rye for roughly 1 rouble 13 kopecks per 
pud but by late November and December this had risen to an average of 1 rouble 35 
kopecks with the local Saratov market charging nearly 1 rouble 40 kopecks.114 When rye 
could be found it was expensive and almost impossible to ship. This led to some uezds 
pushing back against the established rules to maximise the few resources they had. While 
most other uezds stuck relatively close to the MVD and provincial norm of 30 funts per 
‘eater’ in food aid, Shatsk issued 20 funts, or half a pud.115 Yet Shatsk was widely seen 
as the worst affected uezd though it lacked easy rail access and had a high level of debt 
to its grain stores.116 This meant Shatsk had to make a number of difficult decisions. The 
Shatsk uezd uprava had allocated loans more equitably by reducing the amount but 
opening it up to those of working age, paid for by selling rye and barley at possibly 
slightly above cost price.117 They were issuing loans in advance to save money and were 
inspecting lists to eliminate those who did not qualify, to reduce costs and eliminate stock 
uncertainty.118 Shatsk is a perfect example of the difficulties that affected the food relief 
operation and the way in which the province tried to solve them. Its policy seems less an 
arbitrary reduction than an attempt to ensure that it was at least able to issue something 
as opposed to quickly burning through its resources. 
Dry though they may be, transport and price issues underscore the difficulties that 
faced Tambov province. Food need was spiking sharply and Russia’s infrastructure, 
especially its rail network, simply buckled and began to give way under the strain.119 The 
free market oriented 1889 Food Security Statute exposed the zemstvos to the vagaries of 
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supply and demand; the internal grain market was clearly dysfunctional and rail chaos 
appears to have cut various areas off, creating isolated markets which led to dramatic 
price spikes. Surmounting these obstacles was only the beginning of problems: some 
grain had to be transported 100-150 versts to northern uezds owing to the absence of rail 
links and even transport by animal was difficult.120 By December the provincial zemstvo 
assembly was well aware of how serious the issue of transportation had become. The 
reporting commission estimated that forty-seven wagons of grain a day were required but 
that they averaged only seventeen per day and in the week before the provincial zemstvo 
assembly this had fallen to just under eleven.121 Despite deliveries by rail and boat, 
shortages began to mount up. By the 16 December each uezd was awaiting delivery of at 
least 40,000 puds while Tambov uezd was waiting for over 200,000 puds.122 
Compounding this was the worsening situation of the village societies’ grain stores. 
Rokasovskii had asked the land captains in early October to provide monthly totals, 
presumably to provide better data for the relief effort. Like many of the reports from this 
time, they make grim reading. Spassk and Shatsk uezd reported no deposits at all for 
October, Tambov and Usman none for November and December while the only positive 
results came from individual volosts in Morshansk.123 By mid-December, village society 
stores across the province were almost exhausted and unable to provide food aid, with 
just under 211,500 puds of rye and oats available.124 As the crisis had deepened and 
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worsened, the first line of famine relief had weakened. Tambov uezd was awaiting almost 
as much in one week as every village in the province had available. 
The province’s institutions had not expected food need to arise as soon as it did 
and it is clear that their planning for the last few months of 1891 was inadequate. The 
scale of the crisis took Tambov’s institutions aback; even allowing for the fact that those 
aged 18-55 were excluded from receiving food loans, 5o per cent of the population needed 
food aid by December.125 The provincial zemstvo’s reporting commission warned that, 
because of increasing need and supply difficulties, ‘the result […] will be the onset of 
famine in the literal sense with all its terrible and irretrievable losses’.126 The numbers 
receiving food loans went from just under 3,200 people in October to 363,449 in 
December, at an average monthly range of 23.6 funts in October to 28.8 funts in 
December.127 316,148 puds of food loans were issued from October to December, with 
just over 262,000 of this in December alone.128 This fell far below the 50 per cent 
requirement the provincial uprava had identified and to that we must add the 160,000 it 
was determined needed charitable aid.129 
Yet just as in the sowing operation, they were able to perform better than the chaos 
that confronted them would suggest. There were serious shortcomings but given the 
resource and structural contexts, they operated at their maximum potential. Indeed, there 
was a sense amongst the province’s institutions that they had done all that was possible 
but that it had not been enough. The reporting commission felt that the provincial uprava 
and Rokasovskii had acted ‘resolutely’ and ‘energetically’ in trying to increase rail 
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capacity and find alternative routes.130 There had been a considerable degree of success 
in spite of everything. The provincial and uezd zemstvos, battling a supply crisis, price 
rises and other zemstvos, purchased nearly 1.2 million puds of food supplies by mid-
December, primarily from Taganrog, the North Caucasus, Ekaterinoslav and the Kursk – 
Kiev railway.131 The provincial zemstvo assembly had, in July, estimated, that it would 
need 1,358,000 puds for food needs from October to December.132 A gap of 158,000 puds 
is considerable and represents a significant number of potential loans but we should also 
recognise that, given the transport and pricing issues, to be able to meet most of the target 
is impressive. It also shows that perhaps the provincial zemstvo was more capable of 
long-term planning than it seems: in the end, need was much closer to its original estimate 
than Rokasovskii’s. There are also signs that the zemstvos worked to rebuild their own 
grain stores to try to compensate for the collapse of those in the village. By mid-
December, the zemstvos had built up food reserves of 852,000 puds, divided between the 
uezds ‘in sufficient quality’.133 The province’s institutions had responded to external 
problems, such as grain supply and prices, and internal ones such as infrastructure, with 
the same mix of ad hoc measures and an emphasis on control and consistency. The 
provincial uprava and Rokasovskii took early steps to try to redirect grain shipments and 
Kononov visited each designated agent to reinforce the provincial uprava’s instructions. 
Rokasovskii used his personal influence in St. Petersburg to secure priority for the 
province’s traffic. A rising sense of chaos, especially on the railways, gripped Russia in 
these months and despite the best efforts of St. Petersburg, the provinces were, to a certain 
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extent, on their own. Tambov’s micromanagement, particularly of its trading agents, was 
an attempt to put some sense of order on this chaos. The province sought to maximise its 
resources with a reasonably simple strategy: the provincial uprava, in effect the executive 
agency of the relief effort, strictly regulated the broad strategy with political support from 
Rokasovskii but they were ambivalent as to where the grain would come from or how to 
transport it. With chaos the defining feature of these months, the province’s institutions 
approached it much as they had the sowing operation: with an overall, disciplined 
strategic focus but with flexibility on the details. 
It is arguable that part of this focus was because it was the one area where it could 
be guaranteed. At the last provincial food conference in December, Rokasovskii 
emphasised that correct allocation loans depended on the communication and unity from 
those managing it in the uezds.134 Rokasovskii toured the province and recommended that 
each uezd establish its own food conference as only this offered unity, and that in parts, 
seemingly uniform cases could differ in details.135 In essence, Rokasovskii was arguing 
that there could be local differentiation but that it had to be handled in a consistent manner 
as wild variation would threaten the integrity of the relief effort. 
This exhortation was borne out of the experience of the past few months. One 
week after the provincial food conference in September, Rokasovskii issued a circular to 
all uezd upravy, land captains and uezd ispravniks. As with previous circulars, this one 
restated several of Rokasovskii’s key political goals; food loans were to be calculated 
with ‘extreme moderation’, areas had satisfactory harvests and earnings and food was to 
be bought at a ‘moderate price’.136 Despite his increased awareness of the crisis, 
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Rokasovskii still miscalculated badly; he claimed that as the export of rye and rye flour 
abroad had been banned, ‘there will be no difficulties in getting it’.137 To ensure that only 
those who were entitled to loans received them, Rokasovskii requested that the resources 
of every peasant household be investigated with ‘all possible accuracy’.138 The most 
striking thing about the circular was that Rokasovskii ordered the officials, when 
inspecting village societies, not to ‘rely on the inquiries or reports of any one peasant or 
immediate peasant authorities’.139 Rokasovskii did not do this to combat ‘exaggerated’ 
claims however; the previous verification of claims had apparently been done this way 
and Rokasovskii was worried this could now turn out to be ‘insufficient’.140 In other 
words, while Rokasovskii was concerned with moderation and eligibility, he was also 
keen to ensure that all those who qualified for food loans received them.141 This hardly 
speaks to a cold and uncaring bureaucracy, whatever the other manifest failings of the 
relief effort. 
The emphasis on detailed inspections did present problems however. Several uezd 
upravy found themselves overwhelmed with work inspecting resolutions in such a tight 
time-scale, and appealed to their assemblies to appoint additional representatives to 
help.142 Kirsanov and Borisoglebsk upravy found that they were not able to determine 
how many people required aid.143 Timing was not the only difficulty with inspection: 
even if they were able to inspect every household quickly, there was no guarantee that 
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they would get accurate results. Several uezds reported that the peasantry were attempting 
to conceal or hide their resources; Borisoglebsk’s uprava reported that peasants ‘in the 
hope of receiving aid from the zemstvo, without exception enrol in the numbers of the 
needy and by all means hide their own food resources […]’.144 By 5 November this 
concern was no longer being expressed by just a few uezds and was raised at the 
provincial food conference. There was concern that nearly every list contained peasants 
who were hiding their resources and, more importantly, that the peasantry rejected the 
idea that food aid should only be for those in extreme need.145 This made it difficult to 
establish an accurate picture of need; Rokasovskii had already called the figures presented 
to him by the land captains as ‘exaggerated’.146 These delays further hampered the relief 
effort and by the last half of November only six uezds had provided detailed requests, 
forcing the provincial uprava to use them to estimate the overall level of need.147 This 
reliance on extrapolation could lead to miscalculation, highlighting the inadequacy of 
resources and robust planning. Other than extrapolation, the only solution available to the 
institutions was to inspect the lists again, which would lead only to further delays and 
resentment. The best of a bad lot of choices, further inspections were ordered in 
September and November.148 
This issue throws into stark relief the fragmented nature of provincial government. 
As the provincial uprava put it, it was hard to detect exaggerated claims as it was ‘not 
involved in any peasant soslovie’.149 The only institution with any real contact with the 
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peasantry were the land captains and they were only several months in post. It is likely 
that the peasantry saw the inspections as an imposition and attempt to ‘cheat’ them out of 
the aid; subsequent inspections were likely to inflame tensions further. Thus the two main 
institutions supposed to oversee peasant administration and food security were not fully 
capable of relating to the people they were supposed to help; the impression was probably 
one of ‘outsiders’ coming in to make life more miserable. Added to this febrile mix were 
often the actions of officials or important community figures themselves. In Saltykovskii 
volost’, Spassk uezd, Fr. Ioanna Butakov was investigated by the local ispravnik and 
dismissed as a dean by the Bishop of Tambov and Shatsk for inciting resistance to volost’ 
and government officials.150 Fr. Butakov apparently complained about various officials 
and alleged that the government could afford to feed everyone but ‘did not care’ about 
the peasantry.151 He was accused of irregularities in allocating aid and there were 
suggestions of embezzlement over funeral expenses.152 The combination of the zemstvo’s 
multiple inspections, the actions of people such as Fr. Butakov, and the growing level of 
need created the potential for unrest to flare up. 
This, however, did not happen as frequently as might have been imagined. In fact, 
disturbances of any kind only really seemed to occur from the beginning of December. In 
early December a landowner in Bolshoi Dobrinki, Usman uezd, Luk’ianovich wrote to 
Rokasovskii and told him that the peasants in the area needed grain and were threatening 
his estate at night.153 The land captain investigated the issue and found that Luk’ianovich 
had refused to issue them rye on October and so they were ‘obliged to take it by force’, 
something the starosts denied.154 What appears to have happened is that the grain they 
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were issued in November by the zemstvo was of poor quality and full of grit so they stole 
from traders to stave off hunger.155 The land captain was clearly sympathetic; he regarded 
their situation as ‘desperate’ but was constrained by resources and was required to refuse 
loan requests.156 Rokasovskii demanded an explanation from the Usman uezd uprava and 
that they take measures to correct it.157 The uprava, while accepting that some grain was 
‘only fit for the bin’, found that it was generally of good quality and that Bolshoi Dobrinki 
had been accidentally issued remainders.158 In the village of Siniavki in Lipetsk uezd, the 
local procurator, Anton Marchukov, wrote to Rokasovskii, declaring that the population 
were ‘dying deaths from hunger’ and asked for food aid immediately.159 Rokasovskii 
ordered an investigation but stated that if the allegation was untrue, Marchukov was to be 
sent to Tambov town (presumably under arrest); the allegation was found to be false, but 
Marchukov declared there was a disaster and had the peasants elect a representative to go 
to Lipetsk town to apply for loans.160  
While unrest itself was uncommon, there were frequent complaints over the 
amount of aid and a recurring motif is that the Tsar had decreed the release of ‘official 
food’, in which money was provided to feed every peasant. At the last provincial food 
conference before Christmas, Rokasovskii noted he had been receiving an increasing 
number of petitions calling for the universal issuing of food loans and that the peasants 
have ‘fallen into a delusion that the Emperor has deigned that they be generally fed from 
the Treasury account’.161 Finding that such a belief needed to be stopped as it would have 
‘malicious consequences’, the conference agreed to publish an announcement to all 
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village assemblies, laying out the rules for food loans.162 The circular, which volost’ 
boards were obliged to read out, was issued on 23 December and published in the 
gubernskie vedomosti and laid out, in stark language, that there was no ‘official food’, 
and reinforced the norms and rules for food aid.163 These examples show that while 
Tambov was by no means a rebellious province, it was restive and this concerned the 
authorities. It can help explain Rokasovskii’s consistent emphasising of unity; actions by 
officials that strayed from agreed practices could cause disturbances that they may not be 
able to control. This was a genuine concern; Rokasovskii had to upbraid a land captain in 
Tambov uezd who apparently refused to inspect aid resolutions while he asked the 
prosecutor to investigate a peasant agent of the Tambov uezd uprava. This agent had 
apparently forced the peasantry to accept wheat and rye chaff instead of grain.164 
Rokasovskii attached special significance to the latter case in light of the ‘calamitous 
situation of the population’ and asked the prosecutor to accelerate proceedings to warn, 
and presumably prevent, similar abuses by zemstvo agents.165 
All of these issues, internal and external, created a difficult context for food aid: 
poor resources, ignorance of scale, difficulties in establishing accurate information and 
potential unrest from peasants and officials. Despite the relative success in sourcing grain, 
by mid-December, there were more personal signs that hunger had become a serious 
issue: peasants in Temnikov uezd were apparently ‘mown down’ by hunger, there was 
‘terrible hunger’ in Usman and hunger was ‘working’ in several villages in Lebedian and 
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Spassk.166 Princess Belozerskaia, demonstrating the influence a noble could have, wrote 
to Rokasovskii about the ‘terrible poverty’ and hunger near her estate and asked that he 
verify the situation; Rokasovskii quickly instructed the Kozlov uezd uprava to look into 
the situation and take all necessary measures.167 Even the Governor of Moscow wrote to 
Rokasovskii, advocating on behalf of several peasants.168 Though they stuck to their 
strategy as much as possible, events were beginning to overtake the institutions and we 
should be very aware from the above that even relative success still meant that there was 
an increasing level of human tragedy unfolding. 
 
Case study: Management of relief in Spassk and Morshansk uezds 
Overall, when confronted with crisis, the province responded by seeking to cooperate 
internally and innovate where possible to correct structural defects. However what 
happened when the defect was the institution itself? Serious concerns were raised about 
the operation of relief in two uezds, Spassk and Morshansk, and this section will examine 
them to understand what happened when decentralisation failed. 
Rokasovskii, noting that his drive for unification had broken down in several 
uezds, dispatched Vice-Governor Choglokov to Spassk uezd in early December.169 Based 
on the subsequent report from the vice-governor, information from the provincial uprava, 
and with the aim of ensuring uniformity in the relief effort, Rokasovskii ordered the 
Spassk uezd uprava to convene a conference with the land captains and to ‘undertake a 
                                                 
166 Procurator Baydin to Rokasovskii 10 December 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, l. 100, Land captain 
Okhotnikov to Rokasovskii 9 December, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, l. 99, S.A. Pisarev to Rokasovskii 11 
December 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 121-2. 
167 Correspondence between Princes Belozerskaia, Rokasovskii and the Kozlov uezd zemstvo uprava, 3-5 
December 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 71-2. 
168 Correspondence between Governor of Moscow and Rokasovskii, 4, 10 December 1891, l. 95, l. 111. 
169 Minutes of the TPFC 17 December 1891 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 136-40. 
171 
 
 
 
new allocation of loans immediately’.170 In Morshansk uezd Rokasovskii had many 
requests for aid submitted to him in his name which must have raised concerns over how 
the relief effort was being administered.171 The provincial marshal of the nobility, Prince 
Cholokaev, who lived in Morshansk uezd, was appointed to manage the relief effort in 
Morshansk.172 After formal ratification of this decision on 17 December, Rokasovskii 
wasted little time in implementing it. Explaining that the food conference had met to 
‘establish correct measures in the actions of all institutions and to ensure correct 
observation of the rules for food loans and aid to the needy’, on 21 December he asked 
the uezd’s various institutions to provide their full assistance to Prince Cholokaev in the 
matter.173 Prince Cholokaev, seeking to correct any structural defects, quickly instructed 
the uezd’s land captains to continuously check for and correct mistakes in the allocation 
of aid.174  
What is important here is less the ins-and-outs of Rokasovskii’s actions but the 
underlying approach that drove them. Rokasovskii believed in coordination and 
decentralisation but resorted to personal intervention when problems occurred. St. 
Petersburg handled crises involving disunited administration in a similar way and there 
is a direct example from the famine crisis. Convinced of the inefficiency and chaos in the 
Ministry of Railways, Tsar Alexander III appointed Colonel Vendrikh to reform railway 
administration in the area, including deliveries bound for Tambov province.175 The 
imperial state, when confronted with a crisis or bureaucratic ineptitude, often resorted to 
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appointing an official with temporary quasi-dictatorial powers to correct the issue. 
Rokasovskii’s use of this tactic shows that there was an interplay between the provincial 
idea and a distinctly tsarist bureaucratic culture. It is plausible to argue here that the 
culture and practices of the centre flowed down and embedded themselves in certain 
levels of the provincial administration. Rokasovskii’s initiative also appears to be 
endorsed, in the case of Spassk, by the 1890 Zemstvo Statute. The Zemstvo Statute took 
precedence when there was a conflict between it and the 1889 Food Security Statute; in 
such cases the zemstvo was obliged to take into consideration suggestions from the 
governor who could inspect the management of the zemstvo upravy and recommend 
remedial action.176 Thus Rokasovskii’s actions in Spassk and Morshansk uezds show that 
he took advantage of the centre’s restructuring of its relationship with the periphery in 
1889-90 to reinforce his policy of unity and decentralisation. 
There are few records for Morshansk but an investigation into the village of 
Bokovoi Maidan, Spassk uezd, escalated on Rokasovskii’s instructions into an 
investigation of relief in the whole uezd. On 13 November land captain Vedeniapin, ‘in 
consequence of the governor’s command’ went to Bokovoi Maidan with local police and 
members of the uezd uprava to verify the list of those needing food loans.177 The entire 
village assembly declared that they needed loans immediately and that Vedeniapin’s job, 
as a land captain, was to give them part of the 2.5 million roubles that had been set aside 
for food aid.178 Vedeniapin’s explanation of allocation criteria and the emergency nature 
of aid was rejected as too little by the assembly who demanded aid be issued universally 
along with the release of ‘official money’.179 Indeed, Vedeniapin commented that the 
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peasantry believed that the money had already been released to them but was ‘hidden 
from them by the volost' leadership’.180 As we will see in chapter 4 and 5, trust was an 
extremely vital part of the relief effort. If the peasantry did not have confidence in the 
officials administering it, then the overall likelihood of success lowered dramatically. 
This sense of the volost’ leadership hiding aid also reveals much about the tensions and 
conflicts within peasant communities. While we will look more at this in Chapter 4 when 
we examine aid petitions, the famine crisis revealed and often exacerbated community 
tensions, many of which centred on a sense of distrust in peasant officials. Volost’ 
leadership elections were often manipulated and, as Gaudin and Novikov noted, the 
increasing integration of these officials by the state often gave them a changed their 
identity; they were no longer peasants but local officials and must therefore, to the 
peasantry, be automatically against them.  
Vedeniapin dissolved the disorderly assembly but the peasants held an 
unauthorised session, intimidating the starosta into issuing an official stamp so a 
petitioner could be sent to the Tsar to obtain the ‘official money’.181 Vedeniapin accused 
Rubovskii, the proprietor of the local distillery to whom many peasants were in debt, of 
inciting this agitation in order to boost his business and that the loudest calls for 
immediate aid came from those able to feed themselves.182 He also accused Rubovskii of 
‘pressing’ the peasantry into agreeing to send a petitioner to the Tsar (the petitioner, 
Maksim Spiran, was sent before Vedeniapin lodged his complaint to Rokasovskii).183 
Vedeniapin asked the uezd uprava whether it could provide loans to the extremely needy 
in the village, allocated eighty puds of flour from the welfare committee under his charge 
                                                 
180 Vedeniapin to Rokasovskii 1 December 1891, GATO f. 4, op. 1, d. 4196, ll. 7-8.  
181 Vedeniapin to Rokasovskii, 18 November 1891, GATO f. 4, op. 1, d. 4196, ll. 4-5. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Vedeniapin to Rokasovskii 1 December 1891, GATO f. 4, op. 1, d. 4196, ll. 7-8. 
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and had all those involved in the incident arrested and sent out of the volost’ for three 
days. Crucially, he did not seek to get the thirty roubles spent on petitioning the Tsar back 
as ‘getting the thirty roubles back from taxes or drastic measures turned out to be 
impossible as this would incite disobedience to the authorities and rebellion’.184 Replying 
on 25 November, Vice-Governor Choglokov was evidently extremely unhappy and asked 
Vedeniapin how he had allowed the unauthorised assembly to happen and why he had 
decided to break the disorder by issuing food aid and not by calling in the police.185 
Vedeniapin, who pointedly noted that the unauthorised assembly had happened in secret, 
told Choglokov that he considered aid the best way to calm the situation in the shortest 
possible time and prevent a riot.186 The aid apparently had ‘the most beneficial action on 
the peasantry’ and Vedeniapin felt that taking strong measures when there was an actual 
need for aid would cause an outrage which would be difficult to deal with.187  
On 12 December, a troubled Rokasovskii ordered Choglokov to go to Spassk to 
establish whether Vedeniapin’s authority had been ‘broken’ and if he should be 
transferred and if there was sufficient unity between the land captains in Spassk over 
verifying need and allocating food loans.188 He also instructed Choglokov to inspect the 
situation in each precinct of the uezd and recommend a further course of action if it 
emerged that uezd officials needed further instructions.189 More than likely motivated by 
potential concerns over order and a desire to ensure fairness in the relief effort, 
Rokasovskii prefaced this by stressing to Choglokov the importance of allocating loans 
‘fairly and uniformly’.190  
                                                 
184 Vedeniapin to Rokasovskii, 18 November 1891, GATO f. 4, op. 1, d. 4196, ll. 4-5. 
185 Vice-Governor Choglokov to Vedeniapin 25 November 1891GATO f. 4, op. 1, d. 4196, l. 6. 
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Choglokov’s tour was apparently brief as he reported to Rokasovskii on 20 
December, but he had met several village assemblies and the uezd’s land captains in that 
time. The village assemblies told him that aid was insufficient, even capable peasants 
needed aid (apparently verified by the land captains) and they ‘knew’ that every ‘eater’ 
in Kerensk uezd, Penza province had received one pud of flour while Spassk had not 
issued any food loans.191 Land captain D.N. Rogozhin admitted to Choglokov that the 
level of aid allocation was inconvenient and did not satisfy existing need, but he was 
following the provincial food conference’s guidelines from 4 September.192 The 
implication is clearly that it was the province’s own rules that had failed to satisfy need 
and had caused, or part caused, the disturbances.  
This was not a unanimous opinion amongst the uezd’s land captains, however, as 
Choglokov’s meeting with them on 14 December illustrated. Choglokov sought to be 
conciliatory and told them that the relief effort in the uezd had taken different directions 
because of their ‘full conscientiousness and energy’. The issue appeared to be how to 
manage the relief effort; two of the four (Rogozhin and Zhukov) wanted to broaden the 
scale of aid and adopt ‘gentler methods’ towards the population while Vedeniapin and 
Baturin wanted to stick to the letter of the provincial food conference’s guidelines and 
relate to the peasants more strictly.193 Vedeniapin’s strict stance raises the issue of a 
difference in what was seen as ‘strict’ or ‘fair’ between the land captains and the 
provincial administration. It was Vedeniapin who, when confronted with a disturbance, 
refrained from calling in the police and responded by meeting the urgent need of some of 
the village’s residents. Choglokov noted that differences of approach among the land 
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captains generated distrust among the peasantry.194 Referring to the example of the offer 
of employment to the peasantry, not made in every precinct, he ‘came to the conclusion 
that the land captains hide their actions from one another’.195 He ended the meeting by 
impressing upon them the need for full unity and energy of action. Agreeing, they pledged 
to consult each other in future on relief issues not covered by the established rules and 
procedures.196 This would appear to be a victory for Vedeniapin and Baturin’s approach 
of strictness and adherence to established procedure though Choglokov also provided for 
an element of flexibility and local negotiation in light of specific conditions. Negotiations 
with the chair of the uezd uprava A.N. Zhilinskii secured a commitment to work in 
solidarity with the land captains, accelerate the verification and allocation of aid, offer 
work to the peasantry to transport the grain and even to lower its price.197 
Following this meeting, Choglokov addressed a number of village assemblies, 
including Bokovoi Maidan, in an attempt to shore up the authority of the land captains 
(and therefore the government). He told them that the land captains ‘only sought good’ 
and had acted legally, that differences were due to differing conditions in each precinct, 
and that the peasantry should trust and obey the land captains and turn to them for aid.198 
He also told them that unconditional aid was inconceivable and that everything was being 
done to alleviate their situation.199 Choglokov ended his report by noting with confidence 
that Vedeniapin’s authority was not broken and he should remain in post, and that with 
very few exceptions the population of Spassk were enduring severe need to the extent that 
                                                 
194 Ibid. 
195 The issue was between Baturin and Rogozhin. Baturin noted that the peasants in his precinct had turned 
down work transporting grain for the uezd uprava as the wage was too low while Rogozhin declared that 
this opportunity had been hidden from him and maybe the peasants of his district could take the work, 
Choglokov to Rokasovskii 20 December 1891, GATO f. 4, op. 1, d. 4196, ll. 11-8. 
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it was necessary to speed up the allocation of aid on a broader scale.200 Finally he noted 
that the main cause of the antagonism between the land captains was that the estates of 
three of the four were located in the precincts of another.201 The Vice-Governor’s 
intervention appears to have brought the disturbances in Bokovoi Maidan to an end, but 
it was not the last time that Spassk uezd would come under fire for its lack of unity or 
planning, as we will see in in Chapter 5. 
What appears to have happened in Bokovoi Maidan was a heady and undesirable 
combination of desperation, a sluggish relief effort and the knowledge that the authorities’ 
views about who deserved aid varied in different precincts. Fuelled by desperation and 
the belief that they were being cheated out of money supposedly granted by the tsar, the 
residents of Bokovoi Maidan sought redress through either petitioning the tsar or, more 
plausibly, by forcing a response from the local authorities. The results were not fully 
satisfactory and brought unwanted attention but secured extra aid in the short term and an 
overall review of relief management; academic to the peasantry perhaps but it led to a 
permanent, sharp increase in food aid.202 
This episode illustrates several points about the way in which relief was managed 
by the uezds and the way in which the provincial administration interacted with them and 
oversaw the process. Firstly, there was a huge pressure point in the relief operation in the 
person of the land captain; the case of Spassk shows that the relief operation was 
vulnerable to fragmentation based on personal action or antagonism. Since Spassk uezd 
was divided into only four precincts, a breakdown in this network could have serious 
                                                 
200 Ibid. 
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202 The peasants were correct in asserting that no food aid had been issued in the uezd prior to December. 
The MVDs statistical accounts show that Spassk did not issue food loans until December when it issued 
12, 905 puds but in January this increased to 42,082 puds. Whether this is a result of the general upswing 
in need and purchasing or was part of the acceleration the uprava chair agreed to in light of Choglokov’s 
visit is hard to say, Statisticheskie dannye, pp. 38-9. 
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consequences as they were vital to the effectiveness of the relief effort: land captains had 
responsibility for peasant administration and were often the officials most closely 
involved in determining who was eligible for aid. If land captains hid certain opportunities 
for the peasantry from each other and were mutually antagonistic, things could quickly 
grind to a halt. Following on from that is the issue of differentiation or, depending on how 
it was used, arbitrariness. Spassk’s land captains were divided on the fundamental issue 
of how to approach the relief effort and while a stricter interpretation won out, the issue 
is an important one.  
The division between the land captains on how to relate to the peasantry in the 
relief effort shows some of the deeper divisions that affected the position itself; only in 
post since June of that year, the new land captains were undoubtedly still feeling their 
way and getting to grips with their responsibilities. Aleksandr Novikov, the land captain 
in Kozlov uezd, summed up the difficulties of implementing the legislation: ‘the result of 
this legal arbitrariness is that in one province is permitted what is forbidden in the next, 
what is encouraged in one year is what was hampered in the previous’.203 The 1889 Land 
Captain Statute had envisaged a position of authority that was ‘close to the people’ but 
had left the land captains with wide discretion on how to do this; indeed this was the one 
of the main aims of the law. Novikov himself, as we saw in Chapter 1, took Rogozhin 
and Zhukov’s position on how to relate to the peasantry. What this incident highlights is 
how dependent the relief effort was on a small group of powerful individuals, only just in 
post and not yet fully integrated into the administrative structures.  
This exchange also worked both ways, as Bokovoi Maidan illustrated when the 
peasants told Vedeniapin that it was his ‘job’ as their land captain to obtain some of the 
released aid for them. It can be argued that the peasantry clearly understood both the 
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broad power of the new official and the fact that they were now responsible for the 
wellbeing of the peasant community. Indeed, they may have sought to turn this 
responsibility to their advantage. It is likely that the land captains were not yet fully 
familiar with either their duties or communities and this may have encouraged individuals 
or communities to test the new officials. Thus, the peasants in Bokovoi Maidan were 
seeking to define and control what the ‘responsibility’ of the land captain to the peasantry 
actually meant, thereby inverting the paternalistic intent of the 1889 Land Captain Statute. 
Another issue we can see is that it often took an event likely to cause concern for 
the provincial administration, such as the unrest in Bokovoi Maidan, before steps were 
taken to investigate and correct it. Choglokov’s original letter to Vedeniapin focused on 
the case as a routine matter of civil disturbance and it took Vedeniapin’s reply before 
Rokasovskii decided to initiate a broader review of Spassk uezd. Why was he troubled 
enough to launch this review? We know that no reserves of grain were placed in the 
uezd’s public stores in October and December, while up to September there were 161 
chetverts in the stores and nearly 53,000 chetverts in arrears including overdue loans and 
that the uezd had not yet started issuing food aid.204 Unfortunately, since the surviving 
historical record relating to Spassk is relatively sparse, it is hard to get a complete picture. 
Nevertheless, the evidence presented so far, combined with the fact that nearly 21,000 
people received food aid in the uezd when it started in mid-December, suggests that there 
was a serious shortfall between what was needed and what was available and thus 
evidence of the relief effort failing to function effectively became quite serious.205 
Once again, the desire for unity and cooperation in the management of relief was 
central, especially for Rokasovskii, who emphasised the need for unity and the 
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implementation of agreed procedures to Choglokov. There seems to be a contradiction 
here between the emphasis on unity and the decentralisation he highlighted to St. 
Petersburg as essential in 1892. The most likely explanation is that ‘decentralisation’ 
meant, in practice, the local implementation of provincially and centrally agreed 
procedures and is understandable for two reasons. Firstly, the province had to follow 
MVD rules and guidelines for the relief effort, in addition to the Food Security Statute. 
Secondly, total differentiation could have resulted in differing levels of entitlement or 
delivery while a standardised system would at least ensure a minimum, equal standard. If 
it was unfair, it was unfair equally. Nevertheless, Choglokov allowed for the possibility 
that the land captains might face situations outside the agreed provincial practices. 
Allowing them this latitude bound them together through enforced cooperation and, in a 
sign of the ‘provincial idea’, allowed for a greater level of flexibility and rapid response 
than strictly enforcing the centre’s rules provided.
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Chapter 4  
Institutional challenges and adaptation, January – July 1892 
 
Introduction 
If the first six months of the famine crisis in late 1891 were the story of building the relief 
effort’s superstructure while dealing with a rapidly worsening crisis, 1892 marked a 
significant change in tone. By January 1892 the specific institutions of the relief effort, 
the provincial food conferences and welfare committees, were in place while the governor 
and the zemstvos were more experienced. Count Pavlov’s prophetic telegram of 1891 
was followed in February 1892 by one noting energetic zemstvo action.1 The issue now 
was not to construct a relief effort but to run it and to make sure that the structures 
responded adequately to the crisis. In this chapter we will look at the ways in which these 
structures were tested and how they evolved and adapted. Funding and the role of and 
relationships between provincial and uezd institutions would remain key themes. Yet the 
context would change: there were new institutions, the relief effort would eventually wind 
down, and the governor’s chancellery had to adapt to the reality that some uezds would 
face difficulties in running a full relief effort. This chapter, then, will look at how the 
province sought to fund and defend the relief effort as the crisis worsened, how it 
developed oversight functions for the two main arms of the effort, and what happened 
when specific breakdowns occurred.  
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Requesting and repaying funding 
Throughout 1892, finance remained a constant theme and the MVD and Ministry of 
Finance became increasingly reticent, gradually withdrawing support as the crisis 
worsened. After allocating 31,650,000 roubles empire wide in January 1892, and further, 
smaller allocations in February, by the end of March the Committee of Ministers had only 
one million roubles left from the sixty million roubles set aside for the relief effort.2 This 
budgetary pressure, and a sense that the worst was ending, led the MVD in mid-April to 
request the return of any unspent loan reserves.3 Against this, numbers receiving food aid 
in Tambov province averaged 554,000 per month, peaking at over a million in June before 
halving in July.4 Thus, securing funding from the centre over the second half of the crisis 
would become a story of fiercer competition for constantly diminishing resources. 
 In order for any funds to be released, estimates had to go through several levels 
of bureaucracy from the uezd zemstvo to the Committee of Ministers. A narrow sense of 
fiscal responsibility and inherent distrust of lower officials, often, but not always, led to 
requests being lowered as they were reviewed. From the start of the crisis, many 
provincial governors, Rokasovskii included, had generally revised downwards zemstvo 
requests which had totalled 140,000,000 roubles by 1892.5 January 1892 continued this 
trend: the Committee of Ministers assigned 4 million roubles less than the governors 
requested and just over 16 million roubles less than the zemstvos asked for.6 In only six 
                                                 
2 Correspondence between Durnovo and Minister of Finance Vyshnegradskii 22, 29 January 1892, RGIA, 
f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, l. 198, l.212, Note from the Committee of Ministers 22 January 1892, RGIA, f. 
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provinces, Kazan, Orel, Samara, Saratov, Ufa and Voronezh, did the governors agree with 
the requests of their zemstvos.7 Rokasovskii made the biggest proportional reduction in 
January 1892, from seven to four million roubles but he was one of the few governors to 
have his request met in full.8 Thus while the reduction may seem unduly severe to us, and 
events suggest it was, it was also astute politics from a governor who was also a fiscal 
conservative by nature.  
Expected to be two men, the Tsar’s viceroy and the gubernskii nachal’nik, 
governors found that the centre and the province sometimes had wildly diverging needs, 
and being a ‘good governor’ meant satisfying both. Rokasovskii was perhaps more 
fiscally conservative than the vast sums of money involved may have naturally prompted: 
in January 1892 the provincial zemstvo requested 6.9 million roubles to last until July 
while he felt that 3.5 million roubles for food aid would be enough.9 He believed that 
using existing resources would lower the shortfall and rejected the uprava’s fear of a price 
rise for sowing oats, cutting its request from 1,250,000 to 500,000 roubles.10  Rokasovskii 
did not quibble with the zemstvo’s figures, the severity of the crisis, or seek to limit aid 
and its reach. His concern revolved solely around the cost of the relief effort and the 
economic capacity of the people to repay the state for its largesse.  
This concern touches on how the empire was structured and managed; power 
flowed from the centre out while money flowed from the periphery in. Provinces were to 
contribute to the imperial treasury, not drain it and expenses were to be minimised where 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
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10 He believed the shortfall would only be 2,700,000 puds which at one rouble thirty kopecks per pud came 
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Rokasovskii to Durnovo 4 January 1892, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 156-8. 
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possible. Governor Rokasovskii was merely following the dictates of the MVD and 
carrying out his duty to the tsar. Governors were servants of the Tsar first, sent in to new 
provinces and often reliant on their or their family’s service for their noble status, a 
category into which Rokasovskii seemingly fell.11 They referred not to ‘my’ province but 
the ‘province entrusted to me’; they were not part of the province they governed. To be a 
‘good governor’, therefore, was frequently to place the interests of the centre before those 
of the province and to act as the ‘honest broker’, managing various provincial conflicts 
without becoming embroiled in them.  
By 1892 what it meant to be a ‘good governor’ was changing rapidly; the bond 
between tsar and people was refashioned as Tsar Alexander III sought a closer, national 
and almost spiritual connection.12 Now the ‘little father’ needed to be seen to take greater 
care of his people. Indeed, such an emphasis helps explain the land captain reforms, which 
sought to correct ‘defects’ in peasant administration by strengthening the link between 
tsar and people. Governors now had responsibilities such as education, developing the 
provincial economy (for its own and the centre’s sake), and overseeing the zemstvos in 
addition to tax and order; as the imperial state’s objectives broadened, so did the 
governor’s role.13 Without sufficient funding, governors struggled to serve the province 
while protecting the treasury, two difficulties with the same source. Rokasovskii, as we 
saw, ceased resisting the provincial uprava’s estimates (often much lower than the uezds’ 
ones) but still battled to reduce the cost. Trying to satisfy the competing needs of the 
province and the treasury was a risky strategy but alternatives were few for the provincial 
                                                 
11 A notable exception to this was in Nizhnii Novgorod where in 1880 the local gentry forced out Governor 
Pavel Kutaisov who was replaced, albeit only for two months, by the provincial marshal of the nobility, 
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governor. Thus, his reduction of the request is compatible with the narrative of the ‘good 
governor’ defending the province’s interests. As we have seen, the Committee of 
Ministers cut the governors’ requests even further; by pre-empting this reduction 
Rokasovskii was able to control it. There were few opportunities for the province, 
especially in desperate times, to assert control but here Rokasovskii managed it in a 
limited fashion. The province was not served by having its funding cut severely but it was 
served by making this reduction itself rather than have it imposed from above by a 
parsimoniously minded centre. Rokasovskii secured the best possible outcome, 
admittedly from a range of bad options. He was playing politics and here he did so 
astutely. 
However, the attempt to continue this strategy, by proposing how to fund cost-
price grain sales, proved to be a grave strategic error. The provincial zemstvo had asked 
for a special loan of one million roubles to fund these sales while Rokasovskii argued that 
the grain stores, replenished by purchased grain, would meet this need.14 This was a 
dreadful error, which forced stores, already low on grain, to meet competing needs, 
requiring difficult decisions on prioritisation.15 While Rokasovskii was capable of 
flexibility and adaptation, as we will see in this chapter, the bureaucratic culture he was 
a part of did not often prioritise the medium or long-term consequences of certain 
decisions. This, combined with the tremendous pressure governors were under to 
minimise the cost of the relief effort where possible, helps explain Rokasovskii’s error 
here. Governors were now managers and in Rokasovskii, Tambov province had a 
frequently adept manager, but the long-term strategic weaknesses of the system remained. 
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provincial zemstvo uprava 23 December 1891, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 1, d. 2132, ll. 178-81. 
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This rigid culture was embedded throughout the system; in late January Durnovo 
essentially endorsed Rokasovskii’s argument and refused the additional loan.16 The 
decision appeared to have serious consequences; in February, writing on another matter, 
Rokasovskii noted the provincial zemstvo had been forced to substitute cost price sales 
for loans while the provincial uprava noted the ‘simultaneous exhaustion’ of stores in 
February. 17 
Rokasovskii had a definite and consistent notion of fairness and morality but this 
was tied both to his belief in the rightness of autocratic rule (and thus its inherent sense 
of justice), and contemporary notions of the role of charity. A case in point was his 
objection to the provincial zemstvo’s request to increase the food loans from thirty funts 
to one pud, a level several uezds had seen as an absolute ‘minimum’.18 Rejecting it, he 
argued that it was not ‘an especially generous supplement, [but] is in general sufficient in 
order to secure someone from famine’.19 Rokasovskii encapsulated much of the 
government’s approach to famine relief; it was emergency assistance, designed to prevent 
starvation, not a hand-out or unconditional support. Rokasovskii’s definition of fairness 
was rooted within the legal framework established by the imperial centre; challenging the 
concepts at its heart was not within his character or governing strategy. His role as 
governor was to accept and enforce these over-arching frameworks and this he did with 
instinctive loyalty and compliance.  
The rules did not cover every eventuality, and Rokasovskii was able to manoeuvre 
within them by deploying language that emphasised desperation and confidence 
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simultaneously. Striking a tone somewhere between pleading desperation and relative 
confidence, he requested ‘significant sums without delay’, namely four million roubles 
with 3.5 million for food aid.20 While food was getting to the peasantry, even the ‘well 
off’ would be threatened without new grain stores while purchasing would cease without 
an advance of one million roubles ‘immediately’.21 The tone of the MVD’s economic 
department in reviewing this request, and its subsequent approval, shows that 
Rokasovskii had chosen his tactics and tone correctly.22 Once again, Rokasovskii 
performed a balancing act: making the situation bad enough to secure a large advance 
while also not undermining the MVD’s confidence in him or the zemstvos. 
  The governor’s fixation on fiscal conservatism as a first principle brought out 
both an ability to change his mind based on evidence, and contradictions in his character. 
In February the provincial zemstvo, due to an increase in need and its predicted price rise, 
reiterated that it needed 1.25 million roubles to purchase seed grain and requested the 
additional 750,000 roubles.23 Rokasovskii’s response is revealing; loan reserves would 
cover the cost of purchasing the needed seed grain but this depended on a number of 
factors outside the zemstvos’ control so he backed the request in light of the price rises.24 
Firstly, he displayed a remarkable ignorance of the fact that it was he who had originally 
suggested 500,000 roubles was sufficient and scoffed at predictions of a price rise. 
Secondly, he attempted to protect the interests of the imperial treasury by spending now 
to avoid a larger outlay in the future. Evidence could indeed change his mind, especially 
when it matched or supported one of his existing principles. That he was unable to see 
that his earlier strategy was partly responsible for the need to adapt, leaves us with the 
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 MVD economic department 9 January 1892 and Committee of Ministers 16 January 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, 
op. 4, d. 2132 ll. 189-91. 
23 Rokasovskii to Durnovo 17 February 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 4, d. 2132 ll. 215-6 and Zhurnaly 
Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, p. 7, p. 15-9. 
24 Rokasovskii to Durnovo 17 February 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 4, d. 2132 ll. 215-6 
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impression of a governor who could adjust, yet struggled with long-term strategy and 
sought to please two masters.  
 The MVD twice rebuffed this request before finally agreeing to allocate an extra 
500,000 roubles in early April.25 The province secured one million roubles in additional 
imperial funding and sourced the remaining 250,000 roubles from existing loan reserves. 
The three-month battle to get to this point illustrates the ‘provincial idea’; the province 
leveraged imperial government positions against itself before proving itself remarkably 
adaptable. 
 A desire for order and unity amongst provincial officials and a failure to 
understand the peasantry (leading to occasional suspicion) were two prominent imperial 
government positions that Tambov province played on. On the first, Rokasovskii warned 
in February that the loans would not last and needed strengthening, something the uezd 
upravy and the land captains recognised.26 The provincial food conference had also 
‘unanimously’ agreed that one million roubles was necessary (and sufficient) to complete 
the sowing operation.27 The message was subtle but clear; the province had delivered the 
unity that so concerned the MVD, across administrative structures and varying sources of 
authority, although not in the direction it wanted.  
In dealing with the centre, the ‘provincial idea’ could also have a darker aspect 
while also exposing social tensions within the province. The province’s institutions 
needed to convince the centre that they were not profligate and to do this they blamed the 
peasantry. In mid-March, Rokasovskii noted that ‘all government sums have been 
                                                 
25 Correspondence between Durnovo, MVD Economic Dept. Director Vishniakov and Rokasovskii 26-27 
February 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 225-7, Durnovo to Rokasovskii 23 March 1892, RGIA, f. 
1284, op. 1, d. 2132, l. 233, Correspondence between Durnovo, Ministry of Finance, Vice-Director MVD 
Economic Dept. and Rokasovskii, 23 March, 8 April 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 1, d. 2132, l. 234, l. 244. 
26 Correspondence between Durnovo, MVD Economic Dept. Director Vishniakov and Rokasovskii 26-27 
February 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 225-7. 
27 Rokasovskii to Director Vishniakov 13 March 1892, RGIA, f. 4, op. 1, d. 2132, l. 229. 
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exhausted’ and requested 500,000 roubles be released as soon as possible (a phrase which 
the MVD underlined).28 The food conference saw a million roubles as sufficient but 
argued that an ‘insuperable’ aspiration of the peasantry to sell their seed meant that 
additional resources were necessary.29 The ‘provincial idea’ was not fully inclusive and 
the peasantry were almost a category apart; officials were unarguably deeply moved by 
their plight but there was still a sense of separation, or ‘otherness’, about them. The 
slightly unpleasant truth was that by deflecting blame onto the peasantry, the provincial 
authorities were speaking the MVD’s language. It is a cruel irony that to secure more 
resources for the people they were trying to help they first had to belittle their (perceived) 
capacity to act rationally and cope. 
By using the centre’s language and rules, the province’s institutions could 
articulate their own message. However, it was only by adapting their position and working 
within the imperial framework that provincial authorities ultimately succeeded in 
achieving their aims. The goal was still 1.25 million roubles for the sowing operation 
though the province now accepted that this could only be achieved through additional 
loans and reallocation of resources. The provincial uprava had allocated 500,000 roubles 
of food loans to the operation and proposed that of the additional 500,000 roubles, half 
would be spent on food loans. To this, the MVD finally agreed.30 The province however 
had finally secured what it wanted: 1.25 million roubles for the sowing operation. This 
achievement came at a significant cost in that it involved using existing food aid resources 
                                                 
28 Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii 16 March 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 4, d. 2132, l. 232, 
Rokasovskii to Durnovo 16 March 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 4, d. 2132, l. 231. 
29 Rokasovskii to Vishniakov 13 March 1892, RGIA, f. 4, op. 1, d. 2132, l. 229 and Minutes of the TPFC 
12-14 March 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4264, ll. 58-9. As we will see in Chapter 5 there were indeed cases 
of this though most of them appeared to be unfounded and based on rumour. 
30 Tambov provincial uprava to Rokasovskii 11 March 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, l. 38, Tambov 
provincial zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii 16 March 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 4, d. 2132, l. 232, 
Rokasovskii to Durnovo 16 March 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 4, d. 2132, l. 231, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo 
gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, p. 7, pp. 23-34.. 
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that were only partially rebalanced by splitting the final loan. Provinces could be trapped 
and flexible at the same time. Tambov had to front load its spending and wait in the hope 
that the MVD would catch up. Yet Tambov’s provincial officials built an argument that 
eventually succeeded in securing the best deal possible in limited circumstances. As it 
transpired, this was the last of their requests to be granted as further applications were 
rejected by the MVD, who directly questioned the zemstvo’s statistics. 31 
 At the same time as they were attempting to seek additional funding from the 
MVD for the official relief effort, the province’s institutions were faced with another, 
more intractable problem: how to help the 160,000 people, including 48,000 ‘landless’ 
peasantry, who were ineligible for food loans.32 While we will see examples of desperate 
need later in this chapter when we look at peasant petitions, the landless peasantry were 
in a particularly sorry state and often went from town to town, begging for spare or stale 
grain.33 Despite a lot of discussion on the issue, it exposed the limits of the official effort: 
no sums were ever set aside for landless peasants or non-repayable loans due to the 
absence of resources, despite attempts to establish how many needed aid.34 
 While the ‘tremendous help’ of private charity would take on the role of plugging 
this gap, the way in which funding was sought and allocated further illustrates the 
fragmented and often clientelist way in which the imperial state managed events.35 The 
very nature of charitable funding, grants to the Tambov Provincial Welfare Committee 
                                                 
31 Correspondence between the Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava, Rokasovskii and Durnovo 25, 29 July 
and 8 August 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 255-6, l. 260. 
32 Rokasovskii to the Special Committee on Famine Relief 2 January 1892, RGIA, f. 2014, op. 1, d. 165, l. 
22. 
33 Count Bobrinskii to Pleve 14 March 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, ll. 134-42. 
34 Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 100-5. On establishing these 
figures, see Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp.258-60, pp. 367-70, 
Shatsk uezd marshal of the nobility Vorontsov-Vel’iaminov to Rokasovskii 21 August 1891, GATO, f. 4, 
op. 1, d. 4192, l. 180, Correspondence between land captains Kirsanov and Usman uezds and Rokasovskii 
1, 14 March, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 10-11, l. 243. 
35 Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik, No. 106 19 May 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 11, l. 64-ob. 
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(TPWC), which were funnelled downwards, and direct grants to uezd sectional 
committees by the Special Committee for Famine Relief’s agent, Count A.A. Bobrinskii, 
reflect this. Count Bobrinskii linked the Special Committee in St. Petersburg and the 
charitable relief effort in the province, and very quickly became the central element of 
the funding structure.36 
 This transformation of the funding link, from appeals by the organisation to 
interventions by powerful individuals, happened quite quickly. While small grants had 
been made to several uezds, the TPWC had started 1892 as the primary link: it requested 
and received 150,000 roubles and fifty thousand puds by early February from the Special 
Committee.37 It also positioned itself as the primary institution for the overall 
coordination of relief: in addition to opening stolovye they needed to take all measures to 
secure the peasantry as the collapse of agriculture would have ‘serious consequences for 
the future’.38 While the TPWC would remain the leading coordinating body and would 
work closely with Count Bobrinskii, it is hard not to see the intervention of powerful 
private individuals as undermining its position and authority. Circumventing it directly, 
the wife of the minister for public enlightenment, Princess Elizaveta Volkonskaia, 
received 10,000 roubles to open stolovaias in Borisoglebsk uezd while Vorontsov-
Dashkov’s ministry would donate 1,500 roubles to a landowner in Kirsanov uezd, and the 
TPWC would send 1,000 roubles to a member of the powerful Chicherin family.39 
                                                 
36 Of the 457,362 roubles they received, 162,397 roubles was allocated by Count Bobrinskii, Tambov 
provincial welfare committee to the Special Committee on Famine Relief 17 October 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, 
op. 1, d. 254, l. 15. 
37 Correspondence between the Special Committee for Famine Relief and Rokasovskii, 22, 27 January 
1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, ll. 12-3, l. 17, Tambov provincial welfare committee to the Special 
Committee on Famine Relief 27 January 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, ll. 18-9, Correspondence 
between Pleve, Rokasovskii and Count Bobrinskii 31 January, 6 February 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 
100, ll. 20-1. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Correspondence between the Special Committee for Famine Relief, Pleve, Princess Volkonskoi and 
Rokasovskii 12 February 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, ll. 30-1, Correspondence between Pleve, 
Rokasovskii and Elena Chicherina 13 February 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, l. 34, l. 41. 
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Imperial Russia was a state where connections were often more important than formal 
procedure; donations also risked unbalancing the effort, allocating money based not on 
need, but connection. Typical of the contradictions that bedevilled imperial 
administration, it was Count Bobrinskii, the all-powerful individual from St. Petersburg, 
who intervened to limit this short-cutting and asked that he be notified of all Special 
Committee grants to private individuals.40 
 This was a move designed not so much to protect the TPWC as to supplant it as 
the key information link with St. Petersburg. Sent as the Special Committee’s 
representative, Count Bobrinskii quickly became almost a parallel structure to the TPWC 
by himself. This development followed a long established pattern according to which the 
imperial state corrected problems via the creation of special agencies or representatives 
with the power to override local authorities, sometimes across provincial boundaries. As 
we saw, the role of Colonel Vendrikh, sent in to head a temporary administration to ease 
the railway crisis during the famine is a case in point. Bobrinskii, while considerably less 
terse and more cooperative than Vendrikh, acted in a similar fashion. When, after an 
apparent lack of communication, the TPWC requested an extra 50,000 roubles while 
Bobrinskii simultaneously requested 81,000 roubles, Bobrinskii was instructed by the 
Special Committee to sort the situation out.41 Acting quickly, he convinced Rokasovskii 
that the latter sum was sufficient and while there were some modifications, Bobrinskii 
also determined the grant’s allocation.42  
 This assertion of power and mini-autocracy was common in ad hoc situations or 
bodies such as the Special Committee. The loosely coordinated on-the-ground charitable 
                                                 
40 Count Bobrinskii to Pleve 21 February 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, ll. 53-4. 
41 The TPWC requested the money to open a large number of stolovaias to tackle typhus outbreaks and 
secure the population until June, Tambov provincial welfare committee to the Special Committee on 
Famine Relief 5 March 1892, f. 1204,, op. 1, d. 100, l. 65, Correspondence between Count Bobrinskii and 
Vyacheslav von Pleve 12-13 March 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, l. 125, 127. 
42 Count Bobrinskii to Pleve 14 March 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, ll. 134-42, Count Bobrinskii to 
Special Committee concerning allocations for Tambov province n.d., RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, l. 145. 
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relief effort functioned relatively independently but unlike the official relief effort was 
not guided by existing provincial institutions and the 1889 Food Security Statute. The 
dual allocation of money to the TPWC and Count Bobrinskii, and the latter’s regular 
reporting function, shows that there was a fundamental distrust of provincial institutions 
and autonomy by the centre. Bobrinskii had toured Tambov province and after ‘getting 
to know the need of the population […] and the actions of local welfare’, he determined 
how much was needed and that all of the allocation should go straight to the uezd sectional 
committees.43 Count Bobrinskii was diligent and thorough but his actions speak to the 
common assumption that specially appointed imperial officials were better placed to 
allocate money granted from the centre than people in the affected area. His choice to 
allocate it all to uezd sectional committees shows the uneasy balance between central 
control and local autonomy; full central control was impossible so local action and 
direction was a necessity, but the centre would evaluate and rank local action. Here too 
Bobrinskii’s experience highlights one of the contradictions and problems of imperial 
governance. Land captains were introduced in the cause of systematisation, yet Bobrinskii 
recognised that ‘of course, very much depends on the individual’ and assigned grants 
primarily to the active land captains we have already encountered.44 A corollary of an 
institution based on paternal, individualised power, coupled with under-resourcing and 
vague powers, is that the execution of these powers depends on the individual chosen.45 
The personalised nature of power in imperial Russia meant that one outsider could 
make decisions that would affect thousands. The centre placed less trust in provincial 
                                                 
43 Count Bobrinskii to Pleve 12 March 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, l. 125. 
44 Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik, No. 106 19 May 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 11, l. 64-ob. These were 
Rogozhin and Prince Kugushev in Spassk uezd, Okhotnikhov in Usman uezd and Nilov in Morshansk uezd, 
Ibid. Bobrinskii had directly tied the success of welfare to where there were energetic land captains, 
Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik  No. 106 19 May 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 11, l. 64-ob. 
45 For more on the wide variety of ways in which land captains executed their powers and the problems 
caused by the broad tenor of the 1889 Land Captain Statute, see Gaudin, Ruling Peasants, pp. 52-9. 
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institutions than in Count Bobrinskii, his two officials and, temporarily, the son of A.A. 
Polovtsev (the writer of a stinging critique of Governor Rokasovskii and Count 
Bobrinskii’s brother-in-law).46 This concept of a higher official dispatched by the tsar to 
root out abuses and poor decisions while dispensing the tsar’s mercy, was not just a 
Gogolian trope but part of the official ideological framework.47 Indeed, Governor 
Rokasovskii employed similar reasoning in establishing an appeals process as we will 
see. Count Bobrinskii fulfilled this role and, thankfully for the suffering population, did 
so with an eye to ensuring that local charities were provided for, giving 34,100 roubles to 
volost’ and village efforts.48 Seen as virtual plenipotentiaries of the throne (the tsarevich 
in this case), local individuals often wrote to these special representatives or the Special 
Committee directly, bypassing provincial bodies. A.S. Norman in Iambirskaia volost’, 
Shatsk uezd wrote directly to the Special Committee from November 1891 to January 
1892, eventually securing the necessary resources for his popechitel’stvo.49 More 
pertinent here is the example of Prince Gagarin, a land captain in Elatomsk. In April, 
Prince Gagarin wrote directly to Bobrinskii requesting money to purchase flour from the 
American vessel Missouri; awarded 200 roubles he purchased 600 puds (one train 
wagon).50 Despite the fact that Governor Rokasovskii chaired the TPWC, Prince Gagarin 
                                                 
46 Bobrinskii’s two officials were State Councillor Ramkov-Pozhnov and V.V. Langammer, the latter of 
whom would shortly after be sent to Borisoglebsk uezd to verify need and distribute aid, Count Bobrinskii 
to Pleve 12 March 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, l. 125, Correspondence between Bobrinskii, 
Rokasovskii and the Borisoglebsk uezd ispravnik 14 March, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 99-100. 
Polovstev’s son, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, worked for the MVD and was sent to work with Bobrinskii 
for the Special Committee while Bobrinskii was engaged to his sister on 20 January 1883 and they were 
married on 11 February 1883, A.A. Polovtsev, Dnevnik, II, pp. 453-4, I, p. 34, 45. 
47 Gaudin, Ruling Peasants, p. 54, Robbins, Tsar’s Viceroys, pp. 54-6. 
48 Count Bobrinskii to Special Committee concerning allocations for Tambov province n.d., RGIA, f. 1204, 
op. 1, d. 100, l. 145. 
49  On A.S. Norman, see Robbins, Famine in Russia, pp. 164-8. 
50 Tambov provincial welfare committee to the Special Committee on Famine Relief June 1892, RGIA, f. 
1204, op. 1, d. 100, l. 225, Count Bobrinskii to Special Committee concerning allocations for Tambov 
province n.d., RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, l. 145, Note from Bobrinskii 24 April 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 
1, d. 100, l. 202, Prince Gagarin to Count Bobrinskii 12 April 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, ll. 203-
6, Tambov provincial welfare committee to the Special Committee on Famine Relief June 1892, RGIA, f. 
1204, op. 1, d. 100, l. 225. W.C. Edgar, The Russian Famine of 1891 and 1892: Some Particulars of the 
Relief Sent to the Destitute Peasants by the Millers of America in the Steam Ship ‘Missouri’ (Minneapolis: 
The Millers and Manufacturers Insurance Company, 1893), Vol. 2, p. 31. 
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clearly perceived that it was more efficient to sidestep the official structures and go 
straight to the roving imperial agent. 
When convinced of a crisis, St. Petersburg would put laws and money aside but 
once the government believed that the crisis has passed, Vyshnegradskii’s fiscal control 
was reimposed. The additional 500,000 roubles in loans from the MVD in April was the 
final grant from the centre. Bobrinskii and the TPWC secured only 4,350 roubles from 
March to June to fight typhus and rebuild homes destroyed by fire.51 Between April and 
October the MVD and the Special Committee requested that all unspent reserves from 
the official and charitable relief effort be returned.52   
 All the province’s institutions resisted these central directives in a fierce defence 
of local interests. Though the charitable relief effort was not only less strident in tone than 
the TPFC, it was also more successful. Rokasovskii, in a difficult position, cautiously 
supported retaining the reserves of the official relief effort while the provincial uprava 
did not hold back.53 They found it ‘difficult to recognise any part of the sum issued from 
the government […] which can be immediately circulated to the imperial food capital’ 
and requested an additional 300,000 roubles.54 The uprava criticised approaches that 
reduced the annual amount set aside for crop failure relief and pointed out that this 
increased dependency on the harvest and that loans were ‘foreseeable’ (evidently lacking 
awareness of their own predictive failures).55 The TPWC clearly articulated local identity: 
                                                 
51 Count Bobrinskii to Pleve 14 March 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, ll. 134-42, Tambov provincial 
welfare committee to the Special Committee on Famine Relief 9 March 1892, f. 1204,, op. 1, d. 100, l. 66, 
Count Bobrinskii to Pleve, 17, 19 March 1892, RGIA. F. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, ll. 132-3, Rokasovskii to the 
Special Committee on Famine Relief June 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, l. 238,Tambov provincial 
welfare committee to the Special Committee on Famine Relief 28 June 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, 
l. 271. 
52 Durnovo to Rokasovskii 19 April 1892, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, l. 245, Minutes of the Tambov 
provincial welfare committee 27 October 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 101, l. 12. 
53 Rokasovskii to Durnovo 12 May 1892, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, l. 249. 
54 Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii 7 May 1892, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 250-
1. 
55 Ibid. 
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reserves should go to the provincial charitable society as local donors had the right to 
expect their donations would aid local need and the uezd sectional committee network 
should remain open.56 In both replies, there was a clear sense of ownership of funding 
irrespective of source; once it came into the physical possession of a provincial institution 
such as the uprava or the TPWC it became theirs, and they were determined to direct its 
allocation insofar as possible. The boundaries of the province may have been artificially 
created but when it came to desperate need, they were very real. Unsurprisingly, the MVD 
proved inflexible while the Special Committee was responsive to proposals with a 
charitable emphasis. Durnovo was explicit and refused to countenance retaining the 
reserves while the Special Committee felt the TPWC’s suggestion would ‘serve as an 
exemplary standard’. 57 
While the imperial government delineated the areas and ways in which the 
‘provincial idea’ could operate, the province was the seat of innovation and the centre had 
to respond. Bereft of other sources, the centre was often forced to trust the provinces, 
creating considerable latitude for the provincial institutions, something Tambov province 
was prepared to exploit. Where the latitude was smaller, Tambov’s institutions adopted a 
maximisation strategy: if you cannot get everything you want, get as much as possible. 
Though they could not break imperial structures, their approach to seeking funding 
suggests that they could test or nudge them.  
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The creation of the Tambov Provincial Welfare Committee 
Charitable relief saw the greatest institutional change in this period. The ‘structure’ 
established in 1891 was vibrant but fragmented and diffuse and by mid-January 1892, 
with the approval of the Special Committee for Famine Relief, the province would have 
one new over-arching body, the Tambov Provincial Welfare Committee.58 The MVD had 
sought tighter integration of private charity with light touch regulation since September 
1891, but the main instigator of the new structure was Governor N.M. Baranov of Nizhnii 
Novgorod. 59 Governor Baranov sought to centralise activities and information while 
preserving the existing popechitel’stvos and seeking greater local involvement.60 He 
advocated, in essence, a slightly looser version of the provincial food conference, which 
he had also pioneered. The Special Committee supported the idea but allowed the 
provinces themselves to decide if local conditions warranted such a structure.61 Tambov 
clearly decided that they did, as did the authorities in the provinces of Astrakhan, Kursk, 
Perm, Riazan and Saratov.62 
  The methods of the welfare committees in Nizhnii Novgorod and Tambov 
provinces to coordinate the overall relief effort better were quite different. Governor 
Baranov sought to ‘centralise’ charitable relief but argued this would not hinder donations 
or local autonomy.63 It would, he argued, improve information and ensure a more 
equitable distribution of aid.64 The TPWC adopted a lighter touch, preferring to let the 
                                                 
58 Count Bobrinskii to V.K. Pleve 21 February 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 100, ll. 53-4, Pravitel’stvennyi 
Vestnik, No. 15 19 January 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 11, l. 25. 
59 Durnovo to all governors, circular no. 6395/6591 1 September 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 308-
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61 Ibid. 
62 Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik, No. 15 19 January 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 11, l. 25. 
63 Pravitel’stvennyi Vestnik, No. 7 10 January 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 11, l. 20 
64 Ibid. 
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uezd institutions purchase grain while it raised donations and transferred resources to the 
uezds.65 
 Although the evidence is limited, it would seem that the personalities of the two 
governors and the trajectory of relief management in each province are strong explanatory 
factors for the difference between Nizhnii Novgorod and Tambov. Baranov was an 
‘energetic’ governor (though lacking in ‘moral qualities’ according to Sergei Witte) who 
had sought to strip the zemstvos of their food supply duties, then backed them against the 
gentry and used the food conference to establish strict control over the relief effort.66  
Rokasovskii, as we have seen, preferred a more decentralised approach allowing 
institutions relative autonomy in execution; indeed, Robbins uses Rokasovskii as a 
contrast against Baranov’s centralising approach.67 There is a strong degree of truth in 
this; Rokasovskii allowed the provincial uprava to control the mechanics of relief and in 
this chapter, we will look at how he focused more on correcting defects and ensuring 
consistency.  
The structure of the two committees provide further insight into how they 
perceived their roles.  Although there is no record of the TPWC’s meetings before 
October 1892, we can draw some inferences. The committee in Nizhnii Novgorod sought 
to integrate and control charity to improve coordination, while the TPWC aimed to solicit 
donations and to use charity to support official relief; a subtle but important distinction. 
The governor chaired both committees, which included the local bishop and chair of the 
provincial uprava. The similarities, however, stop there.68 In Nizhnii, Baranov also 
                                                 
65 Consolidated reports concerning the income and expenditure of monies which were in the command of 
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included the provincial marshal of the nobility, the mayor of Novgorod, the chair of the 
local Red Cross and representatives of other institutions while Tambov omitted them and 
included the vice-governor, two staff members (secretary and treasurer), the manager of 
the Ministry of State Domains for the province and Rokasovskii’s wife, Baroness 
Aleksandra Rokasovskaia, who was the vice-chair.69 Only Rokasovskaia, probably a 
patron of several charities, and the chair of the provincial uprava (Lev Vysheslavtsev 
until his death in February 1892), had any involvement in charitable matters.70 The 
crossover between the TPWC and the food conference is striking as is the absence of any 
direct charitable representation. while Nizhnii’s committee integrated charitable 
institutions from the start. The TPWC, however, would remove a group from the 
charitable relief effort by emasculating diocesan control. The TPWC was formed by 
merging the July 1891 and Diocesan committees; a move that the Holy Synod approved 
and several members of the Special Committee took a specific interest in.71 Despite Count 
Bobrinskii and Rokasovskii referring to it as ‘unification’, the TPWC itself talked of 
abolition and it received the Diocesan Committee’s 8,900 roubles.72 The only concession 
was including Bishop Ieronim as a member of the TPWC and using the 8,900 roubles for 
soup kitchens or church schools.73  
 The TPWC’s record was mixed; sacrificing control and coordination for donations 
and local autonomy meant it had considerable resources but little control on how to use 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
70 Robbins, The Tsar’s Viceroys, pp. 176-7, Dvukhzhilova, Sotsial’nyi sostav, pp. 112-3, ‘Predsedateli’, p. 
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them effectively which left it dependent on individuals, another thing it shared with the 
official relief effort. Outside of the Special Committee it raised 25,000 roubles (mostly 
from within the province) and just over 138,000 puds in grain and fodder, all from other 
provinces.74 This sense of success was emphasised by Count Bobrinskii, who found it 
impossible to list all the private individuals who contributed via donations, maintaining 
soup kitchens, or providing earnings and healthcare.75 It was fragile however; the TPWC 
found that it had little impact on how charitable relief functioned, was dependent on 
marshals of the nobility and land captains, and lacked detail uezd level information.76 
Managing the relief effort meant making a serious of choices, many difficult. In 
structuring the TPWC loosely, the province was consistent in its practices but charity was 
less formally connected and risked greater fragmentation.  
 
The provincial food conference as an aid appeal board 
The provincial food conference was one of the key institutions of the relief effort though 
provinces affected by the famine made use of it in different ways. In Nizhnii Novgorod, 
Governor Baranov, who had originally proposed the establishment of the conference, 
used it to centralise control of relief within the province.77 As we saw in Chapter 2 
however, Rokasovskii preferred ‘decentralisation’ with the conference having a role as a 
‘guiding organ’.78 Threatened by irrelevance largely brought about by the actions of those 
who comprised it, it proved an adaptable and flexible institution. The changing nature of 
the crisis and its escalating severity forced a rethink of how best to coordinate efforts, 
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especially policy formulation. In this section we will look at how the TPFC re-invented 
itself as an appeals board while some policy formulation was transferred to the uezds. A 
pragmatic response to the changing circumstances of the crisis, it allowed the province’s 
institutions to meet social and political goals. 
 The problems encountered in Spassk and Morshansk uezds, covered in Chapter 3, 
forced Governor Rokasovskii to respond by using the fluidity of the relief effort’s ad hoc 
structure to correct acknowledged defects. His solution was uezd food conferences 
(UFCs), comprised of land captains, the uezd uprava and chaired by the uezd marshal of 
the nobility.79 Along with Governor N. M. Baranov in Nizhnii Novgorod, Rokasovskii 
was the only other governor to seek an uezd-based solution.80As with charity though, the 
two provinces would take the new institutions in very different directions. Baranov sought 
to use them to increase the control of the provincial food conference, while Rokasovskii 
explicitly stated they should address local variations in common issues.81 There are no 
records of communication between the two governors but given Baranov’s ‘energetic’ 
nature and the fact he was behind the provincial food conference, it is almost certain that 
he developed the UFCs first. Rokasovskii was not a radical innovator, rather an adaptor 
of the creations of others; nevertheless, he saw that the UFCs were a way of achieving 
the contradictory goals of unity and decentralisation. They were a recognition that 
decentralisation could not function effectively without an adequate structure and a role 
for the uezds in policy formulation. 
 The TPFC would continue to deviate from the pattern of a domineering institution 
controlled by the governor set out by Robbins.82 At the same meeting where he announced 
the establishment of the UFCs, Rokasovskii repurposed the TPFC. A circular in the 
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Gubernskie Vedomosti and an announcement at all volost’ assemblies would clarify 
eligibility for food aid, the process of obtaining it and establish an appeals process for the 
peasantry.83 Appeals were to be presented in the governor’s name only, not to land 
captains, and would be given ‘due legal process’ before being delivered to the TPFC for 
a final, binding, decision.84 Governor Rokasovskii’s role in this deviation is central and 
complicated. It is easy to label him as buffeted by events, lacking the ability to innovate 
and a weak strategic thinker. Indeed, as we have seen, he made errors. Yet in a moment 
of acute crisis, very few administrators could afford to be strategists. His adaptation of 
the TPFC was pragmatic, responding to existing problems with a practical and 
implementable solution. 
 Rokasovskii had taken the innovation of another governor and adapted it to 
Tambov’s particular circumstances, using it to correct defects in the machinery he 
oversaw, again proving that the province could adapt and do the best it could in the 
circumstances. The TPFC now appeared at the apex of a new, diverse structure designed 
to limit the impacts of the fragmented nature of provincial government. A clear reporting 
loop was now established from the top down; for example, UFCs oversaw the uezd upravy 
and land captains and could vary policies to local conditions, but were subject to the 
TPFC. Every element of the administrative structure now had a role to play, most of which 
now went beyond simply complying with commands from above. Indeed, Rokasovskii 
had now built in a certain level of local initiative, analogous to the very function the TPFC 
played with St. Petersburg.   
                                                 
83 Minutes of the TPFC 17 December 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 136-140, Tambovskie Gubernskie 
Vedomosti, 4 January 1892, Circular No. 6213 to all volost’ boards 23 December 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, 
d. 4193, ll. 201-2. 
84 Rokasovskii to all land captains 23 December 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, l. 187. 
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The new strategy had several goals: effective oversight of the actions at the volost’ 
level, preservation of public order and ensuring continued loyalty to and faith in the 
government. By ‘reaching into the village’ Rokasovskii was using the TPFC to meet key 
political goals.85 Transforming the TPFC into an appeals board closed the last level of the 
feedback loop and provided a mechanism for effective oversight of volost’ officials. The 
zemstvos could not organise on the volost’ level while the land captains did not answer 
to the governor; this disconnected the TPFC from the very epicentre of the crisis. Little 
wonder, then, that Rokasovskii saw it as very important that peasants should be able to 
appeal if they had doubts or complaints about officials.86  
In addition to oversight, introducing appeals helped ensure public order by 
essentially providing a safety valve for discontent while legitimising the relief effort and 
its procedures. Public order was a legitimate concern; as we saw in Chapter 3, there were 
complaints that poor quality food aid had killed two peasants while one village society 
had actually sent a messenger to the Tsar to demand the ‘Tsar’s rations’. On the last claim, 
Rokasovskii himself had drawn attention to the increasing number of petitions for this 
food ‘on the Treasury’s account’.87 The governor was explicit on how the appeals process 
was central to his strategy to maintain order; the development of these ‘fallacious 
instincts’ surrounding free aid would have ‘very malicious consequences, which it is 
necessary to stave off’.88 A week after this warning, there were two indications of what 
these ‘malicious consequences’ would look like. A priest in Spassk uezd, Fr. Butakov, 
was reported for inciting the peasantry against local officials over aid allocation while the 
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86 Minutes of the TPFC 17 December 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 136-140. 
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governor’s chancellery asked that a Mr. Leman, supposedly guilty of the same crime, be 
denied the right to establish a charitable committee.89 These incidents aside, concern for 
public order and a determination to act were a key part of Rokasovskii’s character, 
perhaps partially due to his military career. After the famine, this would lead to reports 
on insufficient police presence in the province and actions that would cause his eventual 
dismissal as governor.90 
In a way, however, Governor Rokasovskii was right to be concerned about public 
order at this time; evidence from other famines throughout history suggests that public 
disturbances peak at the threat of famine when frustration at authorities over food 
shortages rises.91 However, once starvation takes hold, this has in many cases led to 
greater apathy, presumably due to physical weakness and the sheer focus on survival.92 
Thus, the province was responding to the small disturbances at the very moment at which 
public activity would tip away from resistance. The regime of Tsar Alexander III was, 
with some justification, obsessed with internal security and determinedly autocratic; by 
allowing the appeals process, Rokasovskii attempted to head off security concerns by 
allowing a formal, if limited, forum for discontent. 
This is important to recognise as Rokasovskii had the authority under the law 
(backed by a secret MVD circular of 1885) to adopt a more repressive strategy and take 
all necessary actions to break public disorder.93 That he did not take this opportunity 
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shows that his main concern was not strict control of public order but shoring up 
government authority and legitimising the relief effort. Informing land captains of the 
appeals process, Rokasovskii stressed that it was important to ‘strengthen the faith of the 
population in the legal and correct allocation of loans’.94 As we saw in Chapter 3 and will 
see later in this chapter, Rokasovskii intervened when the rules and procedures of the 
relief effort were not followed; fairness and compliance were his key concerns. Attempts 
by the peasantry to hide their resources, the actions of individuals like Fr. Butakov and 
the distribution of poor quality grain undermined the effort’s legitimacy.  
Seeking to legitimise the relief effort and convince the population the government 
was doing all it could, Rokasovskii took a number of potentially risky contradictory 
actions that inadvertently questioned other elements of government policy. The circular 
to all volost’ boards made clear that there would be no ‘official food’ while the appeals 
process he outlined circumvented the land captains.95 Rokasovskii was attempting to limit 
peasant expectations while portraying the government as responsive to popular needs. 
This was no easy task. The land captains were vital in allocating aid and were the 
centrepiece legislation of Alexander III’s reign, yet here Rokasovskii was undercutting 
them. It is especially confusing as he would later emphasise how key they were to the 
relief effort.96 This does, however, make sense when we see it as a calculation based on 
immediate short-term risk; he had clearly decided that the greater risk was to the 
government’s credibility and arbitrary localised authority was not a new experience for 
the peasantry and was even expected.97 The peasantry believed that the land captains 
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could do ‘everything’, and the 1889 Land Captain Statute itself reinforced their powerful 
position.98 The state frequently attacked and outsourced blame to lower level officials in 
the event of a crisis to protect its own reputation, and it is logical to assume that 
Rokasovskii was doing the same thing here. Again, the bureaucratic culture of the centre 
was replicated in the provinces. 
 
The role of petitions in imperial Russia 
By using petitions in his name to create an appeals process against the actions of lower 
officials, Rokasovskii was playing his part in a long established ritual performance of 
power. He was performing the role of the powerful satrap, the appointee from outside 
who would fairly adjudicate and dispense the fatherly mercy of the tsar.99 The myth of 
the tsar-batiushka, the ‘little father’ who dispensed freedom or made small gestures of 
benevolence to the narod to overcome the despotism of officials, was a long established 
cultural motif.100 The nineteenth century also saw the rise of the ‘scenario of power’, in 
which each tsar chose their governing myth. Tsar Alexander III’s was based on a close 
bond with the people via paternalism.101 Allowing the presentation of petitions had long 
been an established method of interaction between the population and the throne, and the 
image of the merciful tsar served to personalise and reinforce loyalty, preserving 
autocracy.102 Petitions regulated conflict and, by ensuring greater subservience and 
freedom of action through the unpredictability of a petition’s outcome, maintained the 
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autocratic nature of the regime.103 By undercutting the land captains, at least symbolically, 
Rokasovskii was effectively reaffirming rituals of deference and loyalty. The governor 
may have become a manager but he could still be a powerful symbol. 
 Petitions were also a useful mechanism for the peasantry as a way of mediating 
and controlling their existence in a state that privileged other social groups as a matter of 
course. The state was the source of all justice; there were no ‘natural rights’ and territories 
and social groups could not resist incorporation. However, a legal system based on 
differentiation still created room for even ‘lowly’ subjects in basic practices of 
governance.104 The great emancipation cemented peasant separateness in the very 
structure of rural administration with the only changes being the way in which they 
interacted with the general system of administration.105 However, peasant culture was 
only partly isolated; it was flexible and adaptable with rituals and customs used to mediate 
a rapidly changing existence, with even the practice of denying the existence of these 
customs part of the process.106 Adaptation stretched to include the reformed legal system; 
peasants were litigious and used the court system to pursue their interests and goals, 
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sometimes all the way to the Senate.107 Recent historiography has shown, through 
examining various court records and petitions, that the peasantry used volost’ courts to 
help reshape society while fighting against its perceived ‘government’ bias while for 
women, petitions to the Senate were a way of articulating personal power and freedom.108 
 
Peasant appeals: type, investigation and decisions 
The peasant appeals and petitions to the TPFC in 1892, then, fit into this long established 
narrative and practice of power. They met the interests of the provincial administration, 
legitimising their efforts and supervising officials; and the peasantry, who could articulate 
their own interpretation of the relief effort and seek redress. Petitions represented the 
point at which state and peasant interests intersected. The appeals process in Tambov 
province was demand led. The peasantry quickly took advantage of it and forced the 
provincial authorities to consider their needs. The TPFC met sixteen times between 
January and August with 94 items out of one hundred and sixty, or 58.75 per cent of the 
total, dealing with new petitions.109 In addition to this, the TPFC also reconsidered 
previously submitted petitions; the TPFC, therefore, spent the vast majority of its time 
dealing with peasant petitions in some form. Other provincial food conferences met only 
once or twice a month and there is no indication of an appeal process in other provinces.110 
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A two-way exchange, peasant need drove the TPFC but the volume of petitions 
highlighted the need to keep an active check on local officials, who retained the final right 
of decision and conducted thorough assessments. 
Famine is the symptom of a wider disease; starvation becomes evident when pre-
existing distress reaches crisis point. Far ahead of his time in this respect, the land captain 
Aleksandr Novikov diagnosed Tambov province with a ‘chronic disease: 
malnourishment, which escalates in crop failure years into famine’.111 Peasant petitions, 
as the final resort for aid, played a similar role, revealing when distress became too much, 
and when this distress started. The TPFC records and the MVD’s statistics show that the 
dramatic spike in petitions for March and April resulted from problems in January and 
February, showing that the provincial machinery was slow in dealing with distress and 
identifying its causes.112 Nearly half of the TPFC meetings took place in March and April 
and it heard 75 of the 94 petitions in this time while March and April were only the third 
and fourth highest months for food loans (874,000 and 922,000 people respectively).113 
The amount of food aid allocated per eater also rose slightly above the MVD norm and 
fell slightly in subsequent months though it was decidedly higher than January and 
February when, as we will see, the TPFC had cut the allocation per eater due to supply 
fears.114 More aid was being provided in April yet twenty-five petitions came to one 
meeting in late April alone.115 Hunger had started to work earlier and faster than the 
province’s institutions were able to cope with or understand; they understood absolute, 
immediate hunger but not relative or slowly worsening distress. 
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The desperate human plight of many peasants and whole communities is not 
captured in the dry and mostly quantitative official documents. The petitions are the 
clearest records we have from the very people worst affected by the crisis. They were not 
just examples of allocation procedures gone wrong but desperate pleas for help. Tambov’s 
countryside was in crisis and, via the petitions, peasants were essentially begging the 
gubernskii nachal’nik and closest link to the Tsar for relief. To see how the relative 
distress affected the peasantry we need to look at specific examples from the petitions. 
Some of the petitions were desperate cases: a family unattached to a village society forced 
to reside elsewhere, eighteen needy households initially denied aid and a peasant woman 
forced to sell her last horse to care for her insane son.116 Entire village societies often had 
to resort to appeals with between fifteen and 106 peasants sometimes on a single 
petition.117  
Apart from desperate need, the petitions show that peasant life, with its tensions, 
grievances and practices, continued. Instead of famine eliminating (if only temporarily), 
these tensions were expressed through the medium of the crisis. Village societies had long 
used expulsion as a way to control or eliminate threats to stability and viability, and the 
petitions provided a mechanism for this. In late April, Dukhovka Vyzhanov, a peasant in 
Soldatskoi village, Tambov uezd, had been imprisoned for theft and attempted to obtain 
a passport on false pretences; after the land captain warned the village society that they 
were responsible for supervising him, they petitioned to expel him one day after the aid 
rolls were revised.118 Collective responsibility bound the members of a village society 
together; debt was collective and Governor Rokasovskii ensured that the peasantry were 
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aware that the aid loans were part of this.119 Burdensome in some ways, collective 
responsibility acted here as a social regulator; Vyzhanov’s petition gave the village 
society the excuse it had presumably been looking for. Very similar to how the province 
often interacted with the imperial centre, the local community adapted the language or 
priorities of the state to meet its own internal goals.120 Obedient in appearance, in reality 
they had transformed the meaning of the act, if not its expression. 
Sometimes the allocation process was used as personal score settling or to 
deceive. In March in the village of Kondrovka, Temnikov uezd, a peasant with the 
surname of Guliaev petitioned for aid after being denied in the original inspection. When 
the land captain investigated, he found that the peasants’ claim that Guliaev rented out 
land and worked on the railway was untrue and he was in need of considerable aid.121 The 
same village also saw a family who ran their own business appeal for aid.122 Land captains 
would often simply accept the resolutions as presented in order to make the process faster. 
Knowing this, many peasants or whole village societies used the petitions to settle scores 
or exclude unpopular peasants, while more powerful individuals (such as volost’ elders 
and scribes) often sought to seize control of the allocation process. The two cases from 
Kondrovka show that instead of simply being passive and compliant, peasants would, 
perfectly understandably, seek any advantage. We need to ask then if the province’s 
attempts to shore up confidence in the relief effort did either the opposite or was simply 
exploited by those who saw it as a second chance to get aid. 
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1891, GATO, f. 4 op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 80-1. 
120 Collective responsibility was used for discipline and also as a way of deflecting tax responsibilities, 
Gaudin, Ruling Peasants, p. 17, pp. 39-40. 
121 Minutes of the TPFC 30 March, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d5. 4265, ll. 198-224. 
122 Ibid. 
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The crisis presented opportunities for long suffering residents, especially wives, 
to seek redress. At an unspecified point in April, Ivan Khomutinnikov, a peasant from 
Sverskoi volost’, Temnikov uezd appealed to Rokasovskii for aid. An investigation 
revealed that he was not needy but the matter did not end there; his wife complained about 
his profligacy and constant drunkenness, and demanded that their property be removed 
from his control.123 The investigator, N. Kazmashnev, presumably the land captain, 
agreed and turned the property over to the command of the village assembly; it is likely 
Khomutinnikov had accrued debts and the law allowed for the seizure of property in the 
event of a peasant neglecting their collective responsibilities.124 Khomutinnikov’s wife 
was able to use the crisis to leverage broader legal and cultural trends to re-establish her 
autonomy and at least ease her condition. Imperial law laid down that a wife’s first duty 
was to obey her husband; yet in another sign of the contradictory nature of tsarist 
governance, the law protected the property rights of women in a way almost unique in 
Europe for the period.125 After 1864, the Governing Senate consistently ruled in the 
favour of women in disputes with husbands; it was perhaps with the idea that the property 
would be assigned to the wife that Kazmashnev transferred it to the assembly.126 If the 
stories on Khomutinnikov’s behaviour are true, there is a fitting justice to the story; in 
attempting to take advantage of a redress mechanism, he himself was complained about 
and fell victim to the law. Imperial legislation and the rules of the relief effort tightly 
delineated room for manoeuvre but by connecting certain provisions and playing one off 
against the other, it was possible to carve out a limited sphere of autonomy and use a 
specific event to improve one’s standing. 
                                                 
123 N. Kazmashnev to Rokasovskii 29 May 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 384-5. 
124 Ibid., PSZ, 2nd series, t. 36, 19 February 1861, No. 36657, glava 3, st. 188. 
125 Svod zakonov, ‘O pravakh i obiazannostiakh semeystvennykh’, t. 10, razdel 1, glava 4, otdelenie 1, st. 
107, Engel, Breaking the Ties that Bound, pp. 80-1. 
126 Engel, Breaking the Ties that Bound, pp. 80-1. 
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Exploitation was all too common a feature in village societies; from the notorious 
abuses of the volost’ scribe to manipulation and intimidation, exploitation was woven 
into the fabric of peasant life. By the late nineteenth century, this feature had become a 
key state concern. Indeed, one of the main aims of the 1889 Land Captain Statute was to 
protect the peasantry from the ‘commune eater’, who exploited and ruined them. Over 
the course of the famine, Tambov’s provincial and uezd authorities complained about the 
exploitation of peasants by kulaks and other groups.127 That the appeals process threw up 
a case of this underscores their position as a reflection of normal peasant society and the 
continuation of its normal tensions. In May in Novo-Cherkutinskoi volost’, Usman uezd, 
Leren Krol’ had listed Aleksandr Kuznetsov as the owner of his shop and had taken debts 
in his name.128 Kuznetsov, having this asset on paper was denied aid but was in reality 
destitute after losing his home in a fire in 1891.129 The arrangement may once have been 
mutually beneficial as Kuznetsov was the shop’s manager and Krol’ was not legally 
allowed operate the business; the famine had torn apart this fragile agreement. It took so 
long to expose the fraud as the land captain, overwhelmed by the volume of work, 
performed only a perfunctory check of the resolutions. The relief effort’s structures are 
again exposed: they functioned satisfactorily at a surface level, but were incapable of 
detecting or dealing with more complicated issues.  
 Unsurprisingly, the petitions reveal that not only did peasants frequently seek to 
manipulate each other, there were also attempts to manipulate local officials and the relief 
effort. Despite aiming to reduce evasion and improve peasant trust and compliance, the 
TPFC was still confronted with cases of peasants seeking to take advantage of the 
                                                 
127 See Minutes of the Special Conference with Director Vishniakov 28 July 1891, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 
2132, ll. 56-66, Annual Report of Governor Rokasovskii on Tambov Province for 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 
223, d. 232, ll. 8-9 and Zhurnaly Borisoglebskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, p. 36. 
128 Minutes of the TPFC 10 June 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 401-19. 
129 Ibid. 
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overworked relief effort and improve their chances of receiving aid. The peasantry took 
advantage of the opportunity the appeals process offered. Most appealed legitimately but 
others used it as a second chance to get around the strict eligibility requirements. An 
example of this comes from Tambov uezd in March: following queries by Rokasovskii 
and the TPFC, the Tambov uezd uprava established that a family in Tsorontsivskii volost’ 
had left off the lists four people, two of working age and two one-year-old children.130 
Neither category were entitled to aid. By excluding them the family clearly aimed to 
improve their chances of getting aid which could then be distributed between everyone. 
The peasantry often (rightly) saw the eligibility requirements as far too restrictive; 
evasion was an attempt to redress what they saw as unfair (and sometimes illegitimate) 
rules. Subverting and re-positioning official structures to their advantage as a survival 
strategy was part of a long tradition of peasant resistance and non-compliance. 
These brief examples give a flavour of some of the petitions that made their way 
to the TPFC in 1892. We cannot claim them as wholly representative but they illustrate 
that even while famine raged, for many life continued as before, only with sharper 
circumstances. In fact, the crisis perhaps served to encourage the behaviour of thieves, 
drunken husbands and exploiters; at a time of sharp need and competition, unethical, 
advantage-focused behaviour usually increases.131 It is also notable that a large number 
of applications came from well-off peasants, suggesting that they were better able to make 
use of official channels. 
It was into this maelstrom that the land captains waded, expected to investigate 
fairly on behalf of the TPFC. They did so in the face of worsening hunger, desperate need 
                                                 
130 Minutes of the TPFC 25 March 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 198-224. 
131 In August 1891, the Tambovskie Gubernskie Vedomosti warned members of the public to secure their 
houses as thefts at night had increased, mostly through open windows, Tambovskie Gubernskie Vedomosti 
Saturday 24 August 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4192, ll. 201-2. For more on the general rise in anti-social 
behaviour during famines see: Ó Gráda, Famine: A Short History. 
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and an almost unmanageable workload: in the words of Aleksandr Novikov, a proper 
inspection of resolutions would take at least a year while if they did not hurry, the loans 
would always be late.132 They were caught in an almost inescapable bind; either they 
risked handing out aid quickly, potentially giving it to those ineligible, or worked 
diligently, potentially missing those who needed it. While there were some mistakes and 
a number of personal judgments, the majority of land captains worked rationally, morally 
and legally: they sought to establish by proper investigation who had been incorrectly 
refused aid or who had become needy. 
The process of investigating the petitions was remarkably similar to the initial 
assessment under appeal. Petitions went to Governor Rokasovskii in the first instance and 
were transferred to the relevant land captain for investigation and appraisal. The land 
captain’s investigation, in the form that reached the TPFC, was a brief statement on the 
material and family condition of the petitioner, whether they had previously been awarded 
aid, and a brief conclusion. By using the same process that they were now accepting 
appeals to, they aimed to legitimise the relief effort and show it was adaptable; mistakes 
were likely but the system would correct itself. A wide-scale reassessment of need in 
changing circumstances was not possible, but by allowing for individual applications, 
they built in a degree of flexibility. It also demonstrated a considerable level of initiative: 
the rules were centrally set, but the tsar’s local representatives would address the issues. 
For the most part, the land captains carried this out. Governor Rokasovskii became 
directly involved in one case but this was at a time when the appeals system was new and 
                                                 
132 Novikov, Zapiski zemskogo nachal’nika, p. 172. 
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fluid and the case crossed uezd boundaries.133 Another case involved the Tambov uezd 
uprava investigating as the local land captain did not respond in time.134 
This delay was unusual however; despite the heavy workload, there is strong 
evidence that the land captains understood the seriousness of the situation and were keen 
to carry out their duties as successfully as possible. We can see this in the fact that land 
captains would break a petition down by each application, with an individual assessment 
and evaluation, whether a petition had one, fifteen or even 106 applicants.135 In this latter 
example, the land captain kept the local uezd uprava appraised of who needed aid as 
circumstances changed. This approach was typical; a rare example of a lack of attention 
was in Badevskoi volost’, Temnikov uezd where in March, a new inspection was ordered 
for several families as the land captain’s original conclusion was based on information 
from 1891.136 In general, each level of the province was aware of the need for accurate 
information; a need that had helped prompt the transformation of the TPFC. The effort 
that went into investigating each petition shows that they were not indifferent to peasant 
suffering and were keenly aware of their responsibilities to them and the state. Prince 
Kugushev, a land captain in Usman uezd, received a ringing endorsement from the uezd 
uprava for following the law while taking ‘close to his heart the calamitous situation of 
the people’.137 Very few land captains followed the example of the eighth precinct in 
Kozlov uezd who rejected a petition to prevent others, which would ‘complicate the 
execution of his duties’.138 While the disinterested land captain in Kozlov uezd was an 
exception, the multiple examples of land captains using their powers in idiosyncratic and 
                                                 
133 Governor Rokasovskii and the Tambov chief of police investigated a case in Tambov uezd for the 8 
January TPFC; it appears this involvement was due to the fact that the petitioning family were from Kozlov 
uezd but were ordinarily resident in Tambov town, Minutes of the TPFC 8 January 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 
1, d. 4193, ll. 249-52. 
134 Minutes of the TPFC 4 March 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 1-9. 
135 Minutes of the TPFC 30, 4 March 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 198-224, ll. 1-9. 
136 Minutes of the TPFC 4 March 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 1-9. 
137 Minutes of the TPFC 10 June 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 401-19. 
138 Minutes of the TPFC 30 March 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 198-224. 
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contradictory ways led many to see them as arbitrary and unchecked. To Aleksandr 
Novikov, there was a clear difference between the law and ‘reality’ and he identified a 
complete lack of consistency at all levels.139 Historians such as Gaudin and Pearson 
instead see a flawed institution wherein the first appointees struggled with broad, vague 
tasks with little support and contradictory messages.140  
The ways in which land captains viewed and judged the petitions they investigated 
endorse Gaudin and Pearson’s view. Faced with an overwhelming workload, land 
captains had to find some way of categorising and evaluating cases that fell into the many 
grey areas, especially for those eligible only for charitable relief. As we have seen already, 
the imperial state interwove notions of trust, merit and pragmatic security concerns, such 
as a petitioner who sought to incite the peasantry to ‘unfounded complaints’, into the 
relief effort. The land captains had to juggle these priorities.141 This sometimes led to 
decisions based less on formal requirements but personal judgments; a land captain in 
Temnikov uezd rejected a request, laying the blame on the peasant’s supposed financial 
mismanagement.142 This is not to excuse or approve of the judgmental nature of these 
decisions; ideally, a more robust, well-resourced process would have existed, eliminating 
the need for this. Famine stricken Tambov province was most certainly not an ideal world, 
however, and the 1889 Land Captain Statute deliberately envisaged paternal authority. In 
post for less than a year, struggling to grapple with the crisis, various complex and 
conflicting laws, and now an ad hoc appeals process, that land captains based decisions 
on personal judgments was not ideal but was understandable. Ultimately, it was an 
attempt to cope and ensure that aid went to where it was needed or ‘deserved’, neatly 
                                                 
139 Gaudin, Ruling peasants, pp. 47-8, Pearson, Russian Officialdom, pp. 204-9, Novikov, Zapiski zemskogo 
nachal’nika, p., 36, 45, pp.200-3. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Minutes of the TPFC 8 January, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 249-52, 
142 Minutes of the TPFC 4 March 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 1-9. 
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encapsulated by the Usman uezd uprava defending Prince Kugushev as ‘it is difficult to 
avoid mistakes in the inspection of the needy peasants’.143 Indeed, several land captains 
would take it on themselves to aid petitioners who were not eligible for official aid by 
contacting the local sectional committee, popechitel’stvo or the TPWC.144 A land captain 
in Lipetsk uezd prevented charitable aid being used to reduce the level of official aid 
allocated while one in Elatomsk uezd requested permission to redirect livestock aid to 
feed desperate peasants.145 One of the issues with ‘proizvol’, especially concerning land 
captains, has been the tendency to see it as a negative qualifier; these examples show 
instead that it often applied to a range of positive, event-dependent actions to help land 
captains discharge their duties. 
The inevitability of errors, accepted almost without question by all of the 
province’s institutions and officials, had been a key driver for the establishment of the 
appeals process. Worried about the number of irregularities or the system’s capacity to 
cope, Rokasovskii had instituted it to legitimise the relief effort and supervise local 
officials. The appeals process was the only formal, direct connection and communication 
between the peasantry and those responsible for their relief. Yet the process was also 
controlled and mediated; petitions restated the subservient nature of the peasantry and by 
the time they reached the TPFC they were presented through the lens and judgment of the 
land captains. The power and responsibility the TPFC had was considerable; it could 
award or deny aid, praise or rebuke officials and order additional investigations. 
  In exercising this power, the archival material shows that the TPFC’s main 
concern was resolving the issue at the heart of each petition and that they, like the land 
captains, were forced to find ways to cope with and adjudicate on the sheer volume of 
                                                 
143 Minutes of the TPFC 10 June 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 401-19. 
144 Minutes of the TPFC 9 May 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 339-44. 
145 Minutes of the TPFC 12-14 March, 30 May 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 41-59, ll. 375-9.  
219 
 
 
 
cases presented. At a considerable distance from the actual events described in the 
petitions, this led to decisions that suggest the TPFC was abdicating responsibility and 
studiously ignoring its own resolution process. However, the truth is a little more complex 
than this; while leaving the petition without action or requesting additional information 
were the most common decisions, they reflected standard bureaucratic practice and were 
an attempt to resolve the issue at the centre of each petition. Indeed, the TPFC took few 
decisions on petitions themselves, suggesting that its main role was in providing an outlet 
for appeal and acting as a driver of better and more responsive local effort. 
Perhaps the most common decision was the ‘petition left without action’, which 
accounted for half of petitions at one meeting in April.146 These petitions were frequently 
resolved between submission and the TPFC meeting. Investigations often established that 
the petitioners did not meet the eligibility requirements for official aid (through either 
wealth or age), or that they were allocated aid between the appeal being lodged and the 
TPFC meeting, therefore the petition was now redundant.147 The frequent time lag may 
make the process seem redundant but the very act of allowing petitions triggered an 
investigation and meant that many issues were resolved at source before the TPFC got 
involved. Governor Rokasovskii got the supervisory function and more responsive 
allocation process he wanted. 
 Imperial bureaucratic practices were transmitted, learned and practised by the 
TPFC. In the courts system, analogous to petitions in many ways, cases took years to go 
through the various levels and there were continuous requests for information.148 Jane 
Burbank highlights the case of one peasant, Praskovia Aref’eva, who spent nine years 
                                                 
146 Minutes of the TPFC 14 April 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 248-63. 
147 See for example Minutes of the TPFC 4, 12-14 March, 9 May 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 1-9, 
41-59, 339-44. 
148 Burbank, Russian Peasants go to Court, pp. 49-81. 
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going through various appeals; not every case was as prolonged but delays were common 
even where there were established submission forms to make it easy for the petitioner and 
officials.149 Informal and fluid, with information presented in a variety of formats, the 
appeals process presented considerable challenges for the TPFC, especially when the 
issue had not been resolved prior to a meeting. Adding to this the approaching rasputitsa 
and rapidly changing circumstances, accurate information was vital. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that the TPFC frequently instructed the land captain or the uezd uprava to 
collect additional information and present the findings to the next meeting.150 Aware of 
the gravity of the crisis and their moral responsibility, they looked to correct widespread 
information deficiencies, for example when they ordered new inspections in part of 
Temnikov uezd after they discovered the land captain was using information from 
1891.151  
The information gap was a persistent and serious problem and helps explain why 
the authorities so often accepted the verdict of the land captain or ordered further 
enquiries. As we have seen in almost every chapter, there were serious problems with 
information travelling upwards from volost’ to the provincial level. The TPFC, as with 
all of the province’s institutions, was ‘flying blind’ in a way; the crisis was unpredictable 
and severe and as an ad hoc body, it could only ever evolve its approach on a case-by-
case basis. This explains what otherwise seems an over-reliance on the opinions of the 
land captains; they were the closest link to the volost’ and were presumed to have ‘better’ 
knowledge of the situation of the peasantry. The investigations required by the appeals 
process itself were to be the safeguard against poor performance. It worked to an extent: 
land captains and the Morshansk uezd uprava were rebuked for not granting aid to those 
                                                 
149 Ibid., pp. 32-42, 49-50. 
150 See for example Minutes of the TPFC 12-14 March, 30 March, 14 April, 28 April, 30 May, 10 June 
1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 41-59,ll. 198-224, ll. 248-63, ll. 292-314, ll. 375-9, ll. 401-19. 
151 Minutes of the TPFC 4 March 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 1-9. 
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entitled to it while, based on a petition, the TPFC ordered an investigation into the 
behaviour of volost’ officials in Dmitrievich volost’, Tambov uezd.152 The message from 
the TPFC was clear: every official had their role to play in the relief effort and it needed 
to ensure that it could trust them to do this in accordance with the rules. 
 This then, was the real purpose behind the TPFC as an appeals board; it was part 
of Governor Rokasovskii’s strategy to ensure that the relief effort ran fairly in accordance 
with established procedures. Neither lenient nor severe in how it treated petitions, the 
TPFC focused pragmatically on ensuring that the issue at the heart of each petition was 
resolved. This resolution could take the form of awarding official aid, denying it, or 
transferring the petitioner to charitable organisations. After hearing its first petitions in 
January, when it reminded uezd officials of the law, active decision-making became rare, 
and the preference was to encourage land captains to resolve the issue at source.153 As an 
appeals body, the TPFC served many functions: clearing house, supervisory mechanism 
and a safety valve for peasant discontent. By building on a long imperial tradition of 
restitution by appeal, the appeals process united moral responsibility and the province’s 
overall relief strategy. It did not, however, highlight every problem and ensure the relief 
effort ran smoothly as a rule. Doing so was, as this thesis argues, beyond the capacity of 
the province owing to structural deficiencies it could not cure. What the appeals process 
did do, and did so reasonably well, was to give  a voice to the human desperation and 
tragedy the crisis caused, and extend a modicum of hope. Without a complete overhaul 
of the administrative and physical infrastructure of the province, perhaps the most that 
                                                 
152 Minutes of the TPFC 4, 12-14, 30 March, 30 May 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 1-9, 41-59 ll. 
198-224, 375-9.  
153 Minutes of the TPFC 8 January 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 249-52. 
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could be done beyond the official effort was to offer hope, a commodity nearly as scarce 
as food.154 
                                                 
154 Visiting Tambov province, Konstantin Arsen’ev discussed authorities being forced to comfort people 
‘with a vague hope for the future, i.e., the opening of a new stolovaia’, К. K. Arsen'ev, ‘Iz nedavnei poezdki 
Tambovskuiu guberniiu: Vpechatleniia i zametki’, Vestnik Evropy (February, 1892), p. 847. 
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Chapter 5 
The relief effort on the ground, January – July 1892 
 
Introduction 
Modesty appears to have been a commodity that, like grain and food, was in short supply 
in 1892. The imperial government declared that no government in human history had ever 
achieved so much for its population and this self-congratulatory mood spread out, 
encompassing the province’s institutions and visitors to Tambov province.1 Governor 
Rokasovskii asserted that success was due to the administrative structures in place.2 The 
focus of this chapter will be to see if this mood was justified. Certainly, the scale of the 
effort mounted from January to July 1892 in the province was impressive in raw scale. 
The authorities purchased just under 1.21 million puds of seed crops and issued just under 
4.229 million puds in official food loans in the same period.3 Putting this into context, the 
total purchased for this period ranks as the fourth largest total for affected provinces for 
the entire crisis period.4 
The province’s institutions appeared to be under siege, suffering from ‘general 
starvation’, a near doubling in the numbers requiring aid (to just over a million people) 
from January to June 1892, and the death of the long-time chair of the provincial uprava.5 
In this context, avoiding complete collapse was a remarkable achievement. Running to 
                                                 
1 Robbins, Famine in Russia, p. 168. On the self-congratulation on Tambov’s relief effort, see Count V.I. 
Pavlov to Durnovo 20 February 1892, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 237-8, Zhurnaly Spasskogo 
uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, p. 12, Zhurnaly Kozlovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 
goda, p. 113-26 and Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 165-6. 
2 Annual Report of Governor Rokasovskii on Tambov province for 1892, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 224, d. 232, 
l. 12. 
3 Obzor Tambovskoi gubernii za 1892 god, p. 19, Statisticheskie dannye, pp. 38-9. 
4 Statisticheskie dannye, pp. 22-3. 
5 Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 7-9, pp. 23-34, Zhurnaly 
Tambovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 6-9, Statisticheskie dannye, pp. 57-8, pp. 5-6. 
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stand still, the province’s institutions were able to give out more aid only by reducing the 
allocation for two months and admixing it with bran.6 Thus, the flattering motions of 
thanks from the zemstvo assemblies to the various upravy reflected relief that the province 
was able to get through the crisis at all. By looking at each element of the relief effort, we 
will see the steps they took to get through this crisis. 
This chapter will argue, by looking at these various elements, that there was a 
fundamental misalignment between policy formation and execution. In a system that 
jealously reserved policy prerogatives to the centre (and specifically to the tsar), Tambov 
province lacked that policy development aspect in its bureaucratic culture. This, as we 
shall see, led to a relief effort that could, for the most part, handle the execution of pre-
set policies, but would struggle greatly at developing its own when the need arose. 
 
The strategic default of provincial institutions 
Perhaps believing that they had sufficiently set the overall direction for the relief effort, 
the provincial zemstvo, uprava and Rokasovskii provided little strategic leadership in 
1892. Focused on quantitative and short-term data, only the uezds issued any strategic 
predictions, mostly in the form of warnings over grain levels. Other than when he 
personally supervised aid allocation in Morshansk in February 1892 and recommended 
opening more stores, Rokasovskii preferred to simply relay TPFC decisions to the uezd 
upravy.7 From the governor to the TPFC to the provincial zemstvo assembly and the 
provincial uprava, often left to make key decisions, the focus was on execution, technical 
                                                 
6 Count V.I. Pavlov to Durnovo 20 February 1892, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 237-8. 
7 See for example Correspondence between Rokasovskii and the Lipetsk, Borisoglebsk, Morshansk, 
Kirsanov and Usman uezd upravy 20-29 April, 27 May, 4-15 June 1892 GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 284-
91, ll. 380-2, ll. 386-7, ll. 396-8, Correspondence between Durnovo and Rokasovskii 27-29 March 1892, 
RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, l. 235, ll. 239-43. 
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minutiae and ensuring that the administrative machinery worked. Summarising this 
approach, the Borisoglebsk uezd uprava told its assembly in October 1892 that it was 
guided by all the instructions and directions from the governor and the previous year’s 
provincial zemstvo assembly; meant to illustrate its diligence, it also shows the degree to 
which the provincial institutions left the uezds alone in 1892.8 
 Imperial bureaucratic culture fostered this attitude; Tsar Alexander III’s zemstvo 
and food security laws bound the zemstvos into the imperial structure and limited and 
defined their actions, making the centre the model for administration. Unfortunately, the 
example it set during the crisis was a poor one. With little tradition of policy formulation, 
the Committee of Ministers comprehensively failed to give the MVD any strategic 
guidance despite rejecting Durnovo’s proposals.9 Policy formulation, even at the 
Committee of Ministers, was discouraged, as it was ultimately the prerogative of the 
tsar.10 
 Combined, these two factors severely limited the ability of the province’s 
institutions to direct the relief effort at a broad level. Recognising this, Rokasovskii opted 
for broad decentralisation: a pragmatic policy that offered the best chance of success. 
Unfortunately, he replicated the centre’s tendency to design a system in the abstract. 
Decentralisation needed local stability and from 1889-92, Tambov was in institutional 
turmoil. In these three years there were wholesale personnel changes throughout the 
province and, in the land captains, the introduction of a whole new administrative 
structure. Additionally, only just over half of the starshins were literate, which forced 
                                                 
8 Zhurnaly Borisoglebskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, p. 341. 
9 For more see: Robbins, Famine in Russia, pp. 61-79. 
10 Robbins, Famine in Russia, p. 67, p. 75. 
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tasks such as inspecting aid rolls onto already overstretched volost’ scribes.11 Rokasovskii 
and the provincial uprava, trying to counter serious structural defects, devolved strategic 
planning to institutions that were in a deep state of flux and, as Aleksandr Novikov noted, 
lacked resilience; a shortcoming that a famine could only exacerbate.12  
 
Purchasing and transport 
The purchase and transport of seed and food grain illustrates the absence of this strength 
in local institutions, as well as the limits of provincial initiative and the counter-
productive nature of imperial governance. Despite a useful contribution from the 
experienced manager of the provincial zemstvo’s statistical bureau, N. Romanov, the 
provincial and uezd zemstvos often used the term ‘grain’ interchangeably for seed and 
food grain, complicating the task for the historian and illustrating the frequently imprecise 
and confused approach to relief management.13  
The imperial government constructed a system for provincial use that bore little 
relation to reality: a rail network lacking coverage and integration, and a free market that 
was unable to cope with the demands placed on it. Adapting to this flawed idealisation 
and resource scramble, provinces began competing with each other, often with serious 
consequences, such as the conflict between Viatka and Kazan provinces in 1891.14 The 
                                                 
11 Correspondence between the Governor’s Chancellery and the Chairman of the Saratov Judicial Chamber 
concerning the volost' starshins for Tambov province 15 September – 18 December 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 
1, d. 4183, ll. 4-36, Gaudin, Ruling Peasants, pp. 69-72, Novikov, Zapiski zemskogo nachal’nika, p. 89. 
12 Novikov, Zapiski zemskogo nachal’nika, p. 158. 
13 N. Romanov had worked for the statistical bureau of the Moscow provincial zemstvo and edited a thirteen 
volume statistical work on Tambov province, the Sbornik statisticheskikh svedenii po Tambovskoi gubernii 
(1881-87). Along with the provincial uprava’s accountants the provincial zemstvo assembly thanked him 
for help in purchasing grain, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 165-
6. 
14 Viatka, also crisis hit, banned grain exports from the province in June 1891 and using tactics such as 
plain clothes policemen, interfered with Kazan’s effort to purchase grain from it until November 1891: 
Robbins, Famine in Russia, pp. 55-7. 
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conflict was unedifying but understandable: resources were scarce and having gone to 
considerable lengths to prevent political cooperation, the imperial government faced the 
consequences of its own policies. Provincial identity enlivened and transformed the way 
provinces interacted with each other, not always positively: Tambov, Kozlov, 
Borisoglebsk and Lebedian uezds all banned exports outside their uezds (save for the 
province’s zemstvos) in January 1892.15 Durnovo made it clear that the imperial 
government would never sanction the move and questioned how such a move could be 
fair.16   
This structuring, based on self-contained provinces, obliged the centre to foster 
the coordination and cooperation it normally opposed. Unilateral zemstvo embargoes 
were not the only problem: an anarchic grain market caused price spikes, shortages and 
transportation difficulties. Durnovo dispatched I.I. Kabat, an energetic MVD official, to 
Rostov-on-Don to untangle the mess; he arranged a deal for Tambov’s uezd zemstvos 
with its main trader, Skaramanga, and arranged a common purchase price for all zemstvos 
in Rostov-on-Don.17 While we cannot absolve the centre of blame for creating defective 
structures in the first place, this example does show that it was also capable of adapting 
and adjusting policies. Yet again though, it was in reaction to provincial actions, even 
undesirable ones. 
The degree of coordination and unity that Vendrikh and Kabat brought does not 
obscure the considerable confusion and mismanagement in the purchasing operation. This 
                                                 
15 Excerpts from newspapers and correspondence between Durnovo and Rokasovskii 25 – 28 January 1892, 
RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 201-5. 
16 Durnovo to Rokasovskii 28 January 1892, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 203-4. 
17 On the common price, or syndicate, that Kabat arranged, see: Correspondence between Durnovo, 
Rokasovskii and I.I. Kabat 23 December 1891 – 2 January 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 176-7, l. 
191, l. 193, l. 207, ll. 220-1, Robbins, Famine in Russia, pp. 144-5. Ambitious and talented, Kabat proposed 
several initiatives during the crisis and appears to have become director of the MVD’s economic 
department, Robbins, Famine in Russia, pp. 81-83, Director I. Kabat, MVD Economic Department to 
Rokasovskii 23 April 1893, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, l. 295. 
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forces us to redefine ‘effectiveness’ and measure it using the problematic assumption that 
the institutions had correctly gauged the level of need.18 Then we need to see if the 
province’s institutions met their own targets. Rokasovskii himself noted the difficulty in 
his 1892 annual report, commenting that because it was impossible to define accurately 
the level of need, the zemstvos purchased 689,893 puds more food grain than was 
‘actually required’.19 Undoubtedly, many peasants disagreed with his judgment about 
surplus grain, again raising the issue of administrative versus peasant expectations and 
judgments (see Khorvat’s investigation of Tambov uezd, below). These caveats aside, 
using the zemstvos’ estimates as a yardstick for success is sensible; it evaluates their 
effectiveness on their own terms and not ones of our (equally) arbitrary choosing.  
Unfortunately, the way in which the MVD and the zemstvos recorded how much 
they purchased and distributed is a significant challenge for the historian. Late imperial 
Russian bureaucracy was almost obsessive in how it collated information, but little was 
ever done with it, as we saw in Chapter 2 with the multiple warnings of existing peasant 
distress. This weakness in analytical thinking affected the MVD’s statistical reports on 
the famine; the information collected is vast and impressively detailed but no attempt was 
made to analyse it. Imperial policy-making and information-gathering were seemingly 
two very different and disconnected branches. The reports produced in Tambov province, 
like the provincial uprava’s fortnightly grain accounts, offer real-time information but no 
clear sense of overall progress. Any form of total or analysis was apparently retrospective, 
exposing a major planning weakness and the potential for serious error. 
 The human cost of failure was high while operational capacity was low: by its 
own metric, the province failed to secure enough grain for sowing fields and food aid. 
                                                 
18 Schattenburg argues that ‘effectiveness’ is a modern concept and that we need to ask ‘effective for whom 
and from what perspective?’: Susanne Schattenburg, ‘Max Weber in the provinces: measuring imperial 
Russia by modern standards’, Kritika, New Series, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Fall 2012), p. 892. 
19 Obzor Tambovskoi gubernii za 1892 god, p. 17. 
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Identifying how much food grain was purchased in the second half of the crisis is difficult, 
owing to aggregation of the figures. The figure arrived at here, approximately 4,894,061 
puds, is based on the total purchasing for all crop types given by the MVD, 8,369,189 
puds, and subtracting the totals for sowing in 1891-2 and the amount purchased for food 
up to January 1892.20 The provincial zemstvo repeatedly emphasised it needed 250,000 
chetverts (approximately 1,407,500 puds) for sowing yet eventually it secured 1,209,942 
puds.21 That was not the only failure, as the provincial zemstvo had set its target for food 
aid at just over 5,790,000 puds. Its total shortfall was therefore almost 1,100,000 puds 
(896,000 for food aid and 198,000 for seed grain).22  
 The significant shortfall highlights how the gap between aims and reality was a 
recurring feature of bureaucratic culture, both within and beyond St Petersburg. The 
province’s institutions established their figures as minimums, but their deliberations 
lacked planning for how to secure these figures. In part, this was due to the very nature 
of the system in which they operated: the 1889 Food Security Statute, 1864 and 1890 
Zemstvo Statutes governed their actions and forced them on to the open market for grain 
while also removing their ability to work with other zemstvos to arrange efficient 
distribution or limit price rises.23 Yet article 102 of the 1889 Food Security Statute 
                                                 
20 Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 354-5, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo 
gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, p. 7, pp. 15-9, Rokasovskii to Durnovo 17 February 1892, 
RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 215-6, Minutes of the Tambov provincial uprava 23 December 1891, 
RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 178-81, Correspondence between Rokasovskii and the Tambov provincial 
zemstvo uprava 18 December 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 143-4, Statisticheskie dannye, p. 19, 
Obzor Tambovskoi gubernii za 1892 god, p. 16, p. 20, pp. 88-9, Obzor Tambovskoi gubernii za 1891 god, 
p. 19 and Otchet po prodovol’stvennoi operatsii, Vol. 2, pp. 4-14. 
21 The provincial zemstvo resolved in December 1891 to purchase seed grain almost entirely in oats and 
the conversion is based on Carol Leonard’s rate of 5.63 puds of oat seed per chetvert: Carol Leonard, 
Agrarian Reform in Russia: The Road from Serfdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 
286. For the provincial zemstvo’s repeated emphasis of the 250,000 chetverts as a minimum, see Zhurnaly 
Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 354-5, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo 
gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, p. 7, pp. 15-9, Rokasovskii to Durnovo 17 February 1892, 
RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 215-6. 
22 Minutes of the Tambov provincial uprava 23 December 1891, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 178-81. 
23 Both statutes contained clauses that limited zemstvo activities to the institutions within their specific 
provincial or uezd boundaries, PSZ, 2nd series, t. 39, No. 40457, glava 1, st. 3; 3rd series, t. 10, No. 6927, 
glava 1, st. 3. 
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required all uezd upravy to conduct the majority of purchasing of all ‘vital’ crops from 
September to May, forcing the upravy on to the market and further increasing the sense 
of panic.24 
Forced to rely on Rokasovskii to expedite funding and delivery, the uezd upravy 
were isolated: in March, Rokasovskii found himself pleading with Colonel Vendrikh on 
behalf of the Kirsanov and Usman uezd zemstvos (the chair of the Kirsanov uezd uprava, 
P.P. Chikhachev, was particularly insistent) to release delayed grain deliveries.25 While 
Rokasovskii’s pleas eventually secured the release of the grain, governors in famine-hit 
areas encountered imperial Russia’s hard bureaucratic reality. They were just one of many 
of the tsar’s viceroys and there appears to have been a growing instability in gubernatorial 
tenure.26 In Vendrikh they met the latest viceroy, installed by political manoeuvring in St. 
Petersburg and granted broad, if temporary, authority.27 Try as they might, there was only 
so much they could do; Rokasovskii visited Durnovo in person in 1891 but such meetings 
were often brief, with governors strictly limited in what they could broach.28 Governors 
were still powerful but their influence waxed and waned with changing circumstances, an 
uncomfortable fact that made dealing with institutions such as railway boards an often-
frustrating task. 
                                                 
24 Svod zakonov, Ustav o obespechenii narodnogo prodovol’stviia, t. 13, razdel 1, glava 6, st. 102. 
25 Kirsanov uezd zemstvo uprava chair P. P. Chikhachev to Rokasovskii 10 March 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 
1, d. 4265, l. 27, Correspondence between Rokasovskii and P.P. Chikhachev 10, 15, 17 March 1892, 
GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, l. 28, l. 97, l. 107, Correspondence between Rokasovskii, Colonel Vendrikh, 
Engineer Tukhin and the Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava 15, 17, 18, 22, 28 March, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, 
d. 4265, l. 108, ll. 125-6, l. 168. 
26 W. E. Mosse has identified that between the 1880s and late 1890s, the average length of tenure for 
governors and vice-governors shrank with newer officials serving roughly five years in each position: 
Mosse, ‘Russian provincial governors’, p. 236. 
27 Vendrikh was empowered to do whatever it took to ease the railroad crisis and his appointment was the 
result of subtle lobbying by Vyshnegradskii and Witte at the expense of the railways minister A. I. 
Giubbenet and not so subtle lobbying by Prince V. P. Meshcherskii, editor of Grazhdanin. See Robbins: 
Famine in Russia, pp. 76-83. 
28 These meetings were often limited to no more than twenty minutes and were controlled by the minister’s 
aides. For more see: Robbins, The Tsar’s Viceroys, pp. 78-9. 
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 Yet such dealings were vitally important as Tambov province was desperately 
short of grain. Only 39 per cent of the grain it eventually bought came from within the 
province, the rest coming primarily from the Don region and the Griaze-Tsaritsyn and 
Lozovo-Sevastopol’ railway lines.29 This dependence on outside grain was not unusual: 
including Tambov, thirteen of twenty-three affected provinces imported the majority of 
their grain, with dependency greatest in Voronezh.30 The pattern of purchasing via 
external railways, started in November 1891, had accelerated; the provincial uprava could 
only buy enough seed grain internally for four uezds while Borisoglebsk bought 94 per 
cent of theirs outside the province.31 We have seen earlier how this external purchasing 
caused tensions between provinces, yet it was also vital. The 1889 Food Security Statute 
mandated a free grain trade and affected provinces took advantage of it.32 
Unfortunately, the provision worked bought ways: Tambov province exported 
554,000 puds of grain (while Samara exported over a million puds).33 The fact that this 
happened while uezd upravy were pleading for external grain highlights serious 
institutional shortcomings. Robbins places the blame primarily on the lack of a zemstvo 
link to the volost’ but the issue goes beyond that.34 The centre designed a system in the 
abstract despite the all too real shortcomings on the ground. This was not just a Russian 
problem of course: the evolution of laissez-faire economics meant that other European 
states designed an unfettered free market system that created tension between rulers, cities 
                                                 
29 Statisticheskie dannye, pp. 94-7, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, 
pp. 7-9, Ministry of Finance (Railway Department) Grain price update 27 March, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 
4265, l. 236. 
30 Statisticheskie dannye, pp. 94-7. 
31 Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii 28 November 1891, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 
40-7, Zhurnaly Borisoglebskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, p. 11, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo 
gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 10-1. 
32 Svod zakonov, t. 13, Ustav o obespechenii narodnogo prodovol’stviia, part 7, section 1, article 111. 
33 Statisticheskie dannye, pp. 94-5, Robbins, Famine in Russia, pp. 145-6. 
34 Robbins, Famine in Russia, pp. 145-6. 
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and provinces and threatened to pull stability apart.35 When needed most, grain was 
flowing out yet there appears to have been no discussion of this problem at the TPFC, by 
Rokasovskii, or the provincial uprava. The TPFC outsourced day-to-day operations to 
the uezd upravy while Rokasovskii, as a governor, a ‘conservator of order’ and a man at 
the sharp end of the crisis, was not going to challenge the very nature of the relevant 
imperial law, even if its market focus was dysfunctional. As we will see later, the only 
proposal was to ban the export of certain types of livestock fodder.36 This is not to say 
that export bans were the solution; the main issue is that the empire was not an integrated 
market, forcing provinces to look close to home, which meant buying from affected 
provinces and driving up prices. 
The major shortcoming in the purchasing operation was the sheer diffusion of 
authority with no parallel oversight structure. There were no fewer than thirteen separate 
zemstvo upravy buying grain for the province with the provincial uprava and the uezd 
upravy often buying grain for the same place.37 There was a multiplicity of agents, traders 
and commissioners: not only did the provincial uprava use five different grain traders, 
uezd upravy often arranged their own contracts or dispatched uprava members to do so.38 
Furthermore, the TPWC outsourced the purchasing of food for charity soup kitchens to 
the uezd sectional committees as it was ‘more convenient’.39  Convenient for the TPWC 
perhaps, but it is impossible to look at how the operation as a whole was organised and 
see anything other than a recipe for confusion and chaos. Yet, at the same time, it was 
also impossible for one body to take on sole responsibility that was far beyond the 
                                                 
35 Gráda, Chevet, ‘Famine and market in ancien régime France’, p. 709, pp. 717-8. 
36 Minutes of the TPFC 8 January 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 249-52, Correspondence between 
Rokasovskii and Durnovo 21, 28 September 1891, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 101-2. 
37 See Zhurnaly Temnikovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 61-3, Zhurnaly Kozlovskogo 
uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 120-1. 
38 Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 172-84, Zhurnaly Lipetskogo 
uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 25-36, Zhurnaly Kozlovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 
1892 goda, pp. 120-1. 
39 TPWC to the Special Committee for Famine Relief 12 September 1892, RGIA, f. 1204, op. 1, d. 254, l. 
4. 
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province’s capacity as well; yet again, officials were obliged to take the ‘least bad’ 
decision. 
A flawless purchasing operation on this scale was, despite the zemstvos’ best 
efforts, beyond its capability: responding to a claim of widespread missing receipts and 
information, the provincial uprava essentially argued that traders simply loaded and 
shipped bags as fast as humanly possible.40 The upravy’s powerlessness came through 
again: one trader was unable to fulfil a contract with the Kozlov uezd uprava as prices 
rapidly rose beyond his ability to pay meaning that Kozlov was left 150 wagons of rye 
short.41 Nevertheless, the Kozlov uezd uprava waived the money he owed them, as he 
had been the cheapest supplier for all northern uezds, suggesting there was a strong sense 
of gratitude born of desperation and a keen awareness of how chaotic and unmanageable 
the situation was.42 It also illustrates the unsurprising strength of traditional personal 
networks: it was better to keep and develop an imperfect relationship than try to build a 
new one if a similar crisis occurred again. 
This chaos was avoidable however, thanks, ironically, to imperial legislation. 
Nicholaevan desires for total control through total information, the search for order in 
chaos via statistics and the rise of zemstvo statistics and cadastral maps as tools for 
administration and identity formation meant that by 1892 there were rich and frequently 
updated sources available.43 The centre’s desire for total information, which often 
strangled the provinces in red tape, was, for once, a plausible solution.44 Articles 102 and 
                                                 
40 Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 167-98. 
41 Ibid., pp. 91-3. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Evtuhov, Portrait of a Russian Province, p. 11, Porter, The Rise of Statistical Thinking, p. 17, p. 27, 
Woolf, ‘Statistics and the modern state’, p. 601, p. 603. For a full examination of the leading role zemstvo 
statistical studies and cadastral mapping played in forming provincial identity in Nizhnii Novgorod see: 
Evtuhov, Portrait of a Russian Province, pp. 165-81. 
44 For example, in 1892 the published obzor to Rokasovskii’s annual report was 103 pages of information 
and statistical vedomosti. For an analysis of information requests, such as weekly reports and more esoteric 
ones, placed on governors, see Robbins, The Tsar’s Viceroys, pp. 71-85.  
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103 of the 1889 Food Security Statute stipulated that every month the uezd upravy were 
to compile grain prices, including purchasing and storage costs, and send them to the 
provincial uprava who would then compile them together.45 Despite collecting this data, 
the uezd upravy of Tambov, Kirsanov and Kozlov uezds appeared to do nothing with it; 
it offered an opportunity to gauge prices and criteria dealing with grain traders and budget 
accordingly yet they went in blind, creating a problem for themselves. 
Deeply powerless, the zemstvos were forced into a maelstrom, competing with 
other provinces in a fragmented market on an overstretched rail network. Not even 
Rokasovskii could ease the strain, despite his efforts. They failed to reach their purchasing 
targets and there were serious shortcomings in strategic planning; disparate and separate 
arrangements helped secure grain but made any level of considered planning impossible. 
Nevertheless, powerless and dependent as they were, they achieved despite the deep-
rooted problems. Perhaps the final word on the purchasing operation should go to the 
provincial zemstvo’s reporting commission: ‘the [provincial] uprava handled this in a 
fitting manner but the results are not yet known’.46  
 
Sowing fields  
It is not enough simply to feed the hungry in times of famine:  it is necessary to secure 
the next harvest in order to avoid the risk of repeating the crisis. Whereas in 1891 there 
was an initial sense that a full crisis could be averted by a large sowing operation, by early 
1892 that was no longer an option. Then, a successful sowing operation was all that stood 
between the peasantry and long-term starvation. The chair of the Borisoglebsk 
Agricultural Society, Dmitri Konstantinovich Zolin, emphasised this to the Borisoglebsk 
                                                 
45 Svod zakonov, t. 13, Ustav o obespechenii narodnogo prodovol’stviia, glava 6, st. 102-3. 
46 Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 100-7. 
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uezd zemstvo assembly in early 1892; calling it the zemstvo’s ‘main task’ he warned that 
without it, hunger would again threaten the population, not as a result of drought, but of 
‘our inaction’.47 
 The zemstvos’ approach to the operation reflects the transmission and 
development of St. Petersburg’s culture of increased systematisation and 
bureaucratisation. They approached the problem mechanically: since half the peasantry 
were in need and one third of Spring sowing was in oats, they simply divided that in two, 
and set a goal of securing one sixth of the average total.48 Dedicated but narrow in focus 
when it came to execution, this was the systematic ideal: the identification of a problem 
and the direction of resources to deal with it in a calculated manner. Bound by legislation 
that levied very specific obligations for food and economic management and operating in 
an era where statistics and mechanical execution increasingly replaced ‘political 
confusion’ with an ‘orderly reign of facts’, this approach would have seemed natural and 
correct.49 As we will see below, the zemstvo assemblies frequently deferred to the upravy 
and reporting commissions. Their sense of moral responsibility demanded that they 
resolved the crisis in quantitative terms; society’s laws, and thus answers to its problems, 
were found by in depth statistical gathering.50 Indeed, the sowing operation reflects this 
approach: the vast majority of the information available is quantitative, especially from 
the provincial uprava, which provided fortnightly reserve updates.51 
                                                 
47 Zhurnaly Boriosglebskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, p. 5. 
48 Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia 1891 goda, pp. 354-5, Minutes of the Tambov 
provincial uprava 23 December 1891, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 4, d. 2132, ll. 178-81. 
49 For example, the 1889 Food Security Statute specified the amount of grain that each village store should 
have per person, in what types and ration, Svod zakonov, t. 13, Ustav o obespechenii narodnogo 
prodovol’stviia, razdel 1, glava, st. 11. 
50 David Darrow, ‘From commune to household: statistics and the social construction of Chaianov's theory 
of peasant economy’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 43, No. 4 (Oct., 2001), p. 795. 
51 There were eight such updates: Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava grain update 1-9, 7-15, 15-30 March, 
1-14, 14-27 April, 27 April – 11 May, 11-24 May, 24 May-7 June, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, l. 23, l. 110, 
l. 225-6, l. 264, ll. 317-8, ll. 345-7, l. 371, l. 399. For quantitative reporting at uezd level, see Zhurnaly 
Tambovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 9-11, pp. 21-3, p. 148, Zhurnaly Lipetskogo 
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 Whether it was due to an over-developed sense of confidence in the uezd upravy 
or being overwhelmed, Rokasovskii and the provincial uprava began to exhibit the same 
contradictions that affected imperial policy in the relief effort. Namely, they abdicated a 
certain level of responsibility and created a system that, on paper, would function well 
but struggled to meet difficult and changing realities. As the sowing operation was 
essentially a repeat of 1891’s operation, primary responsibility shifted to the uezd upravy; 
the provincial uprava conducted limited grain purchases while Rokasovskii issued no 
circulars or exhortations.52 At first glance, this appears to have worked: the uezd upravy 
purchased more compared to 1891, including 1.1 million puds in March alone, allocating 
nearly all of it by the end of April.53 
 Unfortunately, in imperial Russia, the figures frequently did not reveal the true 
picture of a situation and this held for Tambov province too. A mechanical, quantitative 
approach required reliable information flows and these were sorely lacking. Lacking any 
information from Temnikov uezd, the provincial uprava no longer got detailed reports 
from every uezd from late April, making it impossible for the provincial uprava to know 
what was going on.54 
                                                 
uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 33-5, Zhurnaly Temnikovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo 
sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 62-3, Zhurnaly Kozlovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 118-
9, Zhurnaly Kirsanovskogo uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 202-6, Zhurnaly Borisoglebskogo 
uezdnogo zemskogo sobraniia 1892 goda, pp. 10-2. 
52 The provincial uprava purchased grain locally for several uezds while it purchased all of Temnikov’s 
millet needs, at the request of Temnikov’s uezd uprava, Zhurnaly Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo 
sobraniia 1892 goda, p. 63. The weekly grain price and reserve updates were ordered by the MVD in late 
November 1891 but in March 1892, they instructed that they be issued for fortnightly periods only, finally 
calling them to an end in June, Durnovo to Rokasovskii 27 November 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4193, ll. 
29-30, Durnovo to Rokasovskii 19 March 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 121-4, Durnovo to 
Rokasovskii 10 June 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, l. 420. 
53 Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava grain update 7-15, 14-30, 31 March, 1-14, 14-27 April GATO, f. 4, 
op. 1, d. 4265, l. 110, ll. 225-6, 317-8, Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava to Rokasovskii 11 March, 
GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, l. 38. 
54 Tambov provincial zemstvo uprava grain update 14-27 April 11-24, 27 May, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 
4265,ll. 317-8, ll. 345-7, l. 371. 
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 What was happening was the gradual collapse of Rokasovskii’s and the provincial 
uprava’s overall strategy. By decentralising the majority of the relief effort, after centrally 
determining key policies to correct for structural defects, the authorities hoped that uezds 
could respond quicker and more effectively. This strategy bore a striking resemblance to 
the rise of systemisation at the imperial level; too large to manage effectively, it 
outsourced certain actions while seeking to preserve central administrative control and 
standardisation.55 As with the practice of systemisation at the imperial level, two major 
problems arose: a failure in transmitting standardised practice and the inability of reality 
to match the idealised policy.  
 Privileging the centre as the policy maker, no matter where this ‘centre’ was, 
helped create a culture of dependency that frequently left the periphery unable to operate 
without clear instructions. Imperial Russia was a state where, often, the issuing of 
instructions masqueraded as activity.56 The sowing operation in many ways reflected this 
culture of dependency and yet, at the same time, manifested a degree of initiative borne 
of the necessity from operating in a structurally deficient system. The provincial zemstvo 
assembly’s decision in December 1891 (restated in February 1892) that seed loans should 
be allocated in the same way as in 1891, with some allowance for local variation, failed 
to reach Kozlov, Tambov and Borisoglebsk uezds, even by March 1892.57 After 
complaining to their respective assemblies over the ‘lack’ of instructions, the three upravy 
then proceeded to innovate by developing their own allocation procedures. Each one 
differed slightly but all made use of local officials, whether it was the uezd food 
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conference or a special commission of the uprava and land captains.58 Kozlov used pre-
established food aid rules while Borisoglebsk and Tambov uezds used the aid rolls for 
food aid but devised a new system, allocating seed loans proportionally based on various 
criteria such as farm size.59 This innovation and initiative shows that, on a small scale, 
the periphery would take matters in house when either the centre failed or the instructions 
failed to travel down the imperfect chain of communication. 
 Unfortunately, no level of the administrative structure translated initiative into 
consistently effective action on the ground. Volost’ stores never exceeded 50 per cent 
capacity while we only have full information on the sowing operation in three uezds: 
Lipetsk, Borisoglebsk and Kozlov.60 The first two had to devise their own allocation 
policies while in all three, the actual sowing varied widely in timeframe. Lipetsk started 
the earliest, in February, and finished last in May while Borisoglebsk and Kozlov started 
in March and April respectively.61 For some peasants, such a delay would have been a 
luxury: in Elatomsk there was an entire precinct without seed loans, 130 in Usman uezd 
and several petitions to the TPFC in April for seed loans.62 There was an element of self-
correction however: Rokasovskii intervened in Usman and Elatomsk, forcing a new 
inspection in the former, replacing the land captain in the latter (see below) and provoking 
the uezd uprava to dispose of grain stocks to provide seed grain.63 Reinforcing the 
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localised centre-periphery argument, the initial initiative came from the uezds, with 
Rokasovskii forced into reacting to it. We should not be surprised at this: we have seen 
already that the TPWC felt it had little influence while the entire imperial system often 
issued commands that, practical in principle, produced unintended consequences.64 
 Despite the unquestionable concern of the provincial and uezd upravy and 
Rokasovskii’s determination for fairness (evidenced by his intervention above), 
unintended consequences combined to trap the peasantry in an economic pincer. Once 
this happened, the response from officials highlights the sheer psychological gap between 
officialdom and the peasantry and the authorities’ sometimes unintentionally ‘othering’ 
attitudes. The imperial government’s policies on famine relief, especially as relating to 
sowing, contained that element of indirect political failure to act or act correctly that 
inadvertently worsens the problem (such as the British Government’s focus on total food 
availability instead of ability to purchase food).65 Nothing encapsulated this so neatly as 
the 1889 Food Security Statute: not only did it mandate a free market response, seed loans 
issued could not exceed the area normally sown while no more than half the grain stores 
could be loaned out.66 Thus, the peasantry could only access volost’ grain stores at a 
quarter of their capacity or zemstvo aid (when it arrived) or compete on a market where 
they were rapidly being priced out. By 1892, the average wage per day for sowing in the 
central black earth region would purchase just over eight kilogrammes of rye, down from 
over twelve in 1890.67 Furthermore, while Tambov traditionally supplied northern 
provinces, the railways now brought cheaper grain the other way around.68 Drought itself 
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does not cause famine, policy failures such as market mechanisms that create perverse 
incentives or the privileging of other areas at the expense of another are key factors. 
Famines are a complex event, dependent on many factors; tsarist policy took a simplistic 
approach that caught Tambov province’s peasantry in an economic trap.69  
  Their attempts to escape from this trap were logical and economically rational but 
such was the psychological gap between them and officials that the latter reacted with 
incomprehension and sought to punish them for it. Reports came in from across the 
province of peasants evading attempts to compile aid rolls for seed loans and others of 
peasants attempting to sell their allocation.70 One example of this was Belomestno-
Devoynevskii volost’, Tambov uezd, in late March 1892 when allegations of the practice 
reached Rokasovskii: it transpired that five peasants, initially believed to have been 
coerced by the starshin to pay off the ‘collective debts’ of aid loans, had kept the aid but 
sold private reserves.71 This was an economically rational action yet it so worried the 
authorities over the ‘correct’ use of the loans that they formally investigated. The 
peasantry, perceived as innately duplicitous and simultaneously ‘addicted to aid’ and 
refusing to work were, in fact, deeply strategic.72 In the above case, what they sold were 
private reserves; undoubtedly aware that selling aid would not be well received yet 
desperate to escape an economic trap, they used what flexibility was open to them. 
Profiteering may have been the strict legal definition, but as prices rapidly surpassed the 
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peasantry’s ability to pay, these asset sales were a desperate form of ‘coping strategy’, a 
tactic common in contemporary famines.73 That the officials could not even begin to 
understand or rationalise this behaviour illustrates the degree to which identity gaps could 
hamper the relief effort.  
In evaluating the results of the province’s second attempt at sowing fields, we hear 
again a common refrain of this thesis: the province succeeded despite structural obstacles 
and problems it brought on itself. The zemstvos and Rokasovskii did not offer sufficient 
strategic direction, did not use every avenue open to them, relied on a store network that 
did not meet everyone’s needs, and had a frequently counterproductive view of the 
peasantry. Against this, however, should be set a degree of innovation, self-correction 
and the constant dedication of officials such as the land captains who went out and re-
inspected aid rolls. We should also add to this the change in provincial uprava leadership 
and the fact that multiple aid operations were now being managed simultaneously. The 
technocratic and quantitative nature of the sowing operation reveals the strategic 
limitations of the province’s personnel, but also shows that they were diligent, determined 
and capable of innovation to a certain extent. 
 
 
Fodder and livestock 
Horses, and the struggle to purchase, distribute and feed them, illustrate many of the 
structural and strategic problems afflicting the relief effort such as resource strain and 
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limited strategic thinking. This section will show how Tambov province’s institutions, 
able only to innovate within familiar bounds, were at a loss when its executive bodies 
(mainly the provincial uprava) were unable to recommend a course of action, resulting in 
tension and temporary paralysis in the relief effort. 
More than a working animal, horses were economically vital and a powerful 
cultural unifier. For those with horses, there were more employment opportunities, higher 
wages and, unlike one fifth of Borisoglebsk’s households, less arduous physical effort, as 
Geroid Tanquary Robinson reminded us.74 Horse theft was common and the severe 
community justice meted out to those caught, and the sense that the whole community 
suffered, underscores their social importance.75 Horses could be the difference between 
penury and sufficiency; they were a collective and competitive advantage. The famine 
crisis wreaked devastation on this vital resource; 109,273 horses were ‘lost’ in 1891 in 
Tambov province and the sale price of horses collapsed.76 This economic distress 
prompted several petitions to the TPFC and local charities. Matvei Getkin, a formerly 
prosperous miller in Boiarovka village, Morshansk uezd, had to sell half of his horses and 
relied on the continued ‘indulgence and patience’ of his creditors.77 Noting how the crisis 
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was devastating rich and poor peasants alike, the liberal journalist Konstantin 
Konstantinovich Arsen’ev wryly noted that ‘the process of equalisation moves forward 
in major strides’.78  
The crisis in supplying and feeding the necessary numbers of horses, the 
provincial and imperial authorities’ initial ignorance of a growing crisis in livestock 
numbers, and the fact that once again, individual effort and an ad hoc body found a 
resolution shows how limited the empire’s capabilities were. In the summer of 1891, the 
Kozlov uezd uprava obliged peasants to use their horses to assist in collecting seed grain 
from the zemstvo stores, yet there is no evidence to suggest that anyone in the province, 
including Rokasovskii, saw the quantity or maintenance of horses as an issue.79 The only 
recognition from the MVD of a problem was a request in September 1891 for information 
on stock numbers, fodder requirements and sale prices.80 St. Petersburg and Rokasovskii 
failed to provide the province with the strategic management it needed for this particular 
element of the relief effort.81 Imperial law and official culture created a narrow, 
prescriptive system that could not plan outside the narrow scope of sowing and food aid. 
Thus, when forced to act, the administrative structures simply shifted 
responsibility to ad hoc bodies. Tsars had long used these ad hoc bodies to diffuse 
responsibility and circumvent the ‘bureaucratic’ obstacles in the system of their own 
creation; permanent reform was unpalatable as it entailed further limits on the jealously-
guarded autocratic privilege. Deeply embedded in the culture of the system, this meant 
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that only either talented individuals or those unconnected from the centre could innovate. 
One of Vorontsov-Dashkov’s employees purchased 10,000 horses and the count proposed 
extending this scheme to all the affected provinces.82 At the same time, V. M. Petrovo-
Solovovo, the Tambov uezd marshal of the nobility, proposed a purchasing programme 
on a colossal scale, costing one million roubles.83 The stricken, supposedly backwards 
provinces left the centre, reduced to scaling up and resourcing these ideas, far behind 
intellectually.  
Despite the urgency of the problem, the endless deliberation that was a 
fundamental feature of imperial bureaucracy delayed this proposal. The ad hoc Special 
Committee for Famine Relief, chaired by the tsarevich, took from December 1891 until 
March 1892 to design a purchasing programme through which the peasantry could pay 
twenty-five roubles per horse over four years, and were forbidden to sell on the animals.84 
The fact that in May neither a land captain nor the TPFC clearly understood this latter 
provision illustrates the difficulty in getting information from the centre to the provinces 
and how fragmented and disconnected the structures were.85 The horses themselves 
travelled faster than the information governing their arrival.   
Unlike the centre with its frequently abstract conceptions of how things were 
supposed to work, Tambov province sought to adapt to the reality it faced. The province’s 
institutions had a much keener sense than the centre, borne of direct, practical and 
frustrating experience, of the limits of administrative capacity. Despite the 
communication vulnerabilities, uezds retained a decent record at implementation within 
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their own borders. Accordingly, responsibility was transferred and Tambov’s two 
thousand horses (the second lowest allocation) were handed over to the uezd food 
conferences, which in turn required land captains to assess need.86 Policy formation was 
not a strong point but the administrative machinery frequently took on an almost 
automatic quality, even if the process was still slow; there is no evidence suggesting that 
there were problems with allocating the horses.87 
Responsibility shifting was another long established feature of imperial 
governance; after purchasing and sending the horses to the provinces, the Special 
Committee made no provisions for their feeding and maintenance. Exposing the sheer 
fragility of provincial governance, the provincial zemstvo also failed to make a decision. 
The degree of control the provincial zemstvo exerted over the relief effort masked a 
disturbing truth: it was reliant on its two executive bodies, the uprava and the reporting 
commission, as the assembly was frequently weak and timid, preferring to be led by 
reports and recommendations. It was not so much a decision-making body as a clearing-
house. In February 1892 the provincial uprava lacked a chair and the reporting 
commission presented two options on how to feed horses, costing 500,000 and 1.25 
million roubles respectively and no clear preference on either.88 Despite an ‘animated’ 
discussion, the assembly refused to act, seeing the proposals as impossible to 
implement.89 Nervous of the cost involved, the assembly lost its nerve at a crucial 
moment; the 1889 Food Security Statute, for all its defects, provided a response template 
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that the upravy could execute. The TPFC also avoided making decisions; in April it opted 
to simply pass complaints about the suitability of horses for fieldwork to the Special 
Committee.90 
We can therefore see in provincial Tambov all the hallmarks familiar from the 
centre in St Petersburg: a bureaucracy capable merely of reviewing decisions rather than 
of making them, fiscal reticence, weak collective institutions and a reliance on small 
executive bodies to draft and implement decisions. Meeting only once a year, the zemstvo 
assembly was essentially the weaker relation to the uprava, a hierarchy deliberately 
imposed by a hostile imperial government, determined to limit provincial autonomy.91 In 
the long term, this was not a sustainable model: though the more artful zemstvos were 
capable of eluding legal restrictions and surmounting funding shortages, they were forced 
to rely on a governance model that was insufficiently responsive for a crisis.92  
The fact that only prodding by the MVD would end the deadlock shows the 
paralysis and indecision that the centre introduced into provincial government. This 
paralysis was not incompatible with the ‘provincial idea’ and innovation however; in 
January 1892 the provincial uprava adapted an earlier suggestion from Borisoglebsk to 
ban the export of certain fodder ingredients.93 Unfortunately, again highlighting the 
weakness of collective institutions, the provincial food conference declined to make a 
decision. Only a telegram in March from Durnovo finally persuaded them to act, 
seemingly forgetting practical restraints and assigning 30,000 puds to feed horses.94 The 
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administrative mechanism froze far too easily but once restarted, could move quickly: aid 
was set at two puds per horse, uezd food conferences determined allocation numbers and 
a week later land captains requested details on need from volost’ starshins.95 
The horse-purchasing programme may have been new territory for the province’s 
institutions but once a decision was finally made, familiar patterns of intra-uezd tension 
reasserted themselves. Kirsanov felt the allocation was too much, while Borisoglebsk saw 
it as too little.96 The provincial food conference held to its decision, telling Borisoglebsk 
it accepted its argument but it would be ‘unjust’ to privilege one uezd, considering the 
position of others.97 There was no question of paralysis here; the stakes were too high. 
The provincial food conference was not a command and control institution: it was 
essentially a redistributive or balancing mechanism. The debacle over how to support the 
purchased horses shows how weak the governance function was, a function of 
administrative culture and personnel. By no means perfect, policy execution was far less 
problematic than determining the policies themselves, the latter a result of an indecisive 
governing culture found in the imperial centre and the provinces. 
 
Ethics and reality: reduction of food aid allocation 
This governing culture also made negative, and troubling, assumptions about the 
peasantry’s apparent desire to rely solely on aid. As the MVD saw the crisis as an 
economic issue, Durnovo sought to convince the peasantry that government support 
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would be withdrawn as soon as unemployment declined.98 Several uezds, though using 
different reasoning, also sought to reduce aid. Borisoglebsk excluded women of working 
age from receiving aid to incentivise participation in the workforce, while Lipetsk 
proposed halving aid to fifteen funts as the peasantry were ‘addicted’ to aid and further 
loans would have ‘undesirable consequences’.99 The belief that aid was emergency relief 
designed to prevent starvation, not welfare, and that where possible the population should 
support itself chimed with the contemporary, and indeed modern, narratives surrounding 
charity. ‘Dependency’, defined as a population relying on government support and not 
the labour market was seen as an unquestionable moral evil and poor policy. Nevertheless 
even the TPFC had limits: Borisoglebsk’s proposal was seen as indiscriminate while 
Lipetsk’s was not legal, though aid could be lowered in line with local conditions.100 Aid 
would be reduced when it was felt the crisis was abating but the suggested reductions 
would have created inequality within the province, hurt the genuinely needy and, 
crucially, undermined the purpose of the relief effort.  
 Although rarely used, the language of morality was a constant undercurrent in 
these various debates; the desperate search for the ‘right’ decision underpinned 
everything. As we have seen though, what the ‘right’ decision was depended very much 
on one’s particular vantage point or place in the administrative chain. While the harsh 
realities and the will of the MVD eventually took care of many of these issues, the debate 
over aid allocation shows that the province had developed a keen sense of morality and 
duty. While signs of alienation from the peasantry persisted, this moral discussion, and 
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the way it was framed, are clearly key parts of the emergence of a strong, provincial 
identity.  
The very same provincial idea that promoted a sense of moral responsibility to the 
peasantry came to work against Tambov’s population in the early months of 1892. 
Concerned with overburdening the peasantry with debts for the future, as well as heeding 
the MVD’s call for economy, the province’s institutions applied the allocation rules 
strictly at first, and then simply cut the allocation. In chapter 2 we saw how this desire to 
obey the MVD’s call for strict economy combined with fiscal reticence and a wish not to 
overburden the imperial treasury saw children from between the ages of two and five 
denied the right to food loans.101 This decision, in addition to being an overzealous 
reading of the MVD’s instructions on aid allocation, was also an attempt to maximise 
resources while keeping debts down.  
One of the most negative decisions, in the eyes of the peasantry, was borne of 
such a confused attempt to do the right thing. In January 1892 the TPFC, following the 
provincial uprava’s lead, confronted the reality that every decision had high opportunity 
costs. Following a recommendation from the provincial uprava, it reduced the aid 
allocation per ‘eater’ from the thirty funts set by the MVD to twenty-five funts.102 The 
provincial uprava explicitly overrode its parent body: after pressure from several uezds, 
the provincial zemstvo assembly voted in December to increase the loans by ten funts to 
one pud, and the Shatsk uezd uprava immediately re-drew its estimates.103 The provincial 
uprava recommended that the higher level only be issued in March and April, as doing 
so before then would dangerously deplete stores and ‘turn the population to bitter 
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misfortune’.104 In essence, they attempted to make the peasantry hungry now, to avoid 
starving them later. It was a terrible position to be in: logically strong on paper, the moral 
and practical implications were dreadful but perhaps only slightly less so than fully 
depleted stores. Such were the dilemmas Tambov’s institutions had to face. 
The provincial uprava was essentially the main executive body for the relief effort 
and a clear policy gap had now opened between it, its parent body and the uezd 
institutions. Each institution’s definition of the relief effort’s ‘best interests’ depended 
very much on their role within it and the uezd institutions pushed back against the 
provincial uprava in the way it had contested the MVD’s decisions. The provincial 
uprava informed the assembly in February that the reduction had created savings but need 
continued to increase because of the ‘simultaneous exhaustion of peasant stores’.105 The 
uezd upravy responded strongly however: Usman, Morshansk and Shatsk upravy all 
warned they could not guarantee food security and were reporting shortfalls already.106 
The Shatsk uprava took a hard line, demanding that the allocation increase to fifty 
funts.107 The message was clear: the TPFC decision ran counter to uezd needs and ignored 
the pressures they were under and had to change. 
  In their divided responses to this pressure from below, Rokasovskii and the other 
members of the TPFC revealed a tension between two visions of ‘province’. In this 
debate, Governor Rokasovskii emerged as the defender of uniformity and the peasantry 
while the rest of the TPFC used divergent uezd interests as a justification for its own fiscal 
conservatism. In March Rokasovskii called for loans to be increased uniformly by the 
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five funts taken off in January and February but the conference instead permitted the 
increase only where local conditions allowed.108 Rokasovskii saw the province as an 
integrated whole in which fairness should apply to all while the TPFC saw the province 
as a patchwork of uezds where the crisis differed in scale. These rival visions created a 
further point of tension within the relief effort. Governor Rokasovskii, positioning 
himself as the outsider who was the true defender of the peasantry’s interests, made it 
clear to the uezd upravy that it was the conference, not him, which had opted to make the 
increase conditional.109  
 These contested articulations soon became academic however, as the MVD again 
demonstrated that no matter how flexible a province might be, the centre ultimately 
determined the broad framework. Shortly after the institutions essentially put their 
differences aside and agreed to Morshansk’s proposal to allocate two months of loans 
over two weeks in April due to the rasputitsa, the MVD ordered that aid be reduced and 
rolls be revised due to increased employment opportunities.110 While the MVD drew the 
idea from another, unnamed province, it was a command and Tambov had no room for 
manoeuvre; the TPFC noted the instruction while Rokasovskii noted it would ‘ease the 
food difficulties’.111 
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Food aid: Local networks, variation and individual action 
Unable to stop the rising tide of human misery, all the province’s institutions could do 
was blunt its worst effects and the evidence suggests they were able to do this with a 
degree of success. Every uezd met or exceeded the MVD’s guidelines of thirty funts per 
‘eater’ for these months with allocations above this the only significant variations (barring 
the reduction in January and February).112 This conforms to the wider pattern as all of 
Tambov’s neighbouring provinces, with the exception of Riazan, meeting or exceeding 
these guidelines.113 Though the majority of charitable donations came from outside the 
province, Tambov society managed to raise nearly 100,000 roubles and 8,130 puds of 
grain were donated from January to August 1892, no mean feat.114 When the relief effort 
worked, usually via an active land captain or marshal of the nobility, the result could be 
a well-run, harmonious relief effort.115 However, since authority was either too 
fragmented or placed too many responsibilities on one individual, this harmony was by 
no means guaranteed. In this section we will look at two uezds, Borisoglebsk and Spassk, 
to see extremes of how things were managed before looking at the individual actions, 
good and bad, that highlight vulnerability and achievement throughout the province. 
 The famine exacted a cruel toll: a rough maximum of 13,615 people in Tambov 
province died as result of the famine in 1892, despite Count Bobrinskii dismissing hunger 
related deaths as ‘not based on reliable facts’.116 The inescapable truth was that Tambov’s 
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population was getting hungrier: numbers receiving aid rose every single month from 
January to June, peaking at just over a million people, with the burden falling almost 
equally on men and women, despite the exclusion of working males from aid rolls.117 
Konstantin Arsen’ev wrote of children with swollen stomachs and how peasants in 
Morshansk uezd, owing to the delay in zemstvo aid, had to eat shchi made of ‘rotten, grey 
cabbage leaves, heavily seasoned with salt’, which simply made them thirstier so they 
drank too much water.118 Even Count Bobrinskii talked of peasants, too poor to afford the 
cost price grain on sale from the zemstvo, travelling from town to town to beg for grain.119 
While the TPFC, TPWC and the food allocation rules were established in late 1891 or 
early in 1892, there was a clear time lag between decision and implementation; charitable 
relief was slow to get off the ground in Borisoglebsk, Tambov and Lebedian uezds, not 
really beginning until January or February 1892 with Temnikov uezd leading the way, 
having started in October 1891.120 There was often a lot of overlap between the charitable 
and official relief effort but Temnikov uezd, who issued charitable relief the earliest, was 
among the last to start issuing official aid.121 Additionally, there was a crisis amongst 
peasants not attached to village societies, uezds running out of food while others had to 
reassess their stores, creating a picture of a province fighting against the tide of rising 
starvation.122 
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For the peasantry of Tambov province, it appears that the likelihood of receiving 
aid and its quality and quantity depended on where one lived.  In some uezds families 
were given pure, high quality aid (usually rye) while in others surrogates were used, either 
high quality ones such as potatoes or barley, or bitter ones with health complications such 
as goose foot.123 Indeed, a series of letters in the British Medical Journal in 1892 drew 
attention to the fact that peasants in many provinces would rather starve than eat ‘famine 
bread’ made with goosefoot (Chenopodium).124 That there was such dramatic variation in 
aid quality within the same province suggests that the robustness of an uezd’s relief effort 
structures were very important. Borisoglebsk and Spassk uezds illustrate, in opposite 
ways, the extent to which the fragmented, disjointed structures of local government relied 
on individuals.  
At the very southeastern corner of the province, Borisoglebsk uezd was less 
severely affected than others by the famine. Even at its worst, only 31 per cent of the 
population received food aid; yet peasants here consistently received above the thirty 
funts norm in 1892 every month from March to June.125 Here the peasantry were fed clean 
rye and not surrogates.126 The uezd uprava, which had two lieutenants and a peasant 
amongst its members, was effective, dividing the uezd into precincts, issuing aid to stores 
promptly and confirming receipt by the needy five days later.127 It collected precise 
information on grain purchases and their distribution on top of this. The uezd had 
problems however and prior to January 1892 charitable relief was ‘too weak’.128 Into this 
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breach stepped Princess Elizaveta Volkonskaia, the wife of the minister for public 
enlightenment. She toured the uezd meeting local and private officials and her actions 
caused bakeries and sixty-three stolovye to open in rapid succession.129 The involvement 
of the princess, with her powerful status as a wife of an imperial minister, likely changed 
the entire social dynamic around charity, making it ‘fashionable’ and, in a way, a 
competition; as Konstantin Arsen’ev noted, charity became an almost theatrical 
performance.130  
If Borisoglebsk represented the advantages of informal networks, Spassk uezd 
represented what happened when such networks collapsed in the absence of effective 
individuals. Lacking a marshal of the nobility, relief in this uezd fragmented to the extent 
that Vice-governor Choglokov was, as in late 1891, again sent out to restore order (as we 
will see below). The grain issued was rough, admixed and tasted bitter while at the high-
point of the crisis, 63 per cent of the population received aid hovering at thirty funts from 
March to May, and rising to thirty-two funts in June.131 Despite widespread poverty and 
cumulative annual crop failures in Spassk uezd, the official relief effort there was chaotic 
and disorganised while charitable relief was in complete disarray with only six 
stolovaias.132 The fact that the chair of the uezd uprava was also acting marshal of the 
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nobility may help to explain some of the chaos; apparently E.G. Shcheglov, a trader on 
the uprava, was unable to offer it significant commercial expertise.133 
 The above two examples represent end points on the spectrum. Between them fell 
the remainder of Tambov province. The remaining uezds reinforce the lesson that the 
administrative machinery needed a skilled operator to make it work whether that skill was 
in administration or influence. The zemstvos depended not just on the land captains but 
also on various other local figures, such as priests, teachers, hospital staff and zemstvo 
land surveyors, and additional hires to help them inspect aid rolls and issue aid.134  
 Despite the many laws and rules, provincial institutions, official and civil, were 
often weak and utterly dependent on individuals to maintain the relief effort. This 
sometimes encouraged links between official and charitable institutions, as in Kozlov and 
Lipetsk uezds.135 Nothing symbolised this more than the dual role played by the marshals 
of the nobility and the land captains. Bobrinskii speaks of several uezds, such as Kozlov 
and Temnikov, where charity was active because of the ‘energetic’ and dedicated actions 
of the uezd marshal of the nobility; in Temnikov the marshal of the nobility appears to 
have compensated for zemstvo aid frequently adulterated with surrogates.136 Holding an 
‘honourable’ position, they were expected to chair the uezd’s collective institutions, such 
as they were; the imperial state frequently equated ‘status’ with ‘power’ and/or 
‘ability’.137 Several land captains distinguished themselves, including Aleksandr 
Novikov, who personally replaced zemstvo loans when they had not been issued in 
February, inspected lists, and established bakeries and stolovaias amongst other 
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activities.138 The institutional infrastructure was often fragile and without the dedication 
of many officials, the twin arms of the relief effort would have collapsed. Land captains 
and marshals of the nobility lent an air of authority to charity and could help direct aid to 
where it was needed. This combination is significant; there were goals and regional 
identities that transcended political concerns and the crisis show that when a serious threat 
emerged, provincial authorities could pragmatically embrace private charity to 
complement the weaknesses in its own structures.139 
This identification of social goals and provincial identity as connected and 
interdependent went beyond the organised and into individual action. Over the course of 
the nineteenth century, charity developed notions of obligation, community and 
overcoming fragmentation and promoting social harmony, though the imperial 
government thought of charity in explicitly Christian terms.140 The significant donations 
made by the Grand Duchess Elizaveta Fedorovna to Morshansk uezd from Moscow are 
evidence of this socially inspired charitable ethic.141 Within the province however, the 
social ethic of charity linked with provincial identity, strengthening the sense of moral 
responsibility; as we saw in Chapter 4, donations were now seen as ‘belonging’ to the 
province.  
 The efforts of private charity in Tambov province in 1892 were full of those 
individual human relationships and actions that give deeper meaning to philosophical 
concepts such as ‘duty’, ‘morality’ and even the ‘provincial idea’. While the later 
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municipal guardianships of the poor would start from an explicitly different source, there 
are many similarities with the structure and goals of the popechitel’stvos, such as a 
committee, volunteers and community based, individually tailored activities.142 Examples 
are N. F. Plakhova in Tambov uezd and Countess Levasheva in Usman uezd; acting 
separately they opened stolovaias, stables for over 416 horses and employed 100 women. 
Plakhova even visited village assemblies to help allocate aid.143 Borisoglebsk uezd had 
nine popechitel’stvos and fifteen private individuals managing stolovaias and stables.144 
Since late 1891, Governor Rokasovskii had sought to encourage as many popechitel’stvos 
as possible and these examples show that there was a positive response from many private 
individuals. There was, to a certain extent, a sense of common purpose. 
In contrast to this image of charity and selfless devotion was that of an unnamed 
priest who sought not to donate his grain to the hungry, but instead sell it to the zemstvo, 
hardly the embodiment of Christian values and state loyalty the clergy were meant to 
be.145 A Voronezh native, he disdained to help the population of Tambov province, 
deeming them ‘[…] a self-indulgent, vain, and foolish people […]’.146 He was not the 
only case: while we have seen in Chapter 3 that Fr. Butakov in Spassk uezd sought to 
incite peasant unrest in December 1891, in January 1892 several peasants accused him of 
essentially overcharging for funerals, pocketing the difference.147 The mirror image of 
the TPWC’s determination to keep ‘local’ donations for local uses, it shows that notions 
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of charity and who deserved aid became inextricably linked to identity and the sense of 
origin that an individual felt. 
Haunted by the sights they saw, forced to control the allocation of aid, both official 
and charitable, the private individuals and officials who sought to prevent starvation and 
death in the province in 1892 faced a thankless task. They made mistakes, failed to 
coordinate properly and operated in a structure that restricted their activities to small 
geographic areas, leaving them isolated. Yet every month they issued a greater amount of 
food aid at a consistent level. It was not enough, but perhaps no amount would be. As 
structured, there was simply no way that provincial and uezd institutions, and the ad hoc 
charitable committees, could effectively meet the level of desperate, devastating need 
they found. As Konstantin Arsen’ev noted of those who sought to help in Tambov 
province: ‘[…] even if their numbers increased by a hundred, or a thousand times, it is 
still not enough to meet the level of need’.148 What they could do was their best; securing 
everyone was impossible but by providing aid and stolovye, they could at least prevent 
villages ‘fearing the ghost of starvation’.149 
 
Public order and security  
Despite being a paramount concern of Alexander III’s regime, any potential public order 
and security risks the famine raised did not seem to concern Tambov’s provincial 
authorities in 1892. The main concern was threats to the integrity of the relief effort, to 
which the regime responded by adapting the TPFC as an appeals board. There is no sign 
that the authorities were worried about any threat to law and order; in fact, discussing 
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prisons in the obzor to his annual report for 1892, Governor Rokasovskii simply mentions 
that the province’s jails remained unfortunately cramped but that the quality of food had 
improved.150 The only sign of concern was that several uezd zemstvos hired security for 
their grain warehouses though one uezd uprava was explicitly clear that an insurance 
company required this.151  
Not only were they not concerned, key provincial officials reported not 
dissatisfaction, but a sense of gratitude, throughout the province. Count Bobrinskii told 
the Special Committee that no matter how bad the crisis was in the province, he did not 
encounter any sign of dissatisfaction.152 Instead, all he heard were the ‘prayers of 
thanksgiving’ to the tsar and tsarevich from the peasants, issued with ‘tears in their 
eyes’.153 Vice-governor Choglokov brought up the same theme on his investigation of 
Spassk uezd (which we will look at in the next section); the peasants expressed gratitude 
for the ‘paternalism’ of the government and Tsar in securing them from hunger.154 The 
message fed back to St. Petersburg was the same: the population were (rightly, to the 
officials) deeply grateful for the extraordinary mercy and benevolence from the Tsar, the 
true protector of the people. Count Bobrinskii and Choglokov were playing their part in 
the validation and continuation of Alexander III’s ‘scenario of power’ that portrayed the 
Tsar as close to the people and in tune with their needs.  
This feedback loop, engendered by officials telling St. Petersburg what it wanted 
to hear while also validating their own management abilities, does appear to have some 
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factual basis. However, it seems likely this lack of concern was a misdiagnosis of the 
causes of the population’s relative passivity. The comparative literature on famine 
suggests that as the severity of a crisis intensifies, resistance to authority tends to decrease 
because of physical weakening and a desire not to bite the hand that was feeding them, as 
opposed to gratitude. Modern scholarship has shown that communities affected by famine 
tend to develop coping strategies that do not involve disorder such as food substitution, 
rationing, reducing the numbers of claimants, migration or borrowing money.155 The 
livestock and seed loans covered earlier in this chapter are further examples though these 
tactics often have high long-run costs.156 As James C. Scott has argued, the intersection 
of economic and environmental burdens can make violent resistance inevitable.157 Yet 
the archives seem to indicate only one real act of violent resistance, a land seizure in 
Spassk uezd, which focused on a border dispute with a landowner.158 This case had little, 
if anything, to do with the famine, with the archival record referring to a dispute over an 
1890 agreement allowing peasants to rent the land in question.  
To the peasantry the crisis appeared economic or natural, not the result of state 
policies. In consequence, many, as Robbins suggests, adopted a philosophical ‘The Lord 
gives, the Lord takes’ approach.159 Scott refers to this passive acceptance of an event’s 
occurrence as the ‘subsistence ethic’, with technical and social arrangements made to 
cope with periodic food crises.160 Coping was becoming more important; anecdotal and 
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historical evidence shows that areas such as Siberia used railway expansion to ship grain 
quickly and cheaply around the empire, making provinces like Tambov increasingly 
uncompetitive.161 Whether it was relationships with institutions like the land captain, the 
reformed zemstvo elective curia, or rapid economic change, relative powerlessness within 
the established order was a constant in peasant life. 
The increased sense of ownership that the provincial authorities took of the relief 
effort, through the use of investigations and the adaptation of the TPFC as an appeals 
board, affected the peasantry’s actions and lowered the security risk. The highest rate of 
peasant dissatisfaction, as we saw in Chapter 3, was before aid was handed out in any 
systematic way. Widespread resistance is a moral action and often aims not at overturning 
the existing order but at forcing the authorities to discharge their moral obligations, often 
invoked by reference to paternal norms.162 The enthusiastic uptake of petitions to the 
TPFC and the direct invocation of paternalism in Spassk uezd show that the peasantry 
sought to hold the authorities to what they saw as their end of the social contract. 
Governor Rokasovskii, inspired by his sense of duty and fairness, was perhaps the only 
official to grasp this fact. 
The provincial and imperial authorities were not the only ones to misinterpret the 
crisis and the potential for unrest however. Imperial Russia’s administrative officials and 
revolutionary movements had at least one thing in common: an inability to understand 
properly the psychology and priorities of the peasant. In mid-April 1892, several volosts 
in Kirsanov uezd received an anonymous ‘first letter to the hungry’, bearing Moscow and 
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Kirsanov postmarks and ‘seditious’ contents.163 The aspiring conspirators (unfortunately 
the files provide no information about connections to a wider movement such as the 
populists) addressed the letters to peasants with common names such as Petr Ivanov, 
presumably in the hope that there would be someone there with that name.164 When those 
individuals were not there, the volost’ board opened the letters and immediately informed 
the authorities, again showing the reluctance for broader resistance.165 The appearance of 
the letters caused mild concern; Rokasovskii instructed officials to use all of their 
networks to watch out for more letters, gathering them up immediately while one land 
captain tried to get all mail handed over not to individuals but to volost’ boards for 
screening.166 The affair ended in May with the arrest and conviction of three men, all 
Kirsanov uezd residents, and it seems no further disorders were recorded.167 The 
cooperation of the volost’ authorities shows that the peasantry were not convinced of any 
moral argument to resist the state because of the famine. In fact, as we saw in Chapter 3, 
it led to a clamour for the ‘tsar’s rations’; pressure was placed on authorities to fulfil 
obligations, not to stand down. Once this began to happen on a large scale in 1892, it 
seems that the risk of disorder shrank correspondingly. 
Only perceived threats to the peasantry’s existence from the authorities provoked 
the peasantry to active resistance. Such an example was the cholera outbreak, which 
would reach Tambov province in June and July of 1892. While the cholera riots of Saratov 
province are more famous, Tambov was not free of disorder: there was a mini-riot in 
Abakumov, Tambov uezd, which nearly resulted in the murder of the long-serving 
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zemstvo doctor, A. V. Tsevtaev.168 By the far most serious incident in the province during 
the outbreak, it appears to have necessitated the temporary movement of troops to 
Abakumov to quell the disorder.169 The vast majority of the disorders however, were non-
violent and instead focused on accusations that cholera was deliberately spread by 
officials and doctors to kill the peasantry; it reflects that distrust of the morality of science 
and modernity that was a strong part of peasant culture.170 That rumours and the fear of 
cholera as an existential threat, and not innate resistance, drove violence is shown by 
Abakumov: after an apparently thorough information campaign by the zemstvo doctors 
in Abakumov, resistance died down and there was even a thorough disinfection 
campaign.171  
 
Local relief problems and provincial intervention 
Though decision making was diffused through a number of levels during the second half 
of the famine crisis, local officials did not have total freedom and were obliged to follow 
government decisions (with the uezd upravy required to obey the provincial zemstvo 
assembly).172 This gave Rokasovskii the legislative and moral authority to intervene and 
seek to correct problems as quickly as possible. 
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 Despite his other shortcomings, mostly in long-term planning, Rokasovskii’s 
personal interventions and investigations into the relief effort reveal him as an active, 
hands-on manager who understood well the symbolic power of the governor. Instruments 
and symbols of the tsar’s power, governors projected into the daily lives of a province’s 
population and personal visits or intervention of the governor were regularly used to 
resolve disputes or gather information.173 During the famine, the MVD used imperial 
officials to conduct overall reviews and, sometimes, provoke inactive governors such as 
Governor Poltaratskii in Kazan province into action.174 
Such ‘encouragement’ was not necessary with Governor Rokasovskii. With a 
sense of hierarchy and belief in his viceregal status, he toured Tambov province twice, in 
1891 and 1892, to see how relief operated in the province ‘entrusted’ to him.175 He was 
essentially repeating his earlier practice from 1886 when, as vice-governor in 
Ekaterinoslav province, he had toured two uezds suffering from crop failure; he 
recommended imperial loans and grain transfers from other provinces while heavily 
criticising the response of the Novomoskovsk uezd uprava as ‘too passive’.176 Yet in 
Tambov province, despite the errors and defects, the provincial and uezd upravy were at 
the forefront of the relief operation. Often disagreeing with their estimates (especially on 
cost), Rokasovskii appeared to have faith in their management abilities and the example 
of Ekaterinoslav illustrates that he was willing to intervene directly if necessary. Over the 
course of 1892, this necessity arose several times and in each case it was Rokasovskii, 
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via an official, who acted as the correction mechanism; he turned his concern for 
consistency and compliance, and his status as the Tsar’s symbol, into an effective trouble-
shooting role. 
 
a. Collapse of Trust? Khorvat’s investigation of Tambov uezd 
Trust was essential: the peasantry self-declared need for aid and local officials then 
verified these claims and allocated aid accordingly. This meant trusting officials who 
were not directly accountable to, or distant from, the provincial authorities. ‘Trustworthy’ 
people provided crucial information on the scale of need and it was only ‘trustworthy’ 
people who were authorised to open charitable committees.177 Therefore, the relief effort 
could collapse into chaos or be exploited for personal gain if the officials were not 
‘trustworthy’. As we saw in Chapter 2, the definition of ‘trustworthy’ in Tambov province 
referred to those with close official or economic connections to village societies such as 
land captains, landowners, priests, teachers, doctors and other ‘trustworthy’ persons.178 
Holding one of these positions was no guarantee of conduct however: Rokasovskii had 
to upbraid a Tambov uezd land captain in December 1891 who had apparently refused to 
help inspect aid resolutions and asked he be reminded that this task was a ‘necessity’, 
legally and morally.179 
 On 21 February Governor Rokasovskii asked College Secretary Nikolai Khorvat 
to secretly enquire into the actions of two members of the Tambov uezd zemstvo 
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uprava.180 The allegations concerned potential fraud over prices paid for grain and an 
allegation against uprava member Romantsev for distributing poor quality aid.181 
Rokasovskii asked Khorvat to establish to what extent these rumours were true.182 In 
September 1891 the MVD had raised similar concerns with all governors so it was likely 
that the provincial authorities, especially Rokasovskii, were sensitive to any potential 
evidence of corruption.183  
Khorvat was unable to determine whether the allegations of embezzlement were 
true but he discovered other serious issues, concentrated on where uezd uprava member 
Romantsev had managed the distribution of grain.184 In one volost’, there were complaints 
that the grain handed out in December was poor quality and even that it killed two 
peasants.185 This could not be proven, after a sample was tested, though the grain was 
admixed with grit.186 The uezd zemstvo uprava had to promise higher quality grain from 
January 1892.187 Compounding this, it seems that the oats the volost’ bought for sowing 
had already been sold to an agent of the zemstvo uprava, leaving the peasantry with no 
way to obtain the necessary grain for the next harvest.188  
The evidence for corruption is slim but we can infer at least a significant lack of 
coordination and resource pressure. Also at the start of February the uezd zemstvo 
rejected a request from the uprava to inspect its stores and asserted that the aid issuing 
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operation was going well with high quality grain being issued.189 The peasants rejected 
the appointment of the volost’ starshin, choosing someone else from their own number, 
and refused to buy grain for the zemstvo and took ‘reckless unrealistic behaviour’.190 
Volost’ starshins were often seen as an arm of the government and the peasants were 
reacting to poor quality, infrequent aid. Replacing the starshin was, to them, a pragmatic 
‘coping strategy’ aimed at improving administration and asserting control over their 
community against officials they saw as against them or thoroughly disorganised. Yet on 
paper there was coordination and clear delineation: in early February the uprava and land 
captains divided the relief effort with the uprava providing information and the land 
captains managing efforts on the ground.191 There was a definite detachment between the 
reality of the situation and the uezd zemstvo’s understanding of it: the zemstvo lacked 
either the means or the will to supervise the actions of its own agents, and it took the 
governor to investigate the issue. 
 
b. Aid Abuse in Kirsanov uezd 
If the weakness in Tambov uezd was zemstvo agents, Kirsanov uezd reflected what could 
happen if the zemstvo lost trust in the communities it was supposed to help. In March 
Rokasovskii asked Khorvat to go to Kirsanov and ‘personally verify’ that food aid was 
being handed out correctly in several localities.192 Apparently the Kirsanov uezd zemstvo 
uprava had stopped buying seed grain as several peasants were avoiding compiling 
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resolutions.193 Evasion was a serious issue for the authorities and undermined the 
potential of the relief effort to reach those who needed it.  
Khorvat’s investigation found up to thirty-seven cases of the abuse of aid 
allocation, concentrated in the lists of those deemed eligible for aid.194 Many well-off 
peasants (the word ‘kulak’ was not used by Khorvat), including one who owned a 
warehouse, were receiving aid while others, who were ‘burdened by families and endured 
need’ or who ‘positively had nothing’, were excluded or had been put on the lists but 
never received aid.195 Indeed, in two volosts he found that the village starosta and other 
peasant officials, who should have been excluded, were receiving aid.196 According to 
local officials and landowners, the uprava relied on two lists to allocate loans and was 
also having difficulties purchasing enough grain for the hungry.197 All of this led, in 
Khorvat’s words, to potential trouble for the authorities: ‘Such incorrect allocation of 
loans stirs up discontent from the side of the five people incorrectly left out’.198 It is 
possible to see from this why the Kirsanov uezd zemstvo had stopped issuing aid: they 
were struggling to secure enough grain and could not be sure it would go where it was 
needed. 
  The final say on whether the uezd zemstvo had acted correctly belonged to the 
provincial food conference which, on 30 March 1892, instructed the Kirsanov uezd food 
conference to discuss the findings.199 Despite delays, Kirsanov received Khorvat’s 
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findings in April and discussed them on 11 May.200 The uprava provided a list of each of 
the cases of incorrect allocation found by Khorvat, along with the numbered list each case 
was on, the representative who authorised the loans and, occasionally, the basis for its 
authorisation. A general explanation for the situation was offered by the uezd food 
conference: investigating and compiling the lists of the needy involved the land captain 
and the zemstvo assembly and uprava and that in such a ‘difficult and complex matter’ it 
was ‘inconceivable’ that there would not be mistakes.201 For example, one peasant had 
been awarded aid but this was revoked in February upon further investigation and one 
starosta who received aid did so on agreement from the uprava that it was given to 
peasants in genuine need.202 The lists were apparently constantly verified and updated to 
ensure accuracy and that the majority of cases found by Khorvat were now corrected.203 
The provincial food conference, on 10 June, accepted the declaration of the Kirsanov uezd 
uprava and the food conference as ‘completely valid’ and the resulting decisions 
completely correct.204  
Khorvat’s investigation of Kirsanov, and the zemstvo’s moves to correct the problem, 
illustrates that inspections such as this were employed as a corrective technique. It also 
reveals how the fragmented nature of provincial government meant it was sometimes 
difficult to effectively coordinate and manage a task as complex as crisis response. It 
seems likely that several wealthy and powerful peasants took advantage of the situation; 
complaints about volosts leaders ‘hiding’ aid were not unknown and Rokasovskii 
complained to St. Petersburg about intra-peasant exploitation in general. Despite the 
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various problems and confusion, Kirsanov’s relief effort had not resulted in disunity and 
disagreement between officials.  
 
c. Vice-Governor Choglokov in Spassk uezd 
Unity was an important and recurring theme and would play a big role in another 
investigation, in Spassk.  Through its perceived lack of unity and leadership, it became 
an area of serious concern for the provincial and imperial authorities. Rokasovskii, 
touring the province as a form of personal oversight, told his vice-governor, Aleksandr 
Aleksandrovich Choglokov in mid-March that he found the organisation of the relief in 
Spassk unsatisfactory and that there was ‘insufficient unity in actions between the uezd 
actors’.205 Rokasovskii told St. Petersburg in his annual report for 1892 that the province’s 
institutions were united but clearly this did not always hold true.206 As we have seen 
earlier in this chapter, Spassk lacked a marshal of the nobility and the absence of this 
coordinating figure led to at least a partial disintegration, disagreement and a spike in 
poor quality aid, illustrating how fragile and individual dependent the relief effort was. 
This disintegration and Spassk’s falling away from established procedures was 
front and centre in Rokasovskii’s mind when he toured the uezd. He had instructed 
Spassk’s institutions on how to manage the relief effort but, unable to continue the tour, 
asked Choglokov to visit instead.207 Under the 1890 Zemstvo Statute, the governor had 
the right to impose corrective actions on the zemstvo upravy for ‘incorrect’ management. 
Rokasovskii felt that a ‘personal explanation’ from Choglokov to the uezd’s institutions 
would ‘ensure the lasting establishment of the matter’ in line with the commands of the 
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provincial food conference and welfare committees.208 To ‘strengthen’ the activities of 
the land captains, officials were assigned to each one, mostly drawn from other areas.209 
With no marshal of the nobility to provide the necessary supervision and coordination, it 
is clear that Rokasovskii had decided that the gubernatorial authorities had to step in. The 
appointment of outside officials to assist the land captains indicates a lack of trust and 
confidence in them; the uezd was essentially no longer being trusted to organise its own 
relief effort on a local level.210 Vice-Governor Choglokov, as a representative of the 
governor and thus St. Petersburg, was being sent to remind the uezd’s officials of their 
obligations. 
 Choglokov had visited Spassk for a similar reason before. In December 1891 an 
investigation of potential irregularities in one precinct resulted in instructions to 
undertake a new allocation of loans in the uezd. Choglokov left having impressed the 
need for unity on the land captains, who were the source of the disunity, and having 
secured a commitment to increased cooperation from the uezd zemstvo uprava.211 These 
exhortations had clearly not taken hold and the absence of a marshal of the nobility did 
not help matters. 
Choglokov visited Spassk from 25 March to 2 April, and held a long conference 
with the chair of the uezd zemstvo uprava and the land captains. He does not give many 
details of the meeting, but noted that he pressed upon them that a more ‘uniform’ method 
of welfare was possible.212 The rest of the conference focused on how to allocate the 
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horses being sent to the uezd from St. Petersburg and how to prevent the peasantry from 
simply selling them on.213 The allocation of horses was important as it aimed to greatly 
increase the productive capacity of farms, helping to rebuild the peasant economy. 
Choglokov’s focus on it suggests that the provincial authorities were deeply concerned 
about Spassk’s ability to successfully manage such an undertaking. 
 As in December 1891, Choglokov again went to village assemblies but this time, 
instead of seeking to shore up the authority of the land captains (and therefore the 
government), he used it to supervise them. The zemstvo and the land captains were now 
acting mutually in accordance with Rokasovskii’s actions and commands, and ‘in recent 
time the matter of welfare to the needy was established in the best light and the population 
are secured’.214 The zemstvo and the land captains were now cooperating in verifying 
need and allocating aid (including horses), which was now being distributed quickly and 
correctly.215 Choglokov met more than 200 people and told Rokasovskii that all he 
encountered was gratitude from the peasantry to the government and local administration 
for their care and attention towards them.216 Indeed, several village societies presented 
Choglokov with resolutions of gratitude declaring that they had no requests for the 
governor and were fully secured for aid.217 Indeed, Choglokov noted that three claims he 
received were unfounded and another had already been taken care of.218 
 Spassk’s relief effort was now apparently operating well and had been established 
on the basis of ‘[all] possible fairness, humaneness and complete understanding of the 
                                                 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid. 
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217 The archive contains numerous examples of these resolutions, which often follow a standard format. 
One resolution in Kargashin village, Anaevskoi volost’, selected two peasants to deliver their official thanks 
and was undersigned on behalf of 148 people, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4266, ll. 2-38. 
218 Vice-Governor Choglokov to Rokasovskii, 11 April 1892, GATO, f. 4, op. 1, d. 4265, ll. 422-3. 
274 
 
instructions given’.219 This explicitly connected a fair and compassionate relief effort with 
the instructions of the provincial and imperial authorities. Compliance with these 
instructions, especially those issued from the provincial level, would decrease the level 
of distress in Spassk uezd and make the relief effort fairer. In short, the message was that 
the government had the people’s best interests at heart and the uezd had a moral duty to 
its inhabitants to follow these instructions. 
 
d. Confusion in Sasovskoi volost’  
As we saw in the section on horses, while implementation was relatively easier than 
policy making, it still posed significant problems. As the provincial food conference 
acknowledged in June, it was ‘impossible to avoid mistakes in the difficult inspection of 
the needy peasants’, despite the ‘most thorough inspection’ by land captains.220 One such 
example is Sasovskoi volost’ in Elatomsk uezd where the issue was less official 
capriciousness but a struggle to cope with the chaos the crisis engendered.  
What prompted an investigation into Sasovskoi volost’ is unknown, but on 29 
February, Rokasovskii dispatched a member of his staff, College Secretary Malevinskii 
to inspect the allocation of loans.221 Malevinskii found that most peasants were secure 
and relief allocated correctly but there were some problems.222 It seems the ‘authorities’ 
(presumably the land captain), having ‘the right to direct the issuing of loans’, overruled 
the volost’ elders and included well-off peasants on the aid lists.223 Malevinskii presented 
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the lists in question to the Elatomsk uezd uprava for their review and sent them to 
Rokasovskii for his own inspection.224 
Rokasovskii reacted quickly: on 6 March he informed the Elatomsk uezd uprava 
and revealed that he had personally removed two peasants from the list and added two 
more due to their ‘extreme poverty’.225 There were difficulties in delivering to the villages 
of the volost’ and he instructed the uprava to correct them.226 Rokasovskii’s highlighting 
of the situation and instructing the uprava to correct it was a reasonably standard 
response. What was unusual however was Rokasovskii’s personal adjustment of the aid 
lists; while he commented on the veracity of others, he usually instructed uezd officials 
to correct any issues.  
Not limited to mere instructions, Rokasovskii could, and did, arbitrarily intervene 
to ensure compliance with the law, underscoring the tension between zakonnost’ and 
proizvol in a ‘regulated autocracy’. Rokasovskii went further than his earlier instruction 
by appointing Malevinskii as land captain and manager of food affairs for the precinct.227 
Though this was a radical move, the emphasis on the government’s commitment to 
allocate aid fairly left Rokasovskii with little choice. Unfortunately Rokasovskii was 
unclear on how the problem was to be resolved. Malevinskii noted that ‘without 
instructions I cannot appeal to the peasants’.228 The nachal’nik gubernii could intervene 
but without being clear as to the desired outcome, it could be read as simply more 
confusing arbitrariness.  
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l. 18, ll. 34-5. 
226 Ibid. 
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This arbitrariness, even if justified and in the public interest, could be contested. 
The former land captain wrote to the TPFC and accused a land owner and the TPWC of 
either keeping aid rolls too low or not responding to his requests. 229 The provincial food 
conference did not judge the land captain’s actions, instead simply deciding to ask the 
Elatomsk uezd uprava to explain how these incorrect allocations had taken place.230 
Sasovskoi would continue to feature for less serious reasons but a clear line of 
communication was now open between Malevinskii, Rokasovskii and the uezd uprava.231  
Sasovskoi exposes the limits of the food conference’s oversight role: it had no 
power to compel or command land captains (who answered to the MVD): all it could do 
was ask the zemstvo upravy to explain the situation. There was no institution that had 
responsibility for food security and disciplining land captains. Only the governor and his 
chancellery had at least some powers of oversight over every element so when local 
solutions or discussion failed, it would move in and ‘fill the gaps’. Aware of this, the 
province adapted an ad hoc strategy: manage events at a local level where possible with 
the governor as a last resort mechanism. A messy, complicated and under-resourced 
approach, it demonstrated a level of dynamism, adaptability and pragmatism that was 
ultimately successful. 
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Conclusion 
 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the crisis shook Tambov province to its very 
foundations. Since the province was almost entirely reliant on agriculture, the famine 
made over half the province’s population dependent on some form of aid, official or 
charitable. Accompanying this long-term structural damage was the horrifying human 
cost, not just in mortality, but also in the fear, chaos and hunger caused by the crisis. With 
isolated villages, half the province lacking a connection to the (chaotic) imperial rail 
network, getting aid to those in need was an almost-Herculean task even before the 
fragmented administrative structures, resource shortfall and the shortcomings of the 
officials and their mistakes are taken into account. There were indeed plenty of mistakes, 
such as not detecting the ongoing distress early enough, anticipating sharp price rises, 
originally excluding children from those eligible for aid loans, and the not-infrequent 
paralysis of the institutions charged with making these decisions. 
It is important, however, to be aware of the context we are considering. As 
Robbins notes: ‘Famine does no one honour. Not even the biggest and most effective 
relief campaign can remove the stigma produced by hunger and misery’.1 The pride that 
one can take in famine response is limited; the job of governments is ideally to prevent it, 
especially as their actions can inadvertently or deliberately cause famine. The famine hit 
Tambov province when its capacity to respond was particularly low, with empty stores 
and financial reserves, and a high degree of institutional turnover. Yet by adapting these 
self-same deficient structures, the province coped with these challenges to a certain 
degree: month after month, the level of aid allocated increased and aid guidelines were 
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mostly met or exceeded and while breakdowns in the relief effort occurred, they were 
isolated and responded to by the provincial centre. While mortality in Tambov province 
rose by 22,395, an increase of 29 per cent over 1890-1, this compares to the average of 
28 per cent in affected provinces, and is the second lowest rate of its neighbours, which 
ranged from 19 per cent in Riazan to 55 per cent in Saratov.2 It underscores the stark 
nature of a famine crisis, and given the structural difficulties that faced Russian provinces, 
their response was an achievement. When cholera related deaths are removed from the 
total, Tambov province’s total of 13,317 famine related deaths is lower than any of its 
neighbours except for Tula (again Saratov was the highest).3 Overall then, that this was 
accomplished with poor rail infrastructure, empty financial reserves and grain stores 
means we can declare the relief effort in Tambov province a comparative success and a 
moderate one in absolute terms. 
Interwoven with the above are themes of legal responsibility, tensions between 
zakonnost’ and proizvol, the centre-periphery relationship and its pressures, the notion of 
ad hoc versus formal structures and the importance of individuals and overall structural 
capacity. Crisis response and the concept of ‘province’ itself are deeply complex issues 
and the purpose of this conclusion is to draw these themes, teased out in the preceding 
chapters, into a cohesive whole. The aim here is to show that the relief effort proves that 
provincial administration in the late imperial period was more robust than traditionally 
assumed and that the relief effort helped foster a sense of provincial identity, taking it 
from a cultural sphere to a burgeoning sense of solidarity between administrators and 
those they oversaw. 
While this thesis charts the crisis via the medium of the official relief effort which 
opened in June 1891 and wound down in July 1892, that was not the end of the story. The 
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economic damage caused to the province’s economy and to its food supply system would 
last for several years while the provincial zemstvo developed a plan that would see the 
peasantry repay the imperial loans over ten years. The shockwaves of the crisis extended 
out far, and in order to assess the effectiveness of the relief effort, we need to look at the 
short and medium-term consequences of the famine. This will show that many of the 
same themes, attitudes and approaches were prevalent, indicating that these were not 
simply unique to the relief effort, but indicative of a deeper provincial bureaucratic culture 
owing much to the behavioural practices of the imperial centre. 
Looking at the devastation that the crisis had wreaked in only twelve months, it is 
easy to imagine that, as the uezd and provincial officials contemplated their jurisdictions, 
their mood was one of deep despair. With over six million individual loans issued over 
the course of the crisis, the 1891 harvest reaching only 40 per cent of that of 1889 and 
just under 22,400 dead, the crisis exacted a devastating toll.4 It is not hyperbolic to argue 
that 1892 saw crises of almost biblical proportions: no sooner had the famine relief effort 
begun to wind down when a plague of locusts attacked what few crops there were and 
then a cholera epidemic swept in from neighbouring Saratov.5 The TPWC, in seeking aid 
from the Special Committee to help provide for children orphaned by cholera and to fight 
the disease, wearily remarked that the spread of cholera in the empire ‘forced us to assume 
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that Tambov city and Tambov province are not escaping this new disaster, especially hard 
and heavy this year […]’.6 Fatalism, it seems, was the most infectious condition of all. 
This despair was probably made all the worse by the fact that this was the result 
achieved with over 10 million roubles from the imperial treasury; the potential outcome 
had that money not been granted is hard to contemplate. While the relief effort was 
obviously the result of a whole government approach, it is possible to see how Tsar 
Alexander III’s personal convictions had a positive impact on the relief effort. His well-
known disdain for system and regulation perhaps made it easier for the imperial 
government, in the words of a member of the Tambov provincial zemstvo assembly, ‘to 
make a number of deviations from the requirements of strict formal legality’.7 As all 
legality emanated ultimately from the tsar, it was his to uphold or deviate from as 
circumstances required. Small wonder then that an address of thanks from the provincial 
zemstvo assembly thanked him for saving the peasantry from ruin and even thanked 
divine providence for having him as tsar during the crisis (Alexander’s annotation, ‘very 
pleased!’ was communicated back to the province).8  
All of this, however, contrasted with the efforts of Governor Rokasovskii to create 
a positive or self-congratulatory image out of the chaos and suffering. Seemingly drawing 
upon that powerful image of the peasant as a strong character who bore suffering in 
silence, he remarked in his 1892 annual report that the province ‘survived the disaster 
comparatively easily and without special consequences’, and that the peasantry would 
recover by themselves, a theme picked up in the following year’s obzor of the province.9 
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This notion of the famine as merely a temporary disturbance, though undoubtedly a severe 
one, has some merit to it, notably in the fact that the imperial treasury and other 
macroeconomic measures such as the financial system and consumer demand, recovered 
quickly throughout the empire.10  
Yet Rokasovskii’s later confidence looks more like a tactic, aimed at ensuring St. 
Petersburg that things were returning to normal under his watch. In August 1892, 
Rokasovskii again played the loyal, fiscally conscious governor, ‘coerced’ out of a sense 
of duty to ask for more for the province. He assured the MVD he was fully aware how 
important it was to restore a ‘normal situation’ in the province and he accepted that there 
needed to be a ‘struggle with the population’s custom to depend on aid from the 
government, zemstvo and welfare’.11 Nevertheless, there was a need for ‘energetic 
measures’ to secure the food needs for the population and he found it a ‘duty’ to support 
the provincial zemstvo’s request for an additional 356,000 roubles.12 The MVD quickly 
rejected this but offered 100,000 roubles as a compromise; once again, while we might 
baulk at the language used about the peasantry, Rokasovskii had secured a deal for the 
province.13 The scale of the request, meanwhile, illustrates that the province was not 
returning to a ‘normal situation’. 
In fact, evidence suggests that despite Rokasovskii’s later denials and 
reassurances, Tambov province would feel the effects of the crisis for several years. An 
additional request for 497,000 roubles was made (and rejected) in 1893 while in 1894 the 
provincial zemstvo was worried about a ‘significant decline’ in the province’s agricultural 
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development and, ‘despite all efforts of the administration’, it was impossible, as a direct 
result of the 1891-2 crisis, to assess food security as sufficiently secured.14 Forced to use 
the highest grain price over the previous ten years when seeking to convert grain store 
reserves into cash, in 1897 the provincial zemstvo asked for permission to exclude 1891 
and 1892, due to their distortive effect.15 Indeed, the governor’s obzor for 1897 noted that 
that year’s crop failure was especially hard for the peasantry as they have ‘not yet fully 
recovered from the disastrous consequences of the crop failure of 1891’.16 Thus, 
Rokasovskii was telling St. Petersburg what it wanted to hear and avoiding the blunt truth 
that the road to stability was not short.  
Even in a state or province equipped with gifted administrators, an efficient 
administrative structure and deeply advantageous weather conditions, a virtually 
instantaneous recovery from such a devastating crisis would have been extraordinarily 
difficult. This then leads us to the issue of what was possible. As we have suggested 
throughout this thesis, the issue of the uezd and provincial institutions’ capacity is crucial 
here. Any measure of success must be relative since to impose an absolute metric would 
be anachronistic. With the province economically devastated and every level of the food 
security system, from the volost’ level grain stores to the provincial food financial capital, 
virtually exhausted, the options open to the province were limited in the extreme, 
especially as the MVD issued instructions on the repayment of the imperial loans in 
July.17 Before looking at the broader lessons we can take from the famine crisis and 
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Obzor Tambovskoi gubernii za 1894 god: Prilozhenie k vsepoddanneishemu otchetu Tambovskogo 
gubernatora (Tambov: Tipografiia Gubernskogo Pravleniia, 1895), p. 1, p. 15. 
15 Sbornik postanovlenii Tambovskogo gubernskogo zemskogo sobraniia za 1895 – 1906 (Tambov: 
Tambovskaia gubernskaia zemskaia uprava, 1906), ed. V. I. Manotskov, t. 3, p. 406, Svod Zakonov 
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Tambov province’s response to it, we should briefly consider the issue of repaying the 
loans. 
As if coming full circle, the institutional architecture created for the relief effort 
to issue grain to the peasantry was now quickly re-purposed to take grain from them. A 
brief examination of this inversion of the relief effort’s original purpose reveals the 
vitality of the structures. Illustrating that they were a fundamental part of imperial 
governing culture, the themes of decentralisation, provincial adaptation and centrally 
imposed individualised authority are again apparent. To lower the burden on the 
peasantry, the MVD agreed that loans should be repaid on a pud-for-pud basis instead of 
the cash value while the TPFC again embraced decentralisation, mandating that each uezd 
establish a network of food stores under the control of the uezd food conferences.18 The 
strain between the centre and the periphery remained: the MVD appointed Lieutenant-
General Tseimern to oversee the collection and distribution of repaid grain while the 
provincial and uezd zemstvos pushed for debts to be tied to individuals rather than village 
societies and sought to set the repayment period at ten years.19 Operationally, the 
repayment operation was the inverse of the relief effort but the values and approaches that 
maintained it were the same. Once again, the province responded to an instruction from 
the centre by constructing an approach, based on a constructed sense of provincial 
identity, that involved policy making at the provincial centre and localised execution. 
The fact that the approach of the relief effort and the repayment operation were 
almost identical is no accident and was not just the result of their close temporal 
proximity. One of the contributions this thesis has made is to show that these approaches 
were a result of the interactions between the more established official identity and an 
                                                 
18 MVD Circular No. 7156 26 July 1892 and Minutes of the TPFC 8 August 1892 in Zhurnaly Tambovskogo 
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emerging provincial identity (an identity the crisis helped to develop). It was the 
development of legality in the nineteenth century and its often-fraught relationship with 
the autocratic notion of reserved legality and individualised authority that would create 
the space for these interactions to take place and develop. As the governing myth of the 
autocracy became ever closer tied with the notion that the tsar, and his government, were 
responsible for efficient, rational and reliable administration, this created new 
expectations within the provinces. If ‘good government’ was now a key legitimising 
element of the autocracy, then provinces could expect that many of the abuses of the past 
would be reversed or, at least, mitigated.  
A fundamental tension developed between the imperial centre and the periphery 
on how the empire was to be governed. Complicating this even further were conflicts 
within each of these two visions: an imperial one focused on centralisation and a 
provincial one that emphasised local initiative within the autocratic context. To the 
imperial centre, the notion of a rational administration meant centralisation and 
integration; if abuses took place within the province then they were to be suborned to the 
centre and fully integrated into its administrative structure, as we saw in Chapter 1. 
Provinces were, in some ways, inherently untrustworthy; away from the supposedly 
watchful eye of the centre, ‘uncultured’ local elites would seek to exploit whatever and 
whenever they could. The disdain with which Polovtsev and Count Bobrinskii, both 
officials with careers wholly based in the imperial centre, held Rokasovskii and Durnovo 
is an example of this. Their service was entirely provincial and there appears to have been 
a psychological barrier between them and central officials. One need mention only the 
flippant, browbeating attitude shown by A. G. Vishniakov when he held a conference 
with the various provincial and uezd officials in Tambov in July 1891. Thus, control and 
integration were key tools to ensure that the government achieved its aims (in a sign of 
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‘regulatory capture’, even Durnovo attempted this integration). However, the methods 
used to achieve this reveal the complexities within this integrationist approach. 
 Despite the development of a desire for a rational administration, the autocracy 
could not fully uncouple itself from its key ideological conception that rule by a single 
individual was the best model for Russia. This led to governors who were simultaneously 
viceroys of the tsar, provincial managers and, increasingly, provincial cogs within the 
wider MVD machine. As we saw in Chapters 1, 2 and 4, Governor Rokasovskii was 
frequently torn between his duties to the imperial centre (especially the treasury) and his 
responsibilities to provincial welfare. Frequently during the relief effort he sought to 
satisfy both by, for example, asking how much Tambov could expect in loans to ensure 
moderate expenses while also trying to provide the province with an overall strategic 
framework and certainty. That many of these tensions derived from the same statute is 
not a coincidence; as the centre tried to balance two competing ideologies, these became 
bound up in legislation and affected the governance of the provinces. The land captains, 
only introduced in Tambov province in the month before the crops failed, are another 
strong example of this conflict. The ‘counter reforms’ were not inherently reactionary; 
they are better understood as a conservative method of ensuring ‘good government’. By 
granting broad discretionary power, within an increasingly regularised framework, the 
regime of Tsar Alexander III attempted to mesh the continued desire for a regularised 
administration with the belief that only broad individualised authority, a miniature tsar in 
other words, could deliver this. It was not fatally flawed or the narrow illiberal measure 
of historiography but it was a belief riven with contradictions, a by now frequent refrain 
of this thesis.  
 As the centre struggled to define, and then impose, its version of ‘good 
government’, the same debate was happening within the provinces, with profoundly 
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different effects. The centre believed that, ideally, the system should work from the top 
down, with St. Petersburg determining the law and operational framework while the 
provinces simply executed central commands with some allowances made for local 
circumstances. As the nineteenth century moved on, the provinces began to articulate a 
new vision, one that gradually pushed and tested the one emanating from St. Petersburg 
without, it is important to stress, straying into political resistance. This vision was based 
on practice and innovation; the provinces would take the centrally designed framework 
and altered them to meet local needs. Where the framework or law fell short, they would 
often ‘fill the gap’ or rely on the fact that the law did not specifically prohibit a measure 
to take it. The resistance by Tambov province to several provisions of the 1889 Food 
Security Statute and its strategic inversion of the central emphasis of statistics and 
administrative linkages show how this was becoming common practice. While the 
province pushed back against only one specific article of the food security law on paper, 
the move was based around the law’s conception of famine relief as an economic matter.  
Throughout the crisis, this theme of provincial innovation is a frequent one: 
through Governor Baranov, Nizhnii Novgorod created new institutions while Tambov 
province adapted these and existing structures and laws to meet its own particular 
circumstances. The crisis helped further develop a dialogue between the centre and the 
periphery that left autocratic legitimacy unchallenged but instead questioned specific 
decisions. The zemstvos and Governor Rokasovskii remained steadfastly loyal to the tsar 
throughout but interpreted their tsar-given responsibility, to protect the province, 
differently. As ‘good governance’ became a more important part of the way in which the 
imperial regime thought of itself, this rhetoric was internalised by the provinces and fed 
into their actions. Combined with a provincial identity based on lived experience, the 
famine sharpened this debate: who would know better how to deal with the crisis than 
those living through it? We should, of course, acknowledge that St. Petersburg learned 
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this lesson relatively early and sought to give the provincial zemstvos broad latitude in 
handling the relief effort, partially to avoid politicisation which could have threatened 
effectiveness.20 Overall, what was at issue in these debates was not a struggle for political 
control, but how best to implement the same vision. 
 While the relief effort saw the integration and meshing of these two interpretations 
of ‘good governance’, on balance the approach adopted by Tambov province emerged as 
the stronger voice. As political debate and indecision hampered the ability and desire of 
the MVD to take full control, the way was clear for the provinces to step into the resultant 
vacuum. MVD imposed structures, such as the provincial food conferences, or ones 
supported by the centre, such as the provincial welfare committee, were provincial 
innovations. They were ad hoc, extraordinary institutions that the centre took from one 
province and imposed upon others. However, they comprised provincial figures, even if 
several of these were provincial agents of imperial departments. This presented an 
opportunity, taken up with considerable vigour by Tambov province, to integrate this 
structure into the relief effort and to adapt it considerably as the crisis progressed.  
 This ability, and desire, to adapt leads us to look at the nature of provincial 
innovation and the specific responses it engendered. Sometimes a direct reaction to 
imperial decisions or legislation, sometimes an attempt to fill those gaps exposed by 
circumstances, the provincial ‘voice’ was, however, shaped by the culture and attitudes 
of the centre. In managing the relief effort, Tambov’s provincial institutions often used 
the same language and approaches that the imperial centre used with the provinces. This 
makes the case for a specific imperial bureaucratic culture that was transmitted from the 
centre to the periphery. This is reflected in the way that the various institutions in Tambov 
province related to each other during the crisis. Provincial institutions such as the TPFC 
                                                 
20 Robbins, Famine in Russia, p. 175. 
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and the provincial zemstvo may have acted as key determiners of policy. Yet, because 
they lacked both resources and infrastructure, the execution of policy had to be given over 
to the uezds out of necessity. Via Governor Rokasovskii’s recommendation that each 
province establish an uezd food conference, the TPFC imposed institutions on the 
province. The same dialogue we saw between St Petersburg and Tambov, in which there 
was a contest over who was best placed to understand and shape the relief effort, was 
replicated between the provincial centre and the uezds. There was also a reliance on the 
almost interminable culture of review and report, where the process of gathering 
information often took the place of decision-making. The values of St. Petersburg and the 
province were therefore not so different; within each there was a conscious construction 
of a ‘centre’ and a ‘periphery’ with one determining policy and the other tasked with 
execution. There was a consistent emphasis throughout on the need for each level to 
adhere to provincially decided policies yet there was also push back from the uezds or 
several decisions. Compliance and integration also emerge as parallel values; the disunity 
discovered in Spassk uezd and certain volosts sparked full-scale investigations. The 
adaptation of the TPFC into a board of appeal provided a dynamic, peasant-focused 
response to the same issue, explicitly designed to meet peasant concerns while 
maintaining relatively close supervision over the officials on the ground who might 
otherwise have remained poorly managed. 
 The lack of formal administrative control reveals two final, important themes: 
fragmented structures and the role of individuals. There is little doubt that the structure 
of provincial administration was not fit for purpose. It was disjointed, fragmented and 
often sacrificed efficiency and common sense in the name of political stability; making 
uezd zemstvos responsible for the grain stores in volosts in which they were forbidden to 
organise is a case in point. The 1889 Food Security Statute, and the legal duties of the 
governor, prioritised the operation of a free market and threatened to distort the supply of 
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grain; if relief was to be purely market led, grain would simply leave the affected 
provinces as the peasantry could no longer afford it. That, as we saw in Chapter 5, is 
exactly what happened. The lines of communication were unclear and often weak; who 
did a land captain report to on food security, the uezd zemstvo, the Governor, the MVD 
or all three? The zemstvos, who bore the main responsibility for food security, suffered 
from a number of serious failings. Chief among them was the general decision making 
process; meeting only once a year they were utterly dependent on their two standing 
bodies, the reporting commission and the uprava. When these failed, the result was often 
paralysis. The simple fact is that the structures were neither sufficiently connected nor 
robust enough to manage the relief effort automatically. 
 This structural vacuum put considerable pressure on the officials as individuals, 
pressure that not all of them lived up to. From the land captain who refused to inspect 
resolutions to the almost constant disorder and chaos in Spassk uezd, there are plenty of 
examples of abdication of responsibility. However, there are examples such as Aleksandr 
Novikov who went far beyond the minimum expected of a land captain to help those in 
need. While, overall, this thesis has shown that the majority of officials approached their 
job with a sense of responsibility and diligence, what is ultimately more important is this 
interplay between a weak, fragmented structure and individualism. What an individual 
chose to do often had a profound effect; if Governor Rokasovskii had not used the TPFC 
as an appeals board, would public order have been of greater concern?  Here was a man 
with a profound impact; he made short-term decisions with negative longer-term 
consequences but his hands-on management style and insistence on fairness and 
compliance while recognising the need for decentralisation arguably allowed the relief 
effort some of the flexibility and strength it needed.  
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Privileging individualised authority via the marshals of the nobility and the land 
captains, there was a degree of arbitrariness built in to the response, as Chapters 3 and 5 
showed. Authority was individualised almost as a result of the increasing reach by the 
state into the village; with too many responsibilities and not enough time or structural 
support to execute them, Tambov’s officials had to make difficult choices, often on their 
own. Recognising this, they attempted to reduce the potential for negative arbitrariness 
either by using these self-same structures or leveraging the traditional status and power 
of their position.   
This then, was the tangled and complicated network that made up Tambov 
province. It shared many characteristics with other provinces at least in administrative 
terms. Isolated and compartmentalised, the various institutions also overlapped each other 
in many ways, a situation that was not tenable even outside a crisis. Into this were placed 
individuals and the interaction between them had a significant impact. Provinces, 
however, were not just identikit administrative structures where the defining feature was 
simply different individuals. As we saw in the profiles of provincial figures on Chapter 
1, members of the provincial and uezd assemblies were often key players in the social 
and cultural life of the province (such as Boris Chicherin) and also funded key elements 
of the social infrastructure (such as Lev Vysheslavtsev’s family and Aleksandr Novikov), 
showing that cultural and administrative identities overlapped and intertwined. The 
primary sources used here are predominantly administrative in nature but, as Evtuhov 
argues, provincial identity was more than just cities outside the two capitals having 
theatres and newspapers.21 
At the beginning of this thesis, we defined ‘provincial identity’ as a moral 
responsibility to Tambov’s population and a sense of initiative in the face of crisis and it 
                                                 
21 Evtuhov, Portrait of a Russian Province, p. 246. 
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is clear that the relief effort fostered the development and construction of this sense of 
provincial identity. While the crisis did not fully break down the social divisions between 
officials and peasantry, it did subtly change the way in which these divisions manifested 
themselves. From the provincial zemstvo seeking to bind all elements of the 
administrative structure together in a common legal responsibility, to declarations from 
the Borisoglebsk Agricultural Society on inaction threatening the population, to the use 
by uezd zemstvos of the term ‘exports’ when banning grain sales outside the province 
and the TPWC’s determination to hold on to ‘local’ donations for ‘local needs’, the crisis 
helped crystallise and develop the issue of provincial identity by forcing provincial and 
uezd officials to engage with the question of who they served and why. Social barriers 
had by no means broken down completely, but the response to the famine signalled that 
the peasantry had to be helped on terms that, as far as possible, met their needs: not just 
from genuine humanitarian concern but because they were Tambov’s population. It also 
forced these officials to address how they served the population. As we have seen in this 
conclusion and throughout this thesis, the answer to this was through a limited, if growing, 
degree of innovation. When St. Petersburg had established no policies for a specific 
situation or had failed to respond, Tambov’s officials used a combination of pressure on 
St. Petersburg and filling in the gaps to address it. A full, long term view of the 
development of provincial identity in Tambov province as a result of the crisis is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but there are some signs that this subtle culture shift was long 
lasting. The impact of the 1897 crop failure was minimised as the province, likely scarred 
by the empty stores of 1891-92, had land captains personally ensure that the peasantry 
fulfilled their obligations to deposit (good quality) grain into the stores.22 When famine 
came calling again, in 1918-21, Tambov province’s initial response was to deviate 
                                                 
22 Obzor Tambovskoi gubernii za 1897 god, p. 15. 
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considerably from the centre’s policies as they did not fit local needs.23 Whatever the 
nature of the regime that ruled in the capital, Tambov province, post-1891, defaulted to 
an approach that prioritised locally sourced solutions; ‘provincial identity’ had taken root 
in food security policy at least. 
To conclude, the relief effort in Tambov province was often ad hoc, chaotic and 
vulnerable. Conflict, competition and confusion between various individuals often held 
back the relief effort while it is arguable that there was too much variation between the 
uezds. Robbins takes this view of provincial relief in general, arguing that a ‘famine 
dictator’ could have prevented these tensions.24 This ignores the fact, however, that this 
was never a possibility and retroactively imposes an idealised type on the provinces. This 
thesis has shown that Tambov province was a dynamic and evolving place whose 
administration was far from static. Despite its many failings, the uezd and provincial 
officials had no choice but to use the tools to hand. Subject to their own faults and failings, 
these officials managed the best they could. From an artificial boundary drawn on a map, 
Tambov province had evolved into having its own unique, lived variation of Russian 
culture; the relief effort was not just an administrative response, it was a human, local 
one. 
                                                 
23 Dugarm, ‘Local politics’. 
24 Ibid. 
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